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INTRODUCTION 
This is a sociological study of conflict in Jammu & Kashmir, one of the 
northern and hilly states of India. The conflict is popularly known as ' 
Kashmir conflict. Kashmir conflict is not merely of national importance 
but it is also of International significance. This is because of the fact 
that the parties involved in the conflict are not merely Kashmiri 
nationality especially Muslims and state of India but Pakistan is also a 
party to the conflict due to historical and geographical factors. Issue 
of transfer of land to Pakistan or right of principalities to either opt 
India and Pakistan at the time of Partition of India has brought 
Pakistan and United Nations organization into this conflict. 
Furthermore, India and Pakistan have fought three battles on the 
issue of conflict and, therefore, superpowers of the world and 
International organizations have directly or indirectly involved in the 
conflict in order to maintain peace in the subcontinent. The conflict 
does not merely involve right of self-determination of people, 
international law and international relation but also is a product of 
various socio-historical factors. In short, it is the conflict having 
multiple factors may aptly be referred as protracted ethnic conflict. 
Although the conflict has long history, it has flared up and assumed 
violent form since 1989. Militant struggle has increased manifold in 
the Kashmir-Valley. In order to combat growing militancy in the valley, 
government of India has resorted to the use of extensive military 
power. In the struggle between militant and military of India life in 
Kashmir has paralyzed, human rights are violated, children have 
become orphans, women are raped, number of widows have 
increased. In nutshell, there are innumerable incidents and stories of 
human suffering and agony. 
It is because of large-scale violence in the state of Jammu & Kashmir 
since 1989 large number of scholars, Journalists and social activists 
have written over the causes, consequences and resolution of the 
Kashmir conflict. Everyday one could find some kind of writings in 
newspapers and reports on television about the conflict. But most of 
this literature is either impressionistic or motivated. Very few 
researches have been conducted to find out the causes and 
consequences of the conflict and suggest some convenient strategy 
of its resolution. Moreover available researches are conducted mostly 
from the perspective of political science. Indeed, no known 
sociological study of the conflict is available. It is, therefore, we have 
selected this area for our study. 
We have designed this study in a manner as it gives information from 
macro to micro level. The study is organized into five chapters. 
First chapter deals with review of theoretical literature related to 
conflict and conflict resolution. This chapter consists of two sections. 
The first section introduces a brief sketch of sociological perspectives 
for understanding conflict in the social context. These perspectives 
are dialectical and functional. Scholars belonging to both schools of 
thought are unanimous in their thinking that conflict is a universal 
phenomenon and its causes lie in social structure. However, over 
causes and consequences of conflict differences exist among the 
sociologists. Apart from perspectives meaning, classification, sources 
and consequences, of social conflict are other prominent issues of 
this section. Our aim in this section, thus, remained not only to find 
out the differences or similarities between the perspectives but also to 
evolve a theoretical framework for the study. 
The second part of the chapter provides a brief account of conflict 
resolution and approaches related to it. Conflict resolution aims at 
addressing and removal of those factors, which cause conflict. This 
section ends by suggesting the viability of non-governmental 
approaches like track two diplomacy and multi-track diplomacy for 
resolving protracted ethnic conflict in Kashmir. 
Second chapter also consists of two sections, the first section is 
concerned with portraying the setting in which the conflict occurs. It 
depicts briefly the area and location, physiography, population and 
communities and linguistic distribution of the state. Moreover, it gives 
brief information related to the history, economy and cultural of the 
state. The main reason to review this section is to gain familiarity with 
the setting in which conflict persists. Another reason is to explore the 
socio-historical roots of the conflict. 
The second section of this chapter gives a brief account of research 
design and stages of the study. It also informs us about the 
formulation of Interview-schedule, respondents their number, 
religious and regional affiliations. Problems faced by researcher 
during fieldwork, aims and relevance of the study has also been 
discussed under separate headings. 
Chapter third deals with review of literature about Kashmir conflict. It 
shows that in Kashmir conflict both exogenous and endogenous 
sources are involved. These exogenous factors are related with 
hostile relationship between India and Pakistan as well as ineffective 
role of UNO (United nations organization) in mediating the conflict or 
conducting plebiscite in Kashmir. All these exogenous factors are 
explained under the broad sub-heading of International dimension or 
exogenous sources. 
There are some internal factors, which appear to be responsible for 
the emergence and persistence of the conflict. These factors are 
related with politics in Kashmir since 1947, economic conditions of 
people, ethnic diversity of the state and role of religion in fomenting 
the conflict. These factors are explained separately under the broad 
sub-heading of national dimension of the conflict or endogenous 
sources. 
Chapter four is concerned with analysis of various factors political, 
economic, ethnic and religious, which became responsible for 
promoting and sustaining the conflict. Data related to these factors 
were collected during the fieldwork. Our main aim in this chapter is to 
explore the connection between Kashmir conflict and various factors-
political economic, religious and ethnic. And also to identify the major 
factor/s involved in the conflict. 
The chapter number five deals with analysis of data related with 
consequences and resolution of the ongoing conflict in Jammu & 
Kashmir. The first part of this chapter highlights consequences that 
Kashmir conflict has thrown over politics, economic prosperity, 
education, family and marriage organization, Kashmiryat-syncretic 
cultural identity which cements religious communities together there, 
rights and liberties of the people. Our main objective in this section, 
thus, remained to assess what extent the ongoing conflict in the state 
has effected/influenced the social structure of various religious 
communities there. Second part of the chapter describes the design 
and desirability of various conflict resolution models as suggested by 
different scholars regarding the peaceful resolution of Jammu & 
Kashmir conflict. Moreover, various models of conflict resolution (see 
Q. no. 37-48 in the Interview-schedule) over which we have collected 
empirical data have been analyzed also. Our aim of analyzing these 
models is to explore their potential for peaceful resolution of Jammu 
& Kashmir conflict among the people who belong to various ethno-
religious communities in the state. 
This is an exploratory study for which we have selected descriptive 
research design. The research was carried out in three different 
regions of Jammu & Kashmir-Kashmir valley, Jammu and Ladakh. 
For securing information from respondents Interview-schedule was 
used. It contains questions related to causes, consequences and 
resolution of Jammu & Kashmir conflict. Some case studies have 
been recorded in order to substantiate the findings derived in the 
analysis of data. 
WE have selected 310 respondents. Out of 310, 170 respondents 
were selected from Kashmir-region, 110 from Jammu, and 30 from 
Ladakh, respectively. 
Following this, we have focused upon religious communities. That is, 
in region-Kashmir out of 170, 140 respondents were selected 
purposively from Muslims, 20 from Hindus and 10 from Sikhs, 
respectively. 
In Jammu-region out of 110, 50 respondents each were selected 
from Hindus and Muslims. 10 respondents were chosen from Sikh 
community. 
While, in the region of Ladakh out of 30, 15 respondents each were 
selected from Buddhist and Muslim religious communities. 
It is important to mention that for making the selection of respondent's 
population of each study region and proportion of religious 
communities in the regions were taken into consideration. 
Being an exploratory study our aim is to explore causes, and 
consequences of the conflict as well as to find out view of people 
about the way in which conflict is resolved. 
Although we have not formulated any specific hypothesis for the 
study, it gives information about the factors, which are important for 
persistence of Kashmir conflict. Moreover, our aim is to find out 
consequences of the conflict for nation in general and Jammu & 
Kashmir, especially Muslims, in particular. Since no sociological study 
on Kashmir conflict is available we hope this study would fill up the 
gap in sociological literature on the conflict. Because a look at the 
sociological and anthropological literature on conflict, reveal 
sociologists in India have largely ignored conflict studies. This is 
perhaps one of the reasons why conflict tradition could not flourish in 
Indian sociology. Past few decades too have shown that research 
interest has got focused on ethnic conflicts in northeastern context 
than on Kashmir conflict. Moreover, due to paucity of sociological 
studies on Kashmir conflict various stereotypes related to Kashmir 
conflict have got wide currency. These stereotypes surrounding the 
conflict would be certainly demolished by this study. In fact these 
stereotypes have largely underrated the role of sociological factors 
and political also in promoting conflict in the state. Its relevance 
would be generating data related with various aspects of the conflict. 
These data would certainly be useful for researchers and those who 
theorize about the conflict without having sufficient empirical data. 
Moreover, information gained from the study would also be fruitful to 
persons who are in pursuit of resolving the conflict peacefully. 
CHAPTER-I 
Dynamics of Conflict 
Co-operation and conflict are the two important characteristics of 
every society. Conflict exists even in those societies, which are small, 
homogenous and cohesive. In fact, conflict is a universal 
phenomenon. It is inevitable and one of the important sources of 
social change. Social conflict emerges in a society due to various 
reasons or factors and is of different forms. Sociologists have 
explained causes and consequences of social conflict in different 
ways. No doubt, there is a conflict theory in sociology but it is 
advocated by sociologists of different schools of thought. Karl Marx, 
Ralf Dahrendorf, George Simmel and Lewis A. Coser are four main 
advocates of conflict theory. However, many differences of 
understanding and explanation exist among them. 
1.a Sociological Perspectives On Conflict 
A sociological perspective is a set of ideas, which understands and 
explains social phenomenon in its context. As the understanding of 
social phenomena differ from society to society and within a society 
from individual to individual belonging to different social classes or 
groups, multiplicity of sociological perspectives is inevitable. 
Functionalism, Marxism or conflict theory is some of the major 
perspectives in sociology. Every perspective explains social conflict in 
its own way. However, Marxism, functionalism and conflict theory are 
major perspectives in the area of social conflict. 
Conflict theory has its roots in Marxian perspective, which adopts 
dialectical method for explaining social reality. Therefore, Karl Marx is 
an important thinker who considers social conflict as a driving force of 
society^. 
1.a.1. Dialectical Perspective: 
It would be appropriate here to explain the concept of dialectics. 
According to G. Ritzer, American sociologist, dialectics is both a way 
of thinking and an image of the world that stresses the importance of 
processes, relations, dynamics, conflicts and contractions - dynamic 
rather than a static way of thinking. At the most general level, a 
dialectical perspective means a focus on the social totality^. 
Dialectical method of inquiry was borrowed by Karl Marx from 
German philosopher-George Hegel. For Hegel changes occur in 
society due to changes in ideas. And, changes in ideas occur 
because of contradiction or clash and conflict of ideas. This theory of 
ideational dialectics of Hegel was borrowed by Karl Marx but replaced 
the word idea with matter. So changes in society, according to Karl 
Marx, occur due to clash or conflict of material forces or interests. 
Therefore, his theory is known as dialectical materialism or Historical 
materialism. In the context of social life Marx used this perspective in 
his class-conflict theory^. 
Marx views conflict ubiquitous and inevitable in society. He says that 
permanent order and integration is not possible in a society, which is 
based on class structure, inequality and exploitation. So long as 
personal property and classes exist there will be conflict between 
have's and have not's over the distribution of wealth or material 
interests. Conflict, for Marx, is not a goal but a means to achieve an 
integrated social structure. 
In class conflict theory Marx holds that the economic organization 
especially the ownership of property determines the organization of 
the rest of a society, the class-structure and the institutional 
arrangements like polity, religion, law etc; are actually the reflection of 
the economic base of a society. According to Marx inherent In the 
economic organization of any society except communist society are 
forces inevitably generating revolutionary class conflict. Therefore, for 
Marx the source of conflict in a society lies in its infrastructure or the 
economic base of a society, where the unequal distribution of 
property and power initiates a sequence of events leading to 
revolutionary class-conflict. Such revolutionary class conflict is seen 
as bipolar, dialectical as well as occurring in periods, with successive 
basis of economic organization sowing the seeds of their own 
destruction through the polarization of classes and subsequent 
overthrow of the dominant class by the subjugated and the system is 
changed. 
J.H. Turner, sociologist, in his book The Structure of Sociological 
Theory (1995) says that the Marx's "class conflict model" has been 
influential in the development of modern conflict theory - which has 
been most frequently used by contemporary theorists. He has 
formulated certain propositions given by Marx, which are as follows: 
1) The more unequal is the distribution of scarce resources in 
a system, the greater is the conflict of interest between 
dominant and subordinate groups in a system 
2) The more subordinate segments become aware of their true 
collective interests, the more likely are they to question the 
legitimacy of the existing pattern of distribution of scarce 
resources. The subordinate segments become aware when 
they communicate their grievances to each other, develop 
unifying ideologies and when the dominant segment of the 
society bring social changes which disrupt existing relations 
among subordinates as well as create alien native 
dispositions among them. 
3) The greater is the ideological unification of members of 
subordinate segments of a system and the more developed 
is their political leadership structure, the more likely are 
dominant and subjugated segments of a system to become 
polarized. 
4) The more polarized are the dominant and the subjugated; the 
more violent is their conflict. 
5) The more violent is the conflict, the greater is the structural 
change of the system and the greater is the redistribution of 
scarce resources^. 
Another important sociologist who is famous for theorizing on social conflict 
is Ralf Dahrendorf. Although Dahrendorf uses same method, dialectical, as 
was used by Karl Marx. Like Marx, he (Dahrendorf) thinks agreement and 
stability of a system is cut off from reality. 
Dahrendorf holds that conflict is a social reality. The role of compulsion is 
more important than that of consensus in the unity of social structure. Thus, 
he argues that one-sided conflict model be substituted for the one-sided 
functional model. The model that emerges from his theoretical calling is a 
dialectical-conflict perspective^. He views contemporary post-capitalistic 
society as a plurality of relatively discreet "Imperatively Coordinated 
Associations" (ICA's). Each association (ICA) is composed of two groups 
one in authority and other out of it. There has been conflict over authority 
between these two groups. When their interests are latent, they are quasi-
groups; when their interests become manifest, they are interest groups. 
Accordingly to Dahrendroff, under certain specified conditions, ICA's 
polarize into two conflict groups, which then engage in a contest over 
authority. The resolution of this contest or conflict involves the redistribution 
of authority in the ICA, thus making conflict the source of change in social 
systems. In turn, the redistribution of authority represents the 
institutionalisation of a new cluster of ruling and ruled ones that under 
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certain conditions polarize into two interest groups. Social reality is thus 
typified in terms of this unending cycle of conflict over authority within the 
various types of ICA's comprising the social world. Therefore, for 
Dahrendorf, the dynamics of conflict lies in the institutionalized authority 
relations of ICA's®. 
Some of the Dahrendorf s key propositions on conflict are as follows: 
1. The more members of quasi-groups in ICA's can become 
aware of their objective interests and form a conflict group, 
the more likely is conflict to occur. 
(a) The more the technical conditions of organization can 
be met (like leadership cadre and charter) the more 
likely is the formation of a conflict group. 
(b) The more the political conditions of organization can 
be met (by permitting organization of opposed 
interests) the more likely is the formation of conflict 
group. 
(c) The more the social conditions of organization can be 
met (by permitting quasi-groups to communicate), the 
more likely is the formation of conflict. 
2. The less the technical, political and social conditions of 
organization are met, the more intense is the conflict. 
3. The more the deprivations of the subjugated in the 
distribution of rewards, shifts from an absolute to relative 
basis the more violent is the conflict. 
4. The less the mobility between super and subordinate 
groups, the more intense is the conflict. 
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5. The more intense the conflict, the more structural change 
and reorganization it will generate. 
6. The more violent the conflict, the greater is the rate of 
structural change and reorganization^. 
J. H. Turner writes, there are some similarities between both Marx 
and Dahrendorf: 
1. Social systems are seen by both in a continual state of 
conflict. 
2. Both presume that conflict is generated by opposed 
interests inherent in the social structure. 
3. For both conflict is dialectical. 
4. Interests are seen by both as tending to polarize into two 
conflict groups. 
5. Social change is seen by both as ubiquitous feature of 
social systems. 
While contradicting K. Marx, Dahrendorf argues that Marx' s 
conception of those who are dominant economically would be 
dominant politically has lost whatever validity it may once had. 
Although he argues that domination in one association does not 
necessarily involve domination in all others to which he belongs. 
Thus, we see social conflict is inevitable and necessary condition for 
bringing about social change for both the thinkers. Karl Marx saw the 
conflict in a simplified way as it occurs between two classes of people 
i.e. have's and have-not's. 
Dahrendorf differs from K. Marx and looks at social conflict in a more 
deeper and comprehensive way. For him conflict does hot take place 
12 
between the two classes of people but in members of the imperatively 
coordinated associations (ICA) or between the two institutionalised 
authorities. More and more people know about their objectives and 
rights, greater would be the conflict. 
1.a.2. Functional Perspective: 
Functionalism views society as a system. A system is an entity made 
up of interconnected and interrelated parts. To understand any part 
of society, the part must be seen in relation to society, as a whole. 
From this viewpoint, it follows that each part will in some way affect 
every other part and the system as a whole®. 
Early functionalists did not pay much attention to the study of social 
conflict, which has become very important from the beginning of 20*^  
Century. Therefore, sociologists like George Simmel and Lewis A 
coser have analysed social conflict from the functional perspective. 
Functionalists explore the causes of conflict in social structure and 
analyse its functions at various levels®. 
German scholar, George Simmel viewed conflict as ubiquitous and 
inevitable in society. He recognised that an overly cooperative, 
consensual and integrated society would show no life process. He 
says that conflict is a form of sociation i.e. need for hating and 
fighting among the members of society is mixed with others for love 
and affection. For him the dynamics of conflict lies in the innate 
biological make up of human actors. 
It merits mention here that Simmel had given positive form to the 
concept of conflict by describing how it plays an important role in 
maintaining the social structure-mingling of associative and 
dissociative processes resolving dualisms and achieving some kind 
of unity in the society^". 
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Moreover, Simmels work on conflicic reveals that conflict is a variable, 
which shows different states of intensity or violence. He developed 
some propositions for explaining the intensity of social conflicts. 
These are as follows. 
1) The greater is the degree of emotional involvement of 
parties to a conflict, the more likely is the conflict to be 
violent. 
2) The more that conflict is perceived by members of conflict 
groups to transcend individual aims and interests, the more 
likely is the conflict to be violent. 
3) The more that conflict is a means to a clearly specified end, 
the less likely is the conflict to be violent^ \ 
Moreover, Simmel had also formulated propositions over the 
consequences of conflict. These propositions would be discussed in 
the later section of this chapter. 
Another important sociologist who is known for his work on social 
conflict is Lewis A. Coser who is a functionalist, the perspective, 
which has been criticized for undermining the importance of conflict. 
In fact, classical functionalists did not give much attention to the study 
of social conflict. Unlike his predecessors he has not merely paid 
greater attention to the study of social conflict but has also treated 
conflict as a universal phenomenon^^. Coser views conflict as a 
process that under certain conditions functions to maintain the body 
social or some of its parts. He stresses that all social worlds can be 
viewed as a system which reveals imbalances, tensions, and conflicts 
of interest among its various parts. Under certain conditions, 
imbalances in the integration of syr.tem parts lead to the outbreak of 
the conflict, which, in turn, causes temporary reintegration of the 
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system. In fact, it is this reintegration, which increases the flexibility 
and adaptability of the social system in changing conditions. Thus, for 
Coser the source of conflict in society lies in or between the various 
parts of society. 
He has formulated propositions concerning with causes and 
consequence of social conflict. Following proposition about causes of 
social conflict are formulated by Coser. 
1- The more subordinate members in a system of inequality 
question the legitimacy of the existing distribution of scarce 
resources, the more likely are they to initiate conflict. 
a) The fewer are the channels for redressing grievances over 
the distribution of scarce resources by subordinates, the 
more likely are they to question legitimacy 
b) The more membership in privileged group is sought by 
subordinates and the less mobility allowed, the more likely 
are they to withdraw legitimacy. 
2- The more deprivations of subordinates are transformed from 
absolute to relative, the greater will be their sense of injustice, 
and hence, the more likely aro they to initiate conflict^^. 
It merits mention here that all the four sociologists belonging to two 
different schools of thought have similarity on at least two points. 
Firstly, social conflict is universal and inevitable. And, secondly, 
sources of conflict lie in the social structure. However, they have 
certain disagreements on points concerning with nature of sources 
and consequences of the conflicts. 
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1.b Meaning of Conflict: 
The word social conflict has no uniform definition. Different 
sociologists have defined the concept in different ways. Conflict is 
defined as an event in conventional usage. Here it means an overt 
act of clash between two parties at a given space and time. 
Contrary to conventional usage, scn;iologists have defined the conflict 
as interaction condition or as a social process^''. 
J. H. Turner defines; a conflict is direct and overt interaction between 
the parties in which the actions of each party are directed at inhibiting 
their adversaries attainment of goals^^. 
Galtung defines conflict as a condition, "an action system is said to 
be in conflict if the system has two or more incompatible goal 
states"''^ 
L.A. Coser defines it as a process, 'a struggle over values and claims 
to scarce status, power and resources in which the aims of the 
opponents are to neutralize, injure or eliminate their rivals"^^. 
Ralf Dahrendorf uses the world conflict in a comprehensive way as 
he includes competitions, disputes and tensions as well as manifest 
clashes between social forces in the definition of conflict. 
Dahrendorfs definition of conflict is consistent with his dialectical 
assumptions: ICA's reveal "conflicts of interest" among quasi -
groups, which under technical, social, and political conditions become 
true conflict groups willing to engage in overt action against each 
other^^ 
Clinton Fink, conflict is any social situation or process in which two or 
more entities are jinked at least by one form of antagonistic 
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psychological relation or at least by one form of antagonistic 
interaction^^. 
Robin Williams, Jr. defines conflict in one essay as "interaction in 
which one party intends to deprive, control, or eliminate another, 
against the will of that other. Pure conflict Is a fight, its goal is to 
immobilize, neutralize, destroy, or othenwise harm an opponent. In 
the impure world of actuality, some overt struggles are conducted 
accordingly to rules and for limited goals; oppositional behaviour may 
then have the primary goal of winning rather than injuring the 
opponent, we then usually call the encounter a game. Some games 
merge into debates in which the primary aim is to convince or 
persuade opponents or others of the rightness or correctness or 
attractiveness of one's views or claims^°. 
Thus, we see conflict is a process in which two parties come into 
direct interaction and one of the parties attempts to resist the will of 
other in order to achieve its goal. Such an act takes place in a 
situation where does exist an imbalance between goals of people and 
opportunities or means for achieving these goals. 
1 x . Classification of Conflict: 
Like the definition of social conflict, there is no unanimity among the 
sociologists in the classification of conflict. Every sociologist has 
classified conflict in his own way. We find four kinds of classifications 
of social conflict. These classifications are based on the sources of 
conflict, goals of conflict, interests in conflict and area of conflict. 
Francis Abraham has classified social conflict on the basis of sources 
of conflict into two broad categories: endogenous and exogenous 
conflicts. 
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He maintains that endogenous sources of conflict remain in - built or 
within a society and could be distinguished as: conflict over the 
distribution of desirables, values, authority and conflict between the 
individual and society. While exogenous conflicts are those conflicts, 
which occur from the out or between systems. These conflicts 
normally fall into three categories: wars, cultural invasions and 
ideological conflicts. 
Lewis A. Coser has classified conflict on the basis of goals into 
realistic and non-realistic conflicts^^. 
Conflicts, which arise from frustration of specific demands within the 
relationship and from estimates of gains of the participants can be 
called realistic conflict, in so far as ihey are means towards a specific 
result or goal. 
Non-realistic conflicts, on the other hand, are occasioned by the need 
for tension release. Although non-realistic conflict too involves the 
interaction between two or more personal but it allows no functional 
alternative of means and are not aimed at the attainment of a 
concrete result^^. 
Prof. R.J. Rummel classified conflict on the basis of interests into 
three categories. 
1- Conflict of congruent/ positive interest. 
2- Conflict of inverse interest. 
3- Conflict of incompatible interest 
1. Conflict of congruent interest occurs when both individuals 
desire for the same thing. This kind of conflict is often 
forgotten in the belief that similar interests and values avoid 
conflict. 
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2. Whereas, conflict of inverse interest occurs when the 
positive interest of one Is the negative Interest of another. 
For instance, one politician may want to increase social 
welfare payments, another to decrease them. 
3. Conflict of incompatible interest occurs when the interest of 
the two parties are incompatible. For instance, one Indian 
may want to remain capitalistic while another may want it to 
become socialistic^^. 
Another conflict scholar, Wilf. H. Ratzburg classifies conflict on the 
basis of area into three categories: 
(i) Regional conflict 
(ii) Centralist conflict 
(iii) Revolutionary wars 
(i) Regional Conflict involves struggle carried out between an 
identity group and the central authority of the state in which the 
group resides. When rebel groups are geographically and 
culturally separated from the ruling majority, their goal is often 
autonomy or secession. In other cases conflict may be over 
power and control over resources. 
(ii) Centralist Conflict: When the purpose of the conflict is to 
overthrow a regime, it is said to be centralist. When minority 
groups are geographically Intermixed throughout the territory of 
a state and were patterns of subjugations and domination are 
present, communal groups sometimes seek the "ousting" of a 
ruling elite in favour of leaders of their own kin. 
(iii) Revolutionary war: It can be distinguished from the identity -
based centralist conflicts, in this type of conflict the aim is to 
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overthrow the present system and replace it with one that is 
more just, pious, such as fully communist system or an Islamic 
system, In contrast to the revolutionary type, centralist conflicts 
focus less on redesigning society and more on political office '^*. 
There are many other ways of classifying conflicts. In fact we can 
classify conflict on the basis of parties involved in the conflict like 
individual conflict, ethnic conflict, social conflict or on the basis of 
locale of conflict like local conflict, national conflict, international 
conflict and on the basis of nature and consequences of conflict like 
feud, war etc. Thus, there is no definite way of classifying social 
conflicts. 
1.d. Sources of Conflict: 
How does a social conflict emerge in society? We have different 
answers of this question. Differences among sociologists emerge due 
to variation in their perspectives or logic of inquiry. Sources of conflict 
as conceptualized by sociologists may broadly be seen in three 
different ways. First, some sociologists see sources of conflict in 
individual interests and the biological make up of human actors as 
well as in the subjective meaning of social reality. German 
sociologist, George Simmel in his book Conflict and The Web of 
Group Affiliations postulates that an innate hostile impulse or a need 
for hating and fighting among the units of organic wholes are mixed 
with others for love and affection and is surrounded by the forces of 
social relationships. For Simmel, conflict is a reflection of not only of 
conflict of interests but also of hostile instincts. Such instincts can be 
increased by conflict of interests or mitigated by harmonious relations 
as well as by instincts for love. Thjs, for Simmel sources of conflict 
ultimately lies in the biological make up of human actors^^. 
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Whereas R.J Rummel argues that objects or material conditions do 
not carry up potential for conflict, the potential for conflict remains 
latent in the culture that gives varied meanings to material objects. In 
his view opposing interests are subjective in origin and not the 
automatic result of objective facts, conditions or events. For example, 
for some people conflict may generate over the shape of a table 
because of the meaning a particular shape has for the parties 
involved as in diplomatic negotiations to end the Vietnam war, some 
may conflict over an old useless broken cup simply because of its 
religious significance and some may conflict over whose name should 
be first on a theatre marquee, simply as or matter of status. 
Therefore, in Rummels view the social seat of conflict lies in the 
subjective realm of society, that is, in the matrix of meanings, values, 
norms and perceived status and class^^. 
Contrary to other sociologists see the sources of conflict in social 
structure. Among the sociologists who see the social structure as the 
main source of social conflict, there are differences. For Marxists 
sources of conflict lie in material conditions of a society^''. While for 
functionalists the sources are in the total structure and its parts. 
Infact, for a functionalist like Lewis A. Coser the inherent structural 
imbalances in or between the various segments of the social 
structure constitutes the main source of social conflict^^. Whereas, 
Karl Marx in his Class Conflict Theory says that the potential for 
conflict is inherent in every differentiated society, since such a society 
systematically generates conflicts of interest between persons and 
groups differentially located within the social structure and in relation 
to the means of production. Therefore, for Marx it is the material 
conditions of a society where the sources of conflict lie^^. 
While for another dialectical theorist Ralf Dahrendorf the sources of 
conflict lie in the institutionalized authority relations of Imperatively 
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Coordinated Associations (ICA's). Under certain specified conditions 
ICA's polarize into two conflict groups, one in authority and other out 
of it. There has been conflict over authority between these two 
groups. The resolution of this conflict involves redistribution of 
authority in the ICA's. It is therefore, for Dahrendorf the dynamics of 
conflict lies in the authority relations of Imperatively Coordinated 
Associations^". Thus, over the sources of conflict there are 
differences among those who follow dialectical materialism as a 
method of inquiry. The difference is between Karl Marx and Ralf 
Dahrendorf. 
However, differences among Marxists and functionalists on sources 
of social conflict appear to be sorted out with the concept of relative 
deprivation, a concept that is equally used by functionalists and 
Marxists to explain the sources of social conflict. 
W.G. Runcimen in his work Relative Deprivation and Social Justice 
(1968) defines relative deprivation as men's perception of 
discrepancy between their value expectations and their value 
capabilities. Value expectations are the goods and conditions of life 
to which people believe they are rightfully entitled. Value capabilities 
are the goods and conditions they think they are capable of getting 
and keeping^\ 
The concept of relative deprivation was first used in 1940's by the 
authors of the American Soldier' to denote the feelings of an 
individuals who lacks some status, or conditions that he thinks he 
should have, his standards of what he should have generally is 
determined by reference to what some other person or groups 
have^^. In conventional sociological sense, relative deprivation 
means status discrepancy against a reference group^^. 
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Sociologists belonging to both functional and dialectical school of 
thought have proved in their contributions that relative deprivation is 
the necessary precondition to any violence or revolutionary 
upheavals in a society. Relative deprivation is related to frustration by 
Coser, and applied to the explanation of suicide rates^. 
Renowned functionalist, R.K. Merton in his famous essay "Social 
Structure and Anomie: continuities" popularized the term relative 
deprivation by saying it (RD) corresponds with anomie. As, in anomie, 
like relative deprivation, a situation gets created in which men's ends 
(value expectations) remain constant while means (value capabilities) 
are severely restricted. Anomie, though a sociological concept, is a 
breakdown of social behaviour, or normlessness. The degree of 
anomie in a social system is indicated by the extent to which there is 
a lack of consensus on legitimate norms and insecurity in social 
relations. Merton suggested that anomie could lead to wide spread 
deviant behaviour and the establishment of alternative norms, which 
constitutes "rebellion". When rebellion becomes endemic in a 
substantial part of the society, it provides a potential for revolution, 
which reshapes both the normative and the social structure^^. 
Another famous sociologist John Galtung attributes aggression within 
and among societies to status discrepancy, or rank disequilibrium. He 
says if men or groups are high on one dimension of a stratification 
system, but low on another, e.g. if they have high power or education 
but low income, they are said to be disposed to use violence or 
aggression to attain a high or equilibrated position on all 
dimensions^®. 
James A. Geschwender attributes the American Negro revolt of the 
1960's to relative deprivation, defined in its conventional sociological 
sense of status discrepancy against a reference group^''. 
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The anthropological literature on American Indian response to white 
conquest also makes use of the deprivation concept. Philleo Nash, 
for example, shows how deprivation may occur either through 
acceptance or rejection by Indians of white's values and skills, and 
proposes that the aggressive components in Indian revivalism are a 
response to that deprivation^®. 
Dialectical theoreticians Marx and Engels argued the inevitable 
growth of profound dissatisfactions in the proletariat as a 
consequence of absolute deprivations or oppressions the destruction 
of the workers pride through his subjugation to a machine and the 
market, economic deprivation because of minimal wages and job 
insecurity, the latter a consequence of crisis in the economic system 
and repressive measure of the bourgeoisie state^^. 
Infact, Ralf Dahrendorf another dialectical theorist in his book entitled 
Class and Class Conflict attributes the occurrence of conflict in a 
society to relative deprivation. The more the deprivation of the 
subjugated in the distribution of rewards shift from absolute to relative 
basis, the more violent is the conflict'*'^ . 
Thus, seeds of relative deprivation (RD) lie in social structure. This 
may be experienced by an individual or group partly or wholly. It 
means an individual or group may feel relatively deprived if do not 
have adequate economic opportunity, social status or political power 
and all things in combined. When relative deprivation is experienced 
by a group, it generally gives rise to various kinds of conflicts. 
Sociologists try to seek causes of conflict or relative deprivation in the 
economy, polity, religion and in other social institutions. Thus, we 
have economic, political, religious causes of conflict as we have 
mentioned earlier the postulate of Ralf Dahrendorf that greater the 
relative deprivation, intense would be the conflict. 
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I.e. Consequences of Social Conflict: 
Social conflict has far reaching consequences for a society. These 
consequences are conceptualized by functionalists as "functions of 
social conflicts". Consequences or functions of social conflict are 
positive and negative, advantageous or harmful for a society as a 
whole and groups within a society. Positive consequences of social 
conflict are seen in terms of promoting in group solidarity, giving rise 
to innovation or new set of parameters for social life, re-examining 
existing policies of society or bringing change in society'*\ For 
example, Karl Marx saw a positive aspect in conflict as it drives 
society to change and establish rule of proleterate"*^. 
German sociologist, George Simmel has given positive form to the 
concept of conflict by maintaining that it has consequences for social 
continuity rather than change. He says: 
"Conflict is thus designed to resolve dualisms; it is a way of achieving 
some kind of unity, even if it be through the annihilation of one of the 
contending parties. This is roughly parallel to the fact that it is the 
most violent symptom of a disease, which represents the effort of the 
organism to free itself of disturbances and damage caused by 
them"^ "^. 
Simmel had conceptualized the consequences of conflict for the 
parties involved in it and for the whole society. His propositions 
regarding the consequences of conflict for the parties involved in it 
are as follows: 
1) The more violent are inter-group hostilities and the more 
frequent is conflict among groups, the less likely are group 
boundaries to disappear. 
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2) The more violent is the conflict and the less integrated is the 
group, the more likely is despotic centralization of conflict 
groups. 
3) The more violent is the conflict, the greater will be the 
internal solidarity of conflict groups'*". 
While, Simmel has suggested certain important propositions on the 
functions of conflict for the social whole which are as follows: 
1) The less violent is the conflict between groups of different 
degrees of power in a system, the more likely is the conflict to 
have integrative consequences for the social whole. 
a) The less violent and more frequent is the conflict, the more 
members of subordinate groups can release hostilities and 
have a sense of control over their destiny and thereby 
maintain the integration of the social whole. 
b) The less violent and more frequent is the conflict, the more 
likely are norms regularizing the conflict to be created by the 
conflicting parties. 
2) The more violent and the more prolonged are conflict relations 
between groups, the more likely is the formation of coalitions 
among previously unrelated groups in a system. 
3) The more prolonged is the threat of violent conflict between 
groups, the more enduring are the coalitions of each of the 
conflicting parties'*^. 
Another famous functional scholar L.A. Coser has written extensively 
on the positive functions of social conflict. He maintains that conflict 
allows expression of hostility and the mending of strained 
relationships. It leads to the elimination of specific sources of conflict 
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between parties and enables them to redress their grievances 
through the establishment of new norms or the affirmation of old 
ones. Hostility towards the out-group unifies the in-group. When the 
need for greater solidarity is felt, members of the in-group tend to 
exaggerate conflicts with other groups, and Where such conflicts exist 
any deviation from the group norms is severely condemned. Social 
conflicts not only generate new norms and institutions but also new 
coalitions and alliances; they bring about technological 
improvements, revitalize economy, and lubricate the social system; 
they facilitate the release of tension and frustration and enable the 
social system to adjust itself®. 
According to Coser, the consequerices of conflict on social structure 
vary according to the type of social structures. In flexible social 
structures or plural societies conflict that aims at a resolution of 
tension between antagonists is likely to have stabilising functions. As, 
it permits the direct expression of opposing claims and tries to 
eliminate the sources of conflict and with the result unity is 
established in the system. In such flexible societies, multiple 
affiliations of individuals make them participate In a variety of group 
conflicts so that those who are antagonists in one conflict are allies in 
another. The pluralism of associations in such type of societies leads 
to a plurality of fronts of conflict, which are likely to crisscross one 
another and thereby prevent cleavages along one axis. The intensity 
of any one of these conflicts is likely to be relatively low. This 
segmental participation in multiplicity of conflicts constitutes a 
balancing mechanism within the structure. In this way, conflicts may 
be said to sew pluralistic society together. 
However, in rigid social structures or closed groups the impact of 
conflict is likely to be quite different. In closed groups conflict are 
likely to be more intense because such groups do not permit the 
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expression of hostility between the parties since they fear its 
disruptive consequences. These closed groups, moreover, tend to 
absorb the total personality of their members; they are jealous of 
member's affiliation with other groups and desire to monopolize their 
loyalty. The resultant deep involvement of the members and the 
intimate association among them \s likely to lead to a great deal of 
hostility to which the group denies legitimate outlets'*^. 
According to Coser, closeness of association and structural rigidity 
may lead to a high intensity of conflicts; they do not lead to a high 
degree of violence. Violence refers to the choice of means for 
carrying out the conflict. While, the intensity of conflict, they do not 
lead to a high degree of violence refers to the choice of means for 
carrying out the conflict. While, the intensity of conflict means the 
degree of involvement of the participants. Intensity and violence may 
vary independently of each other. The more integrated into the 
society are the parties to the conflict, the less likely will the conflict 
between them be violent. As, there is likelihood that the conflicting 
parties will choose less violent or institutionalized means for realizing 
their goals, such as, institutionalized strikes or regularized contests in 
those societies that permit the integration of lower classes or ethnic 
and other minority groups into the social order. 
Lewis Coser says that social conflicts that do not attack the basic 
values or assumptions upon which the foundation of any society is 
based are positively functional o"- advantageous for the society. 
These kind of conflicts occur mostly in open or plural societies 
because these societies not only allow the contending parties to 
express their anger but also institute variety of institutional 
safeguards against the type of conflict that might endanger the basic 
values of the society. It is actually the presence of these institutional 
safeguards that help to minimize the danger of divergences to touch 
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the basic layer of consensus within flexible social structures. Here it is 
important to note that these institutional safeguards could also be in 
the form of bringing marginalized or excluded groups within the fold 
of mainstream society, that is, by increasing their shares of income, 
wealth, power or prestige. Although after getting these privileges they 
may still engage in multifarious struggles in order to increase their 
shares of income, wealth, power etc., however, these conflicts will be 
waged within the limits of a consensus. In fact, social conflict has 
positive consequences for a society when it is waged within the limits 
of consensus. 
Social conflict has negative, disadvantageous or sometimes-horrible 
consequences for a society. Coser also says that social conflicts in 
which the contending parties in conflict do not share the basic values 
upon which the legitimacy of the social system rests are dysfunctional 
or harmful for the social system. Conflicts having negative 
consequences are rampant in closed social systems or in societies, 
which are plural by name but not in practice. In these societies 
chances remain high that if conflict occurs despite the effort to 
repress it, it (conflict) will reach down to the basic layers of societal 
consensus. For example, if major strata of a society's population are 
permanently excluded from participation in the society's benefits they 
will tend to reject the very assumptions or values of a society upon 
which the society is built. And, if the systems of legitimation no longer 
fully operate or solve the problems of the people they will attempt to 
attack the social order through revolutionary violence. In fact, conflict 
has horrible consequences for a society in which conflicting parties 
no longer share the basic values of the social system"^ .^ 
Other destructive or harmful consequences of conflict are: it diverts 
energy from the real task, destroys morale, polarizes individuals and 
groups, deepens differences, obstructs communication and 
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cooperative action, produces irresponsible beliaviour, creates 
suspicion and distrust and deceases productivity"*^. Moreover, 
destruction of public property, innocent killings like women, children, 
genocide, migration and refugee problems their displacement, 
procurement and rehabilitation are other horrible consequences of 
conflicts like war, racial, ethnic and communal violence or conflicts 
between dominant and subordinate groups in or between the 
societies. In such kind of conflicts powerful groups frequently use 
force to suppress voices of powerless or marginalized sections and 
consequently result into extreme form of human rights violation. In 
fact, it is these horrible consequences of conflict with which social 
activists, planners and policy makers are concerned. 
I.f. Conflict Resolution: 
Although conflict is seen by sociologists as universal phenomenon 
and a force of bringing about change in society. No society can afford 
to live perpetually in a state of conflict. Order, stability, integration or 
cohesion should be established for the proper functioning of the 
society and, therefore, conflict is to be resolved. Indeed, twentieth 
century has experienced many ethnic, national and international 
conflicts. Some of these conflicts are resolved while others are still 
persisting. 
Conflict could be resolved in two ways. One is a natural way without 
human efforts. There are scholars who visualize conflict like a human 
organism, which is born, grows and dies. Similarly a conflict emerges, 
flourishes and disappears over a period of time. This may be 
expressed in a popular saying "Time is a great healer". 
Another way through which conflict is resolved is by human efforts. 
Conscious and deliberate policies and programmes are devised for 
resolving or managing conflict. It is in this sense that the term conflict 
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resolution or management is used. Conflict resolution is the process 
of resolving a dispute or a conflict by providing each side's needs, 
and adequately addressing their interests so that they are satisfied 
with the outcome^". 
Conflict resolution aims at addressing and removal of those factors, 
which cause conflict^\ If we follow sociologist like Karl Marx then we 
can say that conflict cannot be resolved unless and until exploitative 
and contradictory situations in a society are removed or authority or 
roles are not redistributed in the society. Similarly, if the conditions of 
relative deprivation persist conflict cannot be resolved. Such 
sociological theorizing about conflict resolution is ideal and general in 
nature. 
In empirical reality, there is no society in which ideal or egalitarian 
situation exist. Therefore, there is a need to identify the causes of a 
particular conflict or conflicts and address these conflicts for 
resolution in a specific way. There are no fixed procedures or tools for 
conflict resolution. Procedures or tools of conflict resolution differ from 
society to society and from one conflict to another. Scholars have 
identifled certain methods or tools of conflict resolution which are: 
Avoidance, war, sanctions, negotiations and its various forms like 
Good offices and mediation. Inquiry and conciliation commissions. 
Arbitration, Adjudication etc., we shall discuss these approaches one 
by one^^. 
Avoidance: Kenneth Boulding in his book 'Conflict and Defense' 
writes that the method of avoidance is the first approach of ending 
conflicts. In this method parties to the conflict simply remove 
themselves one from another and increase the distance between 
them to the point where the conflict ceases from share lack of 
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contact. Avoidance is the classical method of resolving racial, and 
political disputes^^. 
War: Approach like war is used in a society where, common 
conviction is lacking and machinery of law enforcement is weak^. In 
conflict resolution, an approach like war always proved unsuccessful 
whether its consent given by UN body or self-decision of a country. 
Resolution brought out by war Is not durable because in war parties 
could not address their core issues lO each other. 
Sanctions: The term "sanction" in its widest sense means any 
measure taken in support of a social order regulating human 
behaviour. The purpose of sanction is to bring about a behaviour 
considered to be in conformity with goals and standards of a society 
and to prevent that behaviour which is inconsistent with these goals 
and standards. The international sanctions, envisaged, however, are 
not automatic, being left to the discretion of the Security Council. In 
cases of threats to peace or acts of aggression, Security Council may 
take decisions (under article 4d) rec,uiring the severance of diplomatic 
relations, economic and financial non-intercourse, and action by air, 
seas or land forces. 
Experiences with organized international sanctions in support of 
international order has been limited and does not give much 
encouragement to those who believe in the efficacy of such 
arrangements. Due to various political reasons like conflicting 
interests and purposes of the sanctioning powers and the 
unwillingness of some states to risk war, has made this approach 
highly undesirable and condemnabh^^. 
Negotiation: The term "negotiation" refers to the explicit process, with 
proposals and counter proposals. In the process of negotiation the 
parties may relate their conflicts and common interests explicitly or 
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tacitly. Tacit bargaining is of great importance in military 
confrontations, when negotiations may be difficult because of 
incompatible war aims, domestic opinion or lack of diplomatic 
relations. It can help to keep the area of hostilities limited, restrain the 
use of force and prepare the ground for negotiation to terminate 
hostilities^®. 
Good offices and mediation: These are special forms of negotiation in 
which third party plays a role. Good offices and mediation may be 
offered by a state not involved in the dispute, international official or 
private persons. Good offices consist of helping the parties to the 
dispute to get into direct contact with each other and arranging direct 
negotiation. In some cases, the party offering its good offices may 
attend the negotiation. In 1965 then Soviet Union offered its Good 
offices to India and Pakistan as a result of which was signed the 
Tashkent Declaration concerning the settlement of the dispute over 
Jammu and Kashmir. Mediation refers to active participation in the 
negotiation including the submission of proposals on various aspects 
of the dispute or on the dispute in general. However, a final 
agreement is arrived at only by the parties to the dispute through 
mutual agreement. 
Inquiry and Conciliation Commissions: The purpose of these 
commissions is to resolve dispute by means of direct agreement 
between the parties to the dispute. Such commissions may be formed 
on the basis of parity with equal representation of all the parties to the 
dispute. Representatives from other states may also sit on the 
commissions and their tasks are determined by agreement of the 
parties to the dispute. The main task of inquiry commission is to 
determine the circumstances of the dispute. Whereas, conciliation 
commissions in addition to determining the circumstances of the 
dispute may also issue recommendations on its settlement. 
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Arbitration: Another method of resolving disputes between the states 
is the process of arbitration. In international arbitration dispute is 
subjected to the arbitration court whose composition, range of 
activities and choice of rules of law are determined by agreement 
between the parties to the dispute. Moreover, the court of arbitration 
can resolve the dispute, on the basis of a specific treaty between the 
parties^^. 
Adjudication: It is a method of settling controversies or disputes, and 
in it parties in dispute participate by presenting proofs and reasoned 
arguments. Adjudication takes place at two levels: domestic and 
international. At domestic level, law courts of any country can 
adjudicate between private parties, between private parties and 
public officials and between public officials or public bodies. However, 
all adjudication does not take place in the courts. Parents can 
adjudicate disputes among the children. Facts that are object of 
inquiry at a hearing in adjudication are facts about specific parties. In 
contrast, legislative facts are general facts relating to broad questions 
of policy and law affecting the general population. Whereas, 
"International adjudication", in a more precise sense, is used to 
describe the settlement of disputes by permanent international 
tribunals, a new development of the twentieth century, and is, in 
effect, a synonym for "Judicial Settlement^®". 
The above mentioned techniques of conflict resolution may prove 
useful and effective in settling conflicts at smaller scale and those 
conflicts in which clash of interest is not very visible but these 
techniques are generally used in track one diplomacy - term used 
to describe official government to government negotiation among 
instructed representatives of sovereign states - cannot be effective in 
resolving protracted ethnic conflicts. Kashmir conflict is one of the 
examples of such conflicts. The common characteristics of protracted 
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ethnic conflicts are the stereotyping or deionisation of others and 
massive violations of human rights particularly against civilians. 
Ethnic conflicts at their root involve clashes, or perceived clashes of 
culture which can be defined as socially constructed identity and 
meaning shared by a community, strongly influencing relationships 
between individuals and how they interpret the world. Such conflicts 
are fuelled by notions of identity, a concept of security, and a feeling 
of well-being. 
The protracted ethnic conflicts involve society-wide actors and are 
not a matter between governments. In most cases of ethnic conflicts 
track one alone will not necessarily identify, include, or allow a full 
and fair hearing for all of the antagonists in a conflict. This is because 
in ethnic conflicts in particular, one side or another often denies the 
legitimacy of the other side's existence, especially if the other side is 
a non-state actor such as rebel or seceding group. 
Track one medication whether done by representatives of 
governments or international bodies are unsuited to deal effectively 
with protracted ethnic conflicts because, one, official interveners 
denies the legitimacy of non-state actors, partly, due to predominant 
law in international relations and partly to non-interference with 
national sovereignty. Two, in international diplomacy all official third 
parties have an interest in "who wins" an ethnic conflict. Third, 
another problem with track one interveners is that it is a geo-
strategically manipulative activity, the aim of which is not long term 
conflict resolution but a self interested strategy of advancement by all 
individual parties in a conflict including the mediator. Therefore, the 
value of neutrality or impartiality is questioned or even somewhat 
negated. 
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Unless dialogue and reconciliation with the "enemy" is part of 
antagonists experience at many levels of society no official 
government will truly resolve an ethnic conflict^^. 
Hence more approaches to conflict resolution are needed. There is 
much that non-governmental approaches - track two and multi-track 
diplomacy - can offer. 
Track two diplomacy involves unofficial mediators who do not have 
carrots or sticks. They work with the parties or their constituencies to 
facilitate agreements, encouraging the parties to see their situation as 
lying along the lose - lose to win-win line and to find mutually 
satisfactory outcomes. The strength of track two approach on conflict 
resolution is based on the idea that informal negotiations allow the 
parties "to come together more easily to explore mutual fears, 
grievances and demands". Track two diplomacy also provides the 
opportunity of tentative negotiation offers to be floated, policy 
linkages to be broached in ways that formal negotiations might 
preclude^°. 
Official diplomacy and unofficial second track approaches may also 
be complemented by a range of multi-track solutions, Multi-track 
diplomacy is the application of peacemaking from different vantage 
points within a multi-centred network, reflects the different levels and 
variety of factors which need to be addressed. It has recently been 
described as a 'web of interconnected parts (activities, individuals, 
institutions, communities) that operate together whether awkwardly or 
gracefully for a common goal, a world at peace. It is a new form of 
diplomacy, involving a strategic shift from purely state controlled 
diplomacy towards a greater division of labour between governments, 
NGO's and other organizations. 
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Official diplomatic manoeuvres are often circumscribed by political 
interests, lack of trust concerning the intentions of the mediator, 
short-term domestic considerations. Second-track approaches may 
although stand greater chance of success if they are intended to 
complement official negotiations, but cannot sew on all the other 
areas of concern, which have affected the causes, and duration of 
the conflict. Non-governmental or unofficial diplomacy may be 
effective in creating dialogue, but does not have the necessary 
resources or political leverage to bring about change. Yet the 
combined force of these approaches can address the fundamental 
issues, and still bring the necessary political momentum^\ 
The preceding discussion leads us to say that conflict is caused by 
multiple factors in a society and, therefore, its resolution requires 
various strategies. Strategies for resolution of conflict differ from one 
conflict to another. Although there are conventional methods for 
resolving conflicts. Scholars are of the opinion that protracted or 
ethnic conflicts cannot be resolved without involving people. 
Involvement of people in the form of the NGO's is popularly called as 
track two diplomacy, which play an important role in bridging the gap 
between the state and conflicting parties. Conflict in Kashmir is multi-
dimensional and may be referred as protracted conflict. Therefore, we 
think this conflict cannot be resolved without, help of Kashmiris and 
involvement of reliable NGO's. 
In the next chapter we would try to give a brief account of Kashmir's 
history, geography, economy and society in order to understand roots 
of Kashmir conflict. 
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CHAPTER-II 
Socio - Historical Account of Jammu and Kashmir State 
and Design of the Study 
2.a. Area & Location: 
Jammu and Kashmir is one of the important states of India. It is 
known world over for its natural beauty, lush green pastures, 
meadows, valleys, thick forests and snow clad mountain peaks. The 
state covers an area^ of 222, 236 sq. kms. i.e. 85,806 sq.miles^. 
From north to south the state is about 384 kilometres long and from 
east to west it is about 360 kilometres wide. It is situated between 
32.17 degree and 36.58-degree north latitude and 37.26 degree and 
80.30-degree east longitude. Moreover, the state is bounded by 
Pakistan in the west, by China in northeast, by Afghanistan in 
northwest^ . (For map see figure 1). 
AFCHAi-JISteM 
MWKAftSiA 
Location of 
Jajnmu & Kashmir in India 
snituncA 
Source:- www.india.map.in 
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2.b Physiography: 
It is a mountainous state having valleys and plateaus. 
Physiographically the whole state could be divided into three regions 
known as Jammu, Kashmir valley and Ladakh, respectively. 
Region Jammu could be divided into plains and Shiwalik hills. The 
Jammu plains adjacent to Panjab are situated at an attitude of 300 to 
600 metres above the sea level while the Shiwalik hills are lying at an 
elevation of 1800 metres above the sea level. Most of the 
administrative districs of the region like Jammu, Udhampur.Kathua, 
Poonch, Rajouri and Doda are located between the Shiwalik hills in 
the north and plains in the south'*. This region experiences tropical 
heat whose intensity during summer correspond to that in India. 
Jammu city is the winter capital of the state^. 
Kashmir valley is situated in middle mountain range lying toward the 
north of Jammu region and is about 6000 feet above the sea-level. It 
is surrounded by three mountain ranges known as Pir Panjal range in 
the southwest, Jhelum valley in the northwest, and northeast range 
separates Kashmir valley from ladakh it is through these mountain 
ranges Kashmir valley has maintained links with other parts of India 
and central Asia^. This region is experiencing temperate climate^. 
Kashmir is a land of lakes rivers and flowers. For its fresh water lakes 
and tarns the land is celebrated all over the world®. 
Moreover, there are six administrative districs in valley Kashmir like 
Srinagar, Pulwama, Kupwara, Baramullam, Badgam, and Anantnag. 
Srinagar is the summer capital of the state®. 
Ladakh lies to the northeast of the Kashmir valley. The whole region 
is mountainous. It is here that arctic cold is experienced. The 
population is sparse owing to the extreme climate and low 
44 
production. The Kargil and Leh are the famous districts of this 
mountainous region. The elevation of this part of the state varies from 
8,000 to 15,000 feet. Leh is the economic hub of the region. It was 
before the expansion of the Peoples Republic of China to Tibet an 
important centre of trade as the caravan traders of central Asia and of 
India met here and exchanged their commodities. Ladakh is 
surrounded by the famous Karakoram mountains (now in Pakistan) in 
the north, Baltistan (in Pakistan) in the west and Tibet in the east. 
The region is connected through the Srinagar-Leh national highway 
with the Kashmir. This route remains open only for few months in 
summer. Another land route originating from Leh joins it with Shimla 
(Panjab) while passing through Kulu and Manali of Himachal 
Pradesh^°. 
2.C. Population and Communities: 
The total population of India according to 2001 census is 1, 028, 610, 
328. Out of which 10, 069, 917 persons live in the state of Jammu & 
Kashmir. It is 0.98 percentage of total Indian Population. Although the 
state is thinly populated, but it ranks 19*^  among all states and Union 
territories of India in terms of population. We could not get religion-
wise data of 2001 census. Therefore for religion-wise data (at state 
and regional level) we relied on 1981 census as in 1991 census v^s 
not conducted due to turmoil in the utate^V 
Population of India, according to 1981 census, was 68, 51, 84, 692. 
Out of which 59, 87, 389 lived in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. It 
is 0.87 percentage of total Indian population. Although the state was 
thinly populated but it stood at 17'^  position among the states and 
Union territories of India in terms of populations^^. 
Community-wise distribution of population in the state shows that 
Muslims are largest community with their population figures 38, 31, 
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292 (64.3%). While, Hindus occupy second position with their 
population figures 19, 08, 288 (32.1%). These are two major religious 
communities of the state. Besides, we find presence of three other 
religious communities i.e., Sikhs 1,29, 393 (2.17%), Buddhists 69, 
796 (1.17% and 6, 916 Christians (0.12%)^l 
No religious community in Jammu & Kashmir, like in other parts of 
India, is homogenous. In fact, each religious community is divided 
into various groups based on caste, sect, tribe and language. For the 
purpose of affirmative action Government of India has classified 
population of the country into scheduled caste (SC), scheduled tribe 
(ST) and other backward classes (OBC). We find all these three 
categories of people in Jammu & Kashmir. 
The population of scheduled castes in Jammu & Kashmir is 7, 70,155 
which constitutes 7.59 percent of the total population of the state. The 
prominent scheduled castes with population figures in the state 
(Jammu & Kashmir) are: Watals (169), Saryara (13,327), Ratal 
(1,913), Meg (3,00980), Jolaha (467), Gardi (3,268), Doom 
(1,59,908), Dhyar (7,566), Chura (3,855), Chamar (1,87,277), Batwal 
(39,385), Basith (18,866), Barwala (27,982) & generic castes 
(5,192)''. 
Whereas, the scheduled tribe population of the state (Jammu & 
Kashmir) is 11,05,979 which is 10.90 percent of the total population 
of the state (10,0,69,917). State-wise distribution of scheduled tribes 
with number are: Bakarwal (60,724), Baiti (38,818), Beda (128), Bot 
(96,698), Brokpa (51,957), Changpa (5,038), Gaddi (35,765), Garra 
(507), Gujjar (7,63,806), Mow (732), Purigpa (37,700), Sippi (6,561) & 
generic tribes etc. (7,545)'^. 
Moreover, the list of Backward classes notified by Government of 
India shows following backward classes in the state: 
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1. Bangi, Bhangi, Khakrob (sweepers) excluding those in scheduled 
castes. 2. Bahach Hanjie and Shikara Wallas (excluding House-boat 
owners) 3. Barbers (rural only) 4. Bhand 5. Dambali Faqir 6. Doom 
(excluding those in SC) 7. Fishermen 8. Grati (Rural only) 9. Jheewar 
10. Kulfaqir 11. Kumhar (village potters) 12. Madari, Bazigar 13. 
Mirasi 14. Sansi 15. Shaksaz 16. Show-repairers (working without the 
aid of machines) 17. Shupri wattal (Excluding those in Scheduled 
castes) 18. Sikligar 19. Teli (rural only) 20. Village washermen 21. 
Lobar, Tarkhan^^ 
Religion-wise distribution of population in the state changes position 
of religious communities. As we have shown earlier that state is 
broadly divided into three major regions i.e., valley-Kashmir, Jammu 
and Ladakh, respectively. The population of region-Kashmir (in 1981) 
was 31, 34, 904. Out of which Muslims comprised 94.00%, Hindus -
4.42%, Sikhs - 1.20% and others - 0.38% of the total population of 
the region^^. 
Whereas, the population of Jammu-region was 27, 18, 113. Out of 
which Hindus comprise 66.3%, Muslims - 29.7% and Sikhs 3.58%^^ 
While, the population of Ladakh-region was 1, 34, 372. Out of which 
Buddhists constitute 51.30% and Muslims 46.04% and Hindus 
2.66%, respectively^^. 
2.d. Language: 
Religious communities in Jammu and Kashmir state can be re-
grouped on the basis of language. Languages spoken in the state 
are: Kashmiri, Dogri, Urdu (official), Hindi, Pahari, Gogh, Baiti, 
Ladakhi etc.^° 
Kashmiri, a language of indo-aryan group, is widely spoken from 
Kashmir valley to distric Doda of Jammu-region and a few people 
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speak it in Poonch and Rajouri districs of Jammu^\ According to 
1981 census, kashmiri speaking population (31, 36,146) in the state 
is about 52.37 percent of the total population (59,87, 389) of the 
state^^. It is interested to note that in valley Kashmir all the religious 
communities speak Kashmiri that is why Kashmir Pandits (Hindus) 
are culturally more close to Kashmiri Muslims than their Hindu 
counterparts in Jammu - region because they share same language 
and dress pattern as other Kashmiris.^^ 
Dogri; "From Jammu stretching east along the plains of Panjab the 
people are Dogras - whether they be Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs 
whether high-born Rajputs or low-born menials are known as Dogras, 
and have certain national characteristics a common tongue which 
differentiates them from any other people"^"* Most of the Dogri 
speaking people are by faith Hindus and are culturally more close to 
other Hindus in northern India^^. Census 1981 shows dogri is spoken 
by 14, 45,441 persons and indicates their majority in districts Jammu, 
Udhampur and Kathua, respectively. Their share in the total 
population (5,987,389) of the state was about 24.00 percent^ ®. 
Pahari speaking people are mostly concentrated in Poonch and 
Rajouri districs of jammu-region. As compared to non Muslim 
Paharis, the number of pahari - muslims are more. They represent a 
distinct linguistic and cultural identity. Though the people of this area 
have religious ties with Kashmiri Muslims culturally they are closer to 
Muslim Panjabis living now in Pakistan part of Kashmir^^. 
Gujjari - It is spoken by Gujjars who are tribal people and trek along 
the high mountain altitudes in search of green pastures for rearing 
their cattle. At present, their number in the total population of the 
state (10,069,917) is 763,806. They are spread allover the valiey and 
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Jammu region. Gujjars, like Paharis, are ethno-linguistically close to 
Muslim Panjabis lying towards their west.^ ® 
Baiti: This linguistic community is mainly concentrated in the Kargil 
and its adjacent areas of Ladakh - region. Ethno-linguistically Baltis 
are near to people in Baltistan (now in Pakistan). According to 1981 
census BaIti is spoken by 47,701 persons in jammu & Kashmir^^. 
Ladakhi: It is a tibetian language group and majority of people 
belonging to this linguistic category is found in Leh distric of Ladakh 
region. Their number, according to 1981 census, comes around 
71,852. Culturally ladakhi speaking people are more close to people 
in tibet^°. 
2.6. History: 
Kashmir has a rich and long history. It has the distinction of being the 
only state of India, which possesses uninterrupted written records of 
its history. Kalhan's Rajatarangini provides historical information of 
Kahsmir from ancient period to the time of author (12'*^  Century). 
Historians have referred the period as that of Hindu and Buddhist 
rulers^\ In fact, ancient history of Kashmir shows the Hindus religion 
with its caste system, rituals, priests, and Gods, were practiced 
widely in the valley. However, reaction against Hindu religion started 
when famous Mauryan emperor Ashoka introduced Buddhism to 
Kashmir in the third century B.C., which was later, strengthened by 
Kanishka, Kushan dynasty ruler^^. 
However, under Kanishka's successors Buddhism in Kashmir started 
declining. Gonanda III and King Nara is said to have played crucial 
role in checking Buddhism in Kashmir. Huns who came from eastern 
Turkistan (of China) got the control of the valley in early sixth century 
(A.D.). They too favoured Brahmanism and curbed the growth of 
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Buddhism. However, when the rule of Hun's became unbearable 
Kashmir went under the rule of Ujjain based ruler, king Harsha. After 
the death of king Harsha of ujjain, the valley had its own rulers. There 
was a synthesis of Hindu and Buddhist cultures^^. 
Although, Muslim rule in Kashmir started in 1320 when a non-Muslim-
Rainchana^" converted to Islam. He ruled there for a brief period of 
three years (1320-23A.D.). Rainchana was, in fact, a tibetian who 
along with Mir Shah of Swat worked with commander-in-chief 
(Ramchand) during Simha Deva's rule. After converting to Islam, he 
assumed the title of Sultan Sad-ru-Din.^^ 
Salatin Period: Uninterrupted rule of Muslims in Kashmir was 
established by Mir Shah. He dethroned (in 1339 A.D.) Kota Rani -
the last non-Muslim ruler of ancient and early medieval period of 
Kashmir. Mir Shah's rule heralded a new period in the history of 
Kashmir known as Salatin-i-Kashmir. He ruled over Kashmir from 
1339 to 1342 A.D. He was known as a human, generous sultan who 
contributed in the development of Kashmir and Islam in Kashmir. 
During his reign many Muslim missionaries came to Kashmir 
including Mir Sayyid Ali Hamadani of Persia for promoting Islam in 
valley-Kashmir. 
Another prominent Sultan of Kashmir was Sikander. He became the 
Sultan of Kashmir in 1394 A.D. after fifty-years of Mir Shah. He was a 
great builder. He founded the town of Sikandarpur (now-Nowhata) in 
Srinagar) and built a magnificent palace and a grand jamia masjid in 
Srrinagar. Besides, Sikhander laid the foundation of Idgah and 
constructed the Khanqah-i-Maulla (monastery) on the right bank of 
the Jhelum river, the site were Mir Sayyid Ali Hamadani had 
preached the faith. 
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Zain-ul-Abedin (1420-1470 A.D.) successor of Sikander was 
popularly known as Badshah in Kashmir. He was wise, tolerant and a 
great person of arts and letters. He abolished all laws that 
discriminated against Hindus and worked on the principle of toleration 
of all religions. His rule was peaceful and based on social justice as 
well as communal harmony. Badshah died on ^2^^ May 1470 A.D. 
and did not leave a Government strong enough to resist invasions. 
Therefore, his son (Haider Shah) who succeeded him was defeated 
by Chak tribes. In this way, the period of Salatin-i-Kashmir came to 
an end^^ 
Chaks: The chaks came from the country of Dards - lying towards 
the extreme north of Kashmir. They were shia Muslims. The only 
thing they could do was to allo^v shias gain some influence in 
Kashmir. Ghazi Khan in 1554 A.D. laid the foundation of chak rule in 
Kashmir. Internecine wars were a special feature of that period. 
People on the whole remained backward as before because chak 
rulers did not attempt any constructive programme for the material 
prosperity of Kashmir. Chaks were replaced by moghals during the 
rule of Yakub Khan in 1568 A.D.^^ 
Moghals. Kashmir became a part of Moghal empire on 28^ ^ June 
1586 A.D. during the rule of emperor Akbar. He built the famous road 
known in Kashmir as Moghal road. In Srinagar, he built the Hari 
Parbat forte. Moreover, the abolition of Jazia and other abominable 
taxes imposed by the Muslim rulers upon their Hindu subjects took 
place during the rule of Akbar. 
Jahangir succeeded Akbar when he died on 1605 A.D. He was so 
enchanted by the beauty of Kashmir and once said that he would 
rather lose his whole kingdom than lose Kashmir. In Srinagar be built 
the Shalimar Garden, a living testimony of his aesthetic sense. After 
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the death of Jahangir (1628 A.D.), the Moghal rule under his 
successors in Kashmir lasted till middle of the eighteenth century 
(1752 A.D.) 
Afghans: under the leadership of Ahmad Shah Durani in 1752 A.D. 
Moghal rule in Kashmir was replaced. That period of Kashmir history 
was known as the period of Shahan-i-Durani. Afghans ruled upon the 
thrown of Kashmir for about 66 years (1752 to 1819 A.D.). When 
Afghan rule ended in Kashmir, 28 Governors has ruled there. The 
hallmark of most Afghan governors was unmitigated oppression of 
the people of Kashmir^^. 
Sikhs: When Afghan rule became unbearable, the people of Kashmir 
sought outside help to remove the Afghans. The Kashmiri pandit 
community led by Birbal Dhar encouraged the Sikhs to invade 
Kashmir. In response to this, then ruler of Panjab, Ranjit Singh 
invaded Kashmir and captured the valley on 15"^  June 1819. 
Therefore, after five centuries of Muslim rule during which nine-tenths 
of the population embraced Islam, Kashmir was again in the hands of 
non-Muslims. The capital city of Kashmir was renamed Srinagar. The 
rule of Ranjit Singh was claimed as dharmaraj, the rule of religion^^. 
The Sikhs ruled Kashmir for 27 years (1819-1846). Their rule proved 
worse than that of their predecessors. They treated Muslims like 
animals and nonentities"*^. 
In 1818 during Sikh attack on the city of Jammu, Ranjit Singh was 
impressed by Dogra Chieftain Gulab Singh and his brothers. Ranjit 
Singh gave Jammu to Gulab Singh in 1822 and made him a raja. His 
brother Dhyan Singh was made the raja of poonch. His brother 
Succhet Singh was made the raja of Ramnagar. During the next 15 
years, the three brothers subdued the neighbouring principalities. 
They conquered Ladakh in 1834 and Baltistan in 1840. 
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Ranjit Sing's death in 1841 led to anarchy and intrigue within the Sikh 
dominion. There was no able ruler among the Sikhs to unite the 
forces. The anarchy in the Sikh court gave an opportunity to the 
British to penetrate into the northwestern regions of India. The British 
managed to secure the cooperation of Gulab Singh in connection 
with the invasion of Afghanistan. Unlike Ranjit Singh, Gulab Singh 
offered the British his support and the use of territory. Rani Jindhan, 
Ranjit Singh's successor of Labor was aware of Gulab Singh's 
relations with the British had tried her best to maintain Sikh rule by 
offering Gulab Singh Prime minirtership in Jan. 1846'*\ Instead, 
Gulab Singh betrayed the Sikhs and conspired with the British 
believing that the British would be the future rulers of India. 
Therefore, the British conquest of Sikhs heralded the period of dogra 
rule in Kashmir"^. 
Dogras: In the Anglo-Sikh war on 10*^  February 1846, the British 
defeated the Sikhs in the Battle of Subraon. The British captured 
Lahore and other parts of Panjab that had been under the Sikh 
control. Following this, the British negotiated with Gulab Singh as a 
result on 15'^  of March 1846 treaty was signed at Amritsar Panjab 
namely "The Treaty of Amritsar 1846" under which Britishers sold this 
beautiful mountainous state to Gulab Singh for cash payment of 7.5 
million rupees. Under this treaty, Gulab Singh was recognized the 
future ruler of the state. He laid the foundation of Dogra rule, which 
was restrictive, despotic and exploitative for the Muslim subjects. 
They ruled upon the thrown of Kashmir for about 101 years. Like 
Sikhs, dogra rule could also not become popular there due to their 
exploitative policies of their subjects especially, Muslims who were 
large in numbers in the state. As, dogras and Brahmans of the 
Kashmir captured most of the agricultural lands and became 
landlords. Their exploitative policies and imposition of exorbitant land 
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revenue led to deterioration in the economic condition of peasants 
mostly Muslims'*"^ . 
Like peasants, the economic condition of men working as labourers 
and artisans in the silk factory, carpet weavers, paper-mache, gabba 
makers etc., were not good. They too were groaning under the 
burden of heavy taxation. Moreover, the treatment of officials towards 
the labours had always been one of insult and disgrace. For the first 
time In 1924, the Silk factory labourers rose against the oppressive 
behavior of the officials and protested against the working conditions 
of the factory.""* 
During the Dogra rule modern education was introduced in the state. 
Benefit of modern education and employment opportunities could not 
reach to Muslims of the state. This was mainly due to three factors. 
First, Muslims were denied admissions in schools and colleges as 
well as they were discriminated in governmental jobs. Secondly, if 
some opportunities of education were available to them they could 
not avail it due to their poverty and ignorance. Thirdly, indifferent 
attitude of Muslims towards English education'*^ and Dogra rule made 
them backward looking and isolated community. In short Muslim have 
lagged behind Hindus in education and employment"*®. 
When freedom and civil rights wero emerging in other parts of India 
and people were mobilized for demanding their rights, Dogra rulers 
suppressed all kind of freedoms in Kashmir. Kashmiris especially, 
Muslims were not allowed to express their grievances and to demand 
their rights"''. They even were not allowed to ask for their mosques 
and shrines, which were in the possession of dogras"* .^ Thus, the 
Dogra rule towards Muslims was more oppressive than the British 
rule towards Indians. 
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Preceding discussion suggests that Dogra rule in Jammu &' kashmir 
was both oppressive and suppressive. In fact, it is this" OBPressjpfr 
and suppression of legitimate rights of Kashmiris, which lecLjta^ttf^ 
emergence of Muslim protest in Kashmir. 
Muslim Protest Movement: In the beginning, the Muslim protest 
movement/ independence movement was led by Mirwaiz Yusuf Shah 
and Sheikh Abdullah. They formed All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim 
Conference. (AJKMC) in October IQSZ''^ . The aims and objectives of 
the movement (AJKMC) were undoubtedly secular from the very 
beginning. Kashmiri Muslim leadership focused its attention on the 
problems of peasants, artisans and working class groaning under the 
burden of oppressive taxes. Of course, there were certain issues of 
religious nature such as ban on cow slaughter, closure of the Pathar 
masjid and the alleged sacrilege caused to Quran in Jammu. These 
issues were mainly raised for mobilizing people against Dogra 
monarchy by Muslim leadesship^°. 
However, by January 1933 Muslim leadership in Jammu & Kashmir 
got divided into two groups the followers of Minwaiz Yusuf Shah and 
the followers of Sheikh Abdullah. Main reason of their difference was 
that Sheikh Abdullah wanted to secularize the movement in order to 
bring non-Muslims into party's fold. Whereas, Yusuf Shah group was 
opposite to that move, infact, they wanted to run the movement on 
politico-religious grounds. In consequences of the ideological 
differences, Sheikh Abdullah had dropped the name of Muslim from 
the party and consequently his party came to be known as ALL 
JAMMU AND KASHMIR NATIONAL CONFERENCE IN 1939.After 
this move, some of the non-Muslims who were associated with Indian 
National congress started supporting Sheikh Abdullah and also 
brought the party (AJKNC) close to Indian National congress led by 
Nehru and Gandhi. 
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While former All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference survived 
due to the leadership of Yusuf Shah and Chaudhri Ghulam Abass -
Jammu based representative of Muslim Conference. This party 
(AJKMC) after the split drifted towards Muslim league headed by Ali 
Mohammad Jinnah - the founder of Pakistan^\ 
Following this, on 15^^ of May 1946, Sheikh Abdullah, launched a 
"Quit Kashmir Movement" similar to Gandhi's "Quit India movement" 
four years earlier. Abdullah asserted that the British sale of Kashmir 
to Gulab Singh was an invalid act and demanded that the Dogra ruler 
(Hah Singh) leave Kashmir immediately. The Quit Kashmir led to 
wide spread agitation and in order to quell the agitation maharaja had 
to impose martial law in Kashmir. Moreover Sheikh Abdullah and his 
colleagues were arrested. When Nehru heard about Abdullah's arrest 
he visited Kashmir in order to help Abdullah but was arrested by 
Maharaja's troops. His arrest created a big stir in Delhi where the 
cabinet Mission was involved in crucial talks with leading politicians of 
India. At that time, Lord Wavel, then Governor-general of British India 
intervened and facilitated the release of Nehru back from Kashmir^^. 
Following this, there occurred a radical change in the political 
scenario of the subcontinent as on 20^ *^  February, 1947, Prime 
Minister-Clement Attlee announced that the British empire in India 
would be liquidated and power would be transferred to responsible 
hands by a date not later than June 1948". In view of this, on JuneS, 
1947, Lord Mountbatten-Governor-general of India, came out with 
partition plan. Under this plan each state was to join either of the two 
dominions (India or Pakistan) keeping in view its geography and the 
mandate of the people.^ "^  Moreover, Mountbatten visited Srinagar (on 
18^ *^  June 1947) in order to persuade Maharaja (Hah Singh) to accede 
to either country/ dominion after consulting his people before 15**^  of 
August 1947^^. Inspite of Mountbatten's insistence, Maharaja of 
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Kashmir remained undecided upto 15**^  of August 1947 with the result 
state Jammu and Kashmir became a source of conflict between India 
and Pakistan because after the partition both countries started 
claiming of the State (Jammu & Kashmir)^®. 
In the light of preceding information it could be said that before 
independence the roots of Kashmir problem were laid in: British sale 
of Jammu & Kashmir to Gulab Singh in 1846, tyrannical rule of 
dogras towards Muslims and the indecisiveness of Dogra ruler to 
declare his options and consequently the claim of both the newly 
independent countries India and Pakistan on Jammu and Kashmir. 
2.f. Economy: 
Kashmir is a land scarce and labour abundant state with less than 30 
percent of its total area suitable for cultivation^^. Agriculture is the 
mainstay of the state's economy as about 80 percent of the 
population depends on it. In valley, rice, corn and saffron were the 
main crops while wheat oil seeds were next in importance. Jammu 
province was known for wheat cultivation and also produces corn, 
millet and rice. Ladakh grew millet and fruit at elevations ranging from 
12000 to 15,000 ft. But because of its harsh climate and short 
summer agricultural development was not widely spread. The state 
does not produce enough food and relies on imports from other parts 
of India. Before partition, most of domestic supplies were obtained 
overland through Rawalpindi and Sialkote routes^^. 
However, the valleys temperate climate has been conducive to the 
growth of fruits such as apples, which cover 42 percent of the 1.6-
lakh hectares devoted to fruit cultivation. The other major fruits are 
walnut and almonds. In 1989 walnut exports alone generated over 
15.27 crore in foreign exchange^^. 
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Of the natural resources of Kashmir forests need the special mention. 
The finest quality of timber available from the forests particularly the 
Deodar have been for long its major exports.^° 
Kashmir continues to have a weak industrial base. Its large and 
medium scale industries contribute only 0.1 percent of the states 
income. The contribution of the manufacturing sector to the state 
domestic product does not exceed 9.0 percent. The only successful 
industries are found in the unorganized small-scale units comprising 
Kashmir's famous handicrafts, sericulture, handloom and village 
industries. The value of handicrafts such as carpet, paper-machie, 
woodcarving and embroidery grows from Rs. 20 crore in 1974 to Rs. 
129 crore in 1988. The tourism industry, which provides a market for 
these products, accounts approximately 10 percent of state's income. 
Moreover, tourism generates considerable employment opportunities 
ranging from hoteliers. Houseboat owners, guides and local 
artisans.^^ 
2.g. Culture: 
Foregoing discussion shows peculiar characteristics of Kashmiri 
society. Although we find super ordination of some groups over 
others, exploitation of subjects by rulers, examples of religious 
hatredness, antithetical relationships among groups, Kashmiri society 
has succeeded to maintain its uniformity. This uniformity is reflected 
in ethos, traditions, institutions that have developed over a period of 
time in Kashmiri society, cultural unity of Kashmiri society is referred 
by scholars as Kashmiryat. Kashmiryat is a mosaic of different 
cultured traits brought by different people who have come to Kashmir 
and made it as their homeland. Various groups belonging to different 
religions, tribes, races and professing different religions contributed in 
the development of pluralistic culture in Kashmir. Kashmiri culture, in 
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fact, is blending of innumerable cultural traits and complexes. The 
character of Kashmir culture is synthetic and multi-coloured like 
colours in Kashmiri carpet with warp of the culture of Kashmir valley, 
the dogra woof and Ladakhi design. Its traditions have accumulated 
down the ages, springing forth from life of early Aryan settlers led by 
kashapa and assimilating the cultures of Buddhists, Hindus, Muslims 
and the present westernized intelligentia. Thus, Kashmiri culture has 
flown through the ages like the river Jhelum incorporating in it with 
open heart, the waters of all tributaries.^^ 
2.h. Research Design: 
Research design is generally meant for setting up the research in 
such a way as to derive systematic and logically sound conclusions. 
Among its various aims, one of the important is to decide the data to 
be collected, the sample to be selected and the manner in which the 
collected data to be organized. And this all for the purpose of 
providing conclusive answer to the problem posed as well as to 
economize the research. 
As researches differ in terms of purposes, so designing of research 
cannot be uniform. Some researches may aim at exploring and 
describing phenomenon while others may involve diagnostic and 
experimental objectives. 
An exploratory research is mainly concerned with gaining familiarity 
with a phenomenon or to achieve new insights into it, often in order to 
generate data or to formulate a more precise research problem or to 
develop hypothesis. Whereas, descriptive studies aim at portraying 
the characteristics of a particular situation or group or individual (with 
or without specific initial hypotheses about the nature of these 
studies).An exploratory study would always be descriptive .While 
descriptive study may not necessarily be exploratory. 
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Diagnostic studies are concerned with discovering and testing 
whether certain variables are associated with something else (usually 
but not necessarily with a specific initial hypothesis). And an 
experimental study aims to test a hypothesis of causal relationship 
between variables^^. 
2.i. Design and Stages of the Study: 
We have conceived exploratory and descriptive design for our study. 
It is because of the fact that no sociological study has ever been 
conducted to explore socio-economic factors promoting and 
sustaining conflict in Jammu and Kashmir. This does not mean to 
deny the existence and importance of various studies mostly 
conducted from the perspective of political science (politics) and 
international relations. Some studies of historical nature are also 
available but all these studies do not give primary importance to 
social causes nor they relate politics or international perspectives with 
changing social scenario. Being the study of sociology our aim is to 
explore socio-cultural factors of conflict in Kashmir. This was not 
possible without exploratory and descriptive research design, which 
involves survey of literature, visiting to the field, seeking information 
from people etc; 
We have devised our study into following stages: 
The first stage relates with the review of existing or available 
literature. First three chapters are devoted to survey of literature 
relating with various aspects of conflict in Kashmir. 
The first chapter is concerned with scanning different sociological 
perspectives on conflict. Conflict is, universally recognized by all 
sociologists but they are not unanimous on the causes and 
consequences of the conflict. Our aim in this chapter is, therefore, to 
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analyze different sociological views on conflict in order to identify 
common elements in different perspectives as well as to evolve a 
framework for our study. 
The second chapter of the thesis is concerned with portraying the 
setting in which the conflict exists. It consists of depicting the 
physiography and linguistic distribution as well as the economy. The 
main reason to review this chapter is to gain familiarity with the 
setting in which the conflict persists. Another reason is to explore the 
socio-historical roots of J&K conflict especially before the partition of 
united India in 15'^  August 1947. 
Chapter third relates with reviewing contemporary literature on 
Kashmir problem. The literature is inter-disciplinary political scientists, 
economists, historians, journalist, diplomats and some sociologists 
also have reflected upon the conflict and its resolution. We have 
endeavored to analyze all this literature in this chapter for the 
purpose of identifying major factors of the conflict as well as to locate 
our own study in the existing literature. 
2.j. Formulation of an Interview - Schedule: 
There are many techniques of data collection. We have chosen 
interview-schedule for our study. Interview-schedule does not merely 
give us quantitative and qualitative information but also enable us to 
observe the field or respondents very closely. It is almost participant 
observation. 
Our interview-schedule contains forty-eight question (48). All 
questions are structured (close-ended). However, we have 
encouraged our respondents to provide as much information as they 
like. This was done through informal way of talking. We have 
prepared some notes on the basis of informal discussion, which may 
be referred as case studies. 
Apart from this, interview-schedule includes: dichotomous and 
multiple-choice questions. In dichotomous questions one of the two 
alternatives given in the question is in positive (yes) and other in 
negative (No) form. Dichotomous questions are useful questions as 
the information secured through them can be easily classified and 
tabulated. Whereas in multiple-choice question, different items or 
options are given below to each question and respondents are asked 
to select the one, which is most important. These type of questions 
would help us to identify major factors which are responsible for 
Jammu and Kashmir conflict. Moreover, what is the nature of Jammu 
and Kashmir conflict? Would also be known through these questions. 
In formulating this interview schedule various principles, which govern 
the formulation of any interview - schedule were taken into 
consideration. Moreover, the review of literature, experts in the field, 
colleagues and the purpose of the study were also taken into 
consideration before its formulation. 
The first part of interview-schedule begins with questions, which are 
emotionally neutral or harmless. It consists of questions related to: 
name of the respondent, his age, educations, occupation, income, 
marital status, caste, religion, sect, region, district, place and mother 
tongue. This section is known as the biographical sketch of the 
respondent contains questions, which are simple and easy to answer. 
Its purpose is to awake the interest of the respondent for the 
interview^''. It covers questions ranging from question number one(1) 
to thirteen (13). 
The second part of interview schedule (q.no.14 to 24) is concerned 
with questions related to cause of Jammu & Kashmir conflict. This 
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section highlights the cause of Jammu & Kashmir conflict and the 
various factors, which are associated with it. This will also help us to 
know the relationship that exists between the conflict and various 
variables, which are at, play in Jammu & Kashmir conflict. 
The third part (q.no.25 to 36) touches another important aspect of the 
problem, that is, to know the impact of the conflict over political, 
cultural, economic, familial and religious sub-systems of the state. 
The main rationale behind these questions are to measure, what 
extent the conflict has influenced the social structure of the people in 
Jammu & Kashmir? 
The fourth part (q.no. 37 to 48) highlights the various strategies for 
the resolution of the conflict. Resolution of conflict also constitutes an 
important theme of our study. This section would help us to know, 
what kind of solution masses want for the conflict, and their political 
preferences for the future of the state. 
Next, before going to the field, we have pre-tested the Interview-
schedule. Protesting is the process of testing after the Interview -
schedule has been formulated. It is, infact, a "dress rehearsal" of the 
final study. Pre-testing is done in order to see what weaknesses are 
present in the draft schedule. This will include the proportion of "don't 
know" answers for difficult, ambiguous, or poorly worded questions, 
the proportion of respondents who refuse interviews as well as the 
marginal comments of interviewees or respondents concerning 
particular questions. In addition, an overlooked area may be 
discovered^^. 
Lastly this interview - schedule ends with the note of thanks to 
respondents for their active co-operation in filling the interview -
schedule. 
2.k. Respondents: 
Jammu and Kashmir is a large universe. It is difficult for an individual 
scholar to take extensive fieldwork in this large state. Though, 310 
samples may be said as insufficient, it is, but more than that it was 
not possible for an individual research scholar to manage a large 
sample. 
We have selected 310 respondents purposively for the gathering of 
empirical data. Out of 310, 170 respondents are selected from valley-
Kashmir while 110 and 30 are selected from region-Jammu and 
Ladakh, respectively. Moreover, religion-wise affiliation of 
respondents both at state and regional levels are given in table no. 
1.0. 
Total No. of 
Respondents 
310 
Religion-wise Affiliation of 
Respondents At State-level 
Religion 
Hindus 
Muslims 
Sikhs 
Buddhists 
Total 
Number of 
Respondents 
70 
205 
20 
15 
310 
% age 
22.58 
66.14 
06.45 
04.83 
100% 
Religion-wise Affiliation of 
Respondnets at regional- level 
Kashmir 
20 
140 
10 
XX 
170 
Jammu 
50 
50 
10 
XX 
110 
Ladakh 
XX 
15 
XX 
15 
30 
It is important to note that (in J & K) more respondents are chosen 
from Muslim and Hindu communities than Sikhs and Buddhists. This 
is because the percentage share of Muslim (64.3%) and Hindu 
(32.1%) religious communities in the total population of the state are 
more than the percentage share of Sikhs (2.17%) and Buddhists 
(1.17%), respectively. 
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As we have shown earlier that state is broadly divided into three 
regions i.e., valley-Kashmir, Jammu and Ladakh, respectively. 
Region-wise distribution of population in the state changes position of 
religious communities. That is, Muslims in the region of Kashmir 
comprise 94.00%, Hindus 4.42%, Sikhs 1.20%. It is because of this 
fact that more respondents are selected from Muslims (140) than 
Hindus (20) and Sikhs (10) respectively. While in the region of 
Jammu Hindus (66.3%) and Muslim (29.7%) are major communities 
in the region than Sikhs (3.58%) in terms of percentage share in the 
total population of the region. Because of this reason more 
respondents are selected from Hindus (50) and Muslims (50) than the 
Sikhs (10), respectively. 
While in the region of Ladakh 15 respondents each from Buddhists 
and Muslims are selected for the purpose of interview. The number of 
respondents selected from region-Ladakh is less than the number of 
respondents we chose from region-Kashmir and Jammu respectively. 
The rationale behind this is that the percentage share of population 
residing in Ladakh (2.24%) is less than the percentage of population 
living in the region of Kashmir (52.36%) and Jammu (45.39%) 
respectively^^. 
2.L Problem Faced in Fieldwork: 
There is no doubt in this fact that in a state were feelings of 
insecurity, mayhem and mistrust prevails conducting fieldwork there 
is really a challenging job for any researcher. As the trail of miseries 
faced by the people through cross-firings, bomblasts, crackdowns, 
tortures and custodial deaths have created a grave psychological fear 
among the masses. We have faced many kinds of problems during 
fieldwork. Some of the major problems are listed below. 
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First, the problem of acceptability, wtien we approached respondents 
for interview in some remote areas of the state they refused to co-
operate at first. The main cause was that we were alien in those 
areas and did not belong the ethnic group as the group had. But we 
overcome this problem of acceptability by approaching elder people 
and some government schoolteachers working in those areas. It is 
due to their help these people agreed for the interview. 
Second, the perception of fear, in the interview - schedule there is a 
question like q. no. 43 where respondents hesitated to answer. They 
thought that information gained from them might be misused. 
However, after knowing the cause of their hesitation, we assured 
people that the information secured from them would be kept 
confidential and utilized for acaden-.ic purposes only. After assuaging 
their fear, they come out with revealing facts besides answering these 
questions. 
Next, problem related with language was also confronted. As we 
know J&K is a multi-lingual state, the questions formulated in the 
interview-schedule were in English version. People especially in 
educationally backward areas faced difficulty in understanding 
questions. But we have solved this problem by explaining them 
questions in Urdu language. In J&K Urdu is the official language and 
is understood by all the people of the state irrespective of region and 
religion. 
Last problem faced was in the form of lack of transport in remote 
areas. To overcome this problem, we had to hire horses in order to 
reach those inaccessible areas. 
In addition, after finishing the interview, the authenticity of the 
respondents responses were checked through the Govt, school 
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teachers, acted as informants for us there. These teachers have 
special experience of the area as they are living there over the years. 
2.m. Aims and Relevance of the Study: 
Before describing the aims and relevance of the study we would 
prefer to answer a very important question, which may strike to the 
mind of any researcher. The question is: why did we select conflict in 
J&K for our study? There were many reasons of it. One was the 
reason of exploring the root cause of the conflict, which has hither to 
remain unexplored from sociological angel. Two, find out the 
consequences as well as knowing view people about the way in 
which conflict is resolved. Third, Conflict in Jammu and Kashmir is 
very chronic conflict. It has retained bitter hostility between India and 
Pakistan. Not only this conflict led to loss of life there but also caused 
irreparable damage to democratic politics, economy and cultural 
pluralism of the state in fact this has generated curiosity in me to 
study this problem seriously within the framework of my subject. 
Though various studies were conducted by social scientists in India 
these studies were conducted mostly on ethnic conflicts in northeast. 
So far Indian sociologists have paid very little attention on conflict in 
J&K. This study being exploratory and descriptive in nature we hope 
would be relevant, first, in filling up the gap in literature on conflict in 
Indian sociology. Second, the information gained from the study 
would be helpful to persons who are engaged in the process of 
resolving conflict in J&K peacefully. Thirdly, it would also be relevant 
for the students who are intending to do research on J&K conflict. 
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CHAPTER-I I I 
Sources and Dimensions of Jammu and Kashmir Conflict 
Conflict in Jammu and Kashmir is popularly referred as Kashmir 
conflict. Like any other ethnic conflict involving two countries, Kashmir 
conflict is complex and multi-dimensional. It has historical, political, 
economic, religious and international dimensions. As the conflict is of 
international importance as well as has the serious repercussions for 
society, economy and polity of both India and Pakistan. It has 
attracted attention of scholars, media persons and social activists. 
Much has written on the causes and consequences of the conflict. 
Survey of available literature on the conflict shows that the conflict 
has emerged, persisted and flared-up due to various factors. 
Scholars have broadly categorized the factors/ sources into two 
categories - exogenous and endogenous. 
Three broad exogenous sources of Kashmir conflict are generally 
identified by scholars. These factors are related with unfriendly or 
hostile relationship between India and Pakistan, ineffective role of 
United Nations organization as it has failed so for in conducting 
plebiscite in Jammu & Kashmir as well as Islamic linkage of Kashmir 
with outside world and the emergence of Islamic resurgence in the 
last three decades. These factors of Kashmir conflict are explained in 
the following pages under the broad heading of (a) international 
dimension of Kashmiri conflict. Besides, there are some internal 
factors, which appear to be responsible for the emergence and 
persistence of the conflict. These factors are related with politics in 
Kashmir since 1947, economic conditions of people, and ethnic 
diversity in the state. These factors are explained under the broad 
heading of (b) national dimension of the conflict. 
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3.a. International Dimension or Exogenous Sources: 
Origin of Kashmir conflict can be traced in movement for freedom of 
India from the British rule as well as the way in which the India was 
partitioned. Freedom struggle was launched by Indian National 
Congress, which believed in secularism and a country in which 
people of all religions should live together on equal basis. From the 
beginning of 20'*^  Century issues of ethnic and religious interests crop 
up in the movement for freedom. Muslim league was formed In 1906, 
the party propagated for the protection and promotion of interest of 
IVIuslims. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, who was active member of Indian 
national congress relinquished his membership of congress party and 
joined Muslim league. He became president of Muslim league and 
advocated two-nation theory. Nation for him is based on religion; 
therefore, he raised the demand for the creation of a nation for 
Muslims. The demand got momentum from 1940 onwards. Thus, on 
the one hand, there was leadership of Indian national congress, 
which believed in secular and plural India, on the other hand, Jinnah 
demanded a country for Muslims. Kashmir being a Muslim majority 
area and adjacent to areas which became part of Pakistan was very 
dear to Jinnah. Thus, Indian National Congress Leader, Jawaharlal 
Nehru, wanted to retain Kashmir in India, whereas, Jinnah wanted 
Kashmir for Pakistan. Such a kind of contra-dictionary interests and 
ideologies of Nehru and Jinnah is explained by Paul Brass, who 
argues that source of conflict in Jammu and Kashmir lies in the 
nature of freedom struggles and the processes of nation building in 
both countries of India and Pakistan. For instance, the Indian national 
congress, which headed the Indian nationalist movement, was 
committed to the notion of creating a secular and democratic state. In 
contrast, the Pakistan nationalist movement sought to create a 
religiously based state that would serve as a homeland for south 
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Asian Muslims\ For Indian nationalists such as Nehru, the integration 
of Kashmir into India was critical because it would demonstrate that 
all faiths could live under the aegis of a secular state. By the same 
token, Pakistani nationalists such as Jinnah saw the inclusion of 
Kashmir into Pakistan as equally critical, but for diametrically opposite 
reasons (as a homeland for south Asian Muslims).^ 
The way in which India was partitioned by colonial administration 
appears to be more responsible for the creation of Kashmir conflict. In 
fact, during colonial regime there were about 562 principalities in 
India. Jammu and Kashmir was one of the principalities. Chief of this 
principality was a Hindu dogra. Hah Singh. Whereas, majority of 
people was of Muslims. Every principality was given right either to go 
with India or with Pakistan and this should be decided by people's will 
or referendum. Such kind of referendum could not took place in 
Jammu & Kashmir. Therefore, Mushtaqur Rahman, argues in his 
book 'Divided Kashmir".... That Jammu & Kashmir conflict is the 
product of hasty partition of the subcontinent, which left issues, 
related to assets, army and accession of princely states undecided. 
As, this hasty process of partition could not give enough time to 
emergent states to make reasonable decisions for the effective 
control of their territories. Thus, the problem with accession arose 
because the British seemed to do three things at one time: to rule, to 
handover power and to divide and quit in hurry^. 
Well known British historian, Alaister Lamb in his book 'Kashmir A 
Disputed Legacy' also argues in the same line that it had taken the 
British hundred years to consolidate the Indian empire. In 1947, they 
dismantled it in seventy days. 
As the people of Jammu & Kashmir were not given chance to express 
their will about their future destiny, the issue of Kashmir remained 
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alive. Last monarch, Hari Singh did not opt for India or Pakistan. 
Technically the state became an independent*. As the majority of 
people were of Muslims, Pakistani leaders promoted entry of Pathans 
who incited rebellion in Jammu & Kashmir. Sumit Ganguly writes that 
during the first week of October 1947, a tribal rebellion broke out near 
poonch in the northwestern reaches of Kashmir. In response to it a 
band of tribal from the northwest frontier province of Pakistan invaded 
the state on October 22, 1947. They had captured the part of 
Kashmir now referred as "Azad-Kashmir"^ 
In response to this development, dogra monarch, Hari Singh then 
requested for military assistance from India. Lord Mount batten -
governor general of India, suggested Nehru to get instrument of 
Accession from Hari Singh before sending troops there. Accordingly, 
on 26"^  of October 1947, the accession document was signed. Sheikh 
Abdullah also had ratified it subseauently. Mount batten, who was in 
the chair favoured kashmir's temporary accession to India on the 
condition that the people's wishes would be ascertained after the 
restoration of law and order in the state. Similarly, on Nov.2, 1947, 
Nehru also confirmed in a broadcast: "that the fate of Kashmir is 
ultimately to be decided by people". And that "we are prepared ... to 
have a referendum (Plebiscite) held under international auspices like 
United Nations" .^ To date this promise of Nehru remained unfulfilled 
and became a seat of Kashmir Conflict. 
Why did Mount batten suggest Nehru to get Instrument of accession 
from Hari Singh? Why did he not send British army to crush the 
rebellion? Why did he indirectly help the entry of Indian army into the 
Kashmir? These and others are some questions, which are still not 
been answered. It is, therefore, many scholars suspect a colonial 
design in the creation of Kashmir conflict. One of such scholars is 
British historian Alaister Lamb. He argues that decision to retain 
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Jammu and Kashmir as part of India was made by the British colonial 
administration under Mount-batten, as the departing British felt that 
Jammu and Kashmir was an important buffer to the north of India 
against the communist Soviet Union. Since it was a political decision 
made by the colonial administration, there was no question of 
allowing the future of Kashmir to be decided throug^Mlafe'.^ opufi5'rA/i«jJr'-
of the people/ / l y ^ . U ^ " ^ ' 
In Lamb's opinion the logic behind partition of the kjkk^ntinent into a; 
Muslim and non-Muslim portions suggested that Kasn^iir QL 
to Pakistan. The mechanics of partition as applied to the Pahjab in 
great measure created the background to Kashmir dispute. In theory 
all Muslim majority districts contagious with Muslim core of Panjab 
would go to Pakistan but by awarding three out of four tehsils of 
Gurdaspur district to India, the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to 
India became a practical possibility. Through these territories like 
Gurdaspur, Batala and Pathankot, road link between Jammu and 
Kashmir with India became a practical possibility. While before 
independence Kashmir was linked to rest of the subcontinent through 
Srinagar-Rawalpindi and Jammu-Sialkot roads.^ 
Although Maharaja's accession of the state to India legalized the 
entry of Indian army into the state on 27*'' of October 1947. This led to 
outbreak of war between Indian and Pakistani troops in November 
1947. With no resolution in sight, at the suggestion of Mountbatten, 
the Indian cabinet decided to refer the case to United Nations 
Security Council. Accordingly, a complaint was lodged to the council 
on, Januaryl, 1948.^This led to the internationalization of the Kashmir 
conflict. 
Well-known Indian journalist Kuldip Nayyer says that the debate in 
the Security Council did not go the way India thought it would. There 
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was no immediate acceptance of its basic complaint that Pakistan 
had created a situation, which might lead to international friction. In 
the Security Council debate Pakistani representative, Mohammad 
Zafrullah Khan's arguments proved more convincing. Therefore, 
convinced of Pakistan's case, the Security Council changed the tilt of 
the complaint from "Jammu and Kashmir question" to "Indo-Pakistan 
question". The Council passed its first resolution on 17*^  January 
1948, calling on both sides to help ease tension. 
Three days later, however, the council passed another resolution to 
create a United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCiP) 
to exercise a mediatory role and to investigate facts. The Council 
through its resolution on 21^^ April, 1948, had raised the commissions 
strength to five and was authorized: to investigate facts, to use its 
mediatory role in regard to Kashmir, to restore order and hold a 
plebiscite in Kashmir in co-operation with both governments. India 
rejected the resolution on the ground that it raised doubts about the 
legality of accession^". Following this, the commission passed 
another resolution on 13*^  august 1948. The resolution was split up in 
three parts. Part-I concerned itself with the cease-fire, part-ll with the 
trace agreement and part-Ill with plebiscite. It is to be noted that part-
Ill was to be taken on after part-l and part-ll had been fully 
implemented and not before. 
In this resolution, Commission asked Pakistan to withdraw its troops 
from Kashmir. The Indian withdrawal was to follow that of Pakistan. 
Although India was allowed to retain a certain number of forces 
necessary for the maintenance of law and order in the state. Pakistan 
did not accept the resolution, as it demanded balanced and 
synchronized withdrawal of both armies of India and Pakistan. 
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After this, on 11 December 1948, another resolution was adopted. 
Some of the important provisions of the resolution are as follows: 
i) The question of accession of Kashmir to India or Pakistan 
would be decided by the free and impartial plebiscite. 
ii) The plebiscite was contingent on a ceasefire in accordance 
with the provision of part-l and II of the commission's 
resolution passed on 13 August 1948. 
iii) Appointment of plebiscite administrator who would be 
nominated by the secretary general of United Nations in 
consultation with the commission. 
iv) (a) After the cease-fire, and when the commission was 
satisfied about the restoration of peaceful conditions, it 
would in consultation with the government of India and the 
plebiscite administrator determine the final disposal of 
Indian and state armed forces. 
(b) As regards the areas under Pakistan, final disposal of 
the troops in that territory would be determined by the 
commission and the plebiscite administrator. 
It is important to note that both India and Pakistan had accepted the 
UN mediated proposals as discussed in the preceding paragraph. 
Accordingly both countries came to accept a UN mediated cease-fire 
and UN observers group to supervise it from January 1, 1949." 
The present cease-fire line divides the state into two political units: 
(a) Azad Kashmir lying under the control of Pakistan and 
(b) Indian Part of Kashmir-Jammu, Kashmir valley and Ladakh. 
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Presently 45 percent of the state's territory is in India, 35 percent in 
Pakistan and the remaining 20 percent in Chinese control.^^ 
After cease-fire, UN commission has failed to convince India for 
withdrawal of troops from the state. However, the Security Council 
president, Mc Naughton, in order to remove the deadlock, proposed 
that India and Pakistan forces should be withdrawn and both the 
Azad Kashmir troops and the state forces were to be reduced. India 
rejected the proposal but India's rejection did not deter the Security 
Council from adopting Mc Naughton's proposal in a resolution dated 
14 march 1950^^ 
When the Commission failed to persuade India for plebiscite, it 
recommended its own dissolution and appointed Sir Owen Dixon as 
UN mediator on 2f^ of March 1950. 
He made two proposals: (1) to hold the plebiscite by sections or 
areas (2) to partition the state according to the known wishes of the 
inhabitants and holding a plebiscite in the Kashmir valley^"*. 
Following this, in disregard of the United Nations pending discussions 
of Kashmir, India held elections in Kashmir in 1951 and formed a 
constituent assembly to further integrate the state. In response to this 
development, the Security Council at the instance of Pakistan 
resolved (30 March, 1951) that any decision made by the state 
constituent assembly about the future of Kashmir would not be 
binding.""^ 
Mean while, in early 1951 an attempt was made to resolve the conflict 
at Common wealth conference. Accordingly, on S'*^  January 1951, 
seven Prime Ministers of Common wealth nations (UK, Australia, 
New-Zealand, Canada, Sri Lanka, Pakistan and India) met informally 
and discussed the Kashmir issue for about 80 minutes. It was 
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proposed that common wealth troops be stationed in Kashmir. India 
rejected this proposal also.^^ 
After this failure, the United Nations again continued with its 
"operation Kashmir". Between 1951 and 1955, there were five UN 
reports - all by a new UN mediator, Frank P. Graham. He first 
suggested direct talks between India and Pakistan governments. 
When this proposal made no headway, he got down to fixing the 
quantum of forces to be retained by the two sides after 
demilitarization of the state, for holding a plebiscite. Graham's 
proposal was acceptable to India and Pakistan only in parts. 
Therefore, he also came to the conclusion that the way out for the 
resolution of Kashmir conflict was bilateral talks between India and 
Pakistan". 
In 1953, Pakistan joined the lobby of United States in response to it, 
Indian leadership went back on its promise of the right of self-
determination for the people of Jammu and Kashmir^ ®. 
Whereas, India joined the lobby of Soviet Union. In view of this Nehru 
in 1956 declared that there was no need for a plebiscite because 
Kashmir was legally a part of India^^. In this way from 1957 with 
soviet veto permanently in place any meaningful initiative on Kashmir 
offered a bleak prospect. 
The continued dispute over the state had crystallized two more 
bloody wars between India and Pakistan in 1965 and 1971, 
respectively. In 1965 war after the cease-fire, then Soviet Union took 
the initiative and brought Indian Prime Minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri 
and Ayub Khan (Pak military ruler) together at Tashkant where peace 
declaration was signed. This was the first-time that both India and 
Pakistan affirmed in writing " not to resort to force" and "to settle 
Kashmir dispute through peaceful negotiations". 
The same peaceful approach was underlined In the Shimla 
agreement in 1972. Under this agreement the two countries resolved 
to settle their difference by "peaceful means" and promised not to 
"unilaterally alter the situation". The two also under took to "prevent 
organization assistance or encouragement of any act detrimental to 
the maintenance of peaceful relations between the two". 
Since the Shimla agreement there has been no conflict between India 
and Pakistan but there has been no settlement either. Now due to the 
presence of militancy in the state since 1989,Pakistan now argues 
more vigorously than before that Kashmir is the core of its problems 
with India. Once it is out of the way, the relationship will normalize 
with India. Moreover, it (Pakistan) reiterates the demand for a 
plebiscite. It may do so one day but all the major powers in the world 
are united in thinking that the solution will have to be found by India 
and Pakistan. 
Since the emergence of militancy in the state, another party, the 
Kashmiri's have come prominently into the picture. Their separatism 
on the one hand, and India's ruthless suppression on the other, has 
attracted the world attention. This has introduced a new option 
"Independence "undoing accession to India and not joining 
Pakistan"^". 
The preceding facts and analysis show that roots of Kashmir conflict 
lie in the nature of India's freedom struggle, hasty partition of the 
country and the denial of right of plebiscite to people of Jammu and 
Kashmir. These factors of Kashmir conflict have transformed it into 
conflict between two sovereign countries or an international conflict. 
Although it has repeatedly been argued in diplomatic circles and 
media that Kashmir conflict should be bilaterally resolved. I wonder! 
how can it be possible without involving some other parties. 
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3.b. Endogenous Sources or National Dimension: 
No conflict can emerge and sustain only with the exogenous factors. 
For the emergence or sustenance of the conflict internal 
contradictions, clash or development of discriminatory political system 
and economic contradictions are more responsible for the emergence 
and sustenance of conflict. Indeed, external factors may only 
contribute in the intensification of the conflict. Many internal factors of 
Kashmir conflict are discussed and debated in academics and media. 
Foremost among these factors are politics in the state after 1947 war, 
educational development from 1960's and unemployment among 
educated youth, rampant poverty and inequalities in the state. There 
is also one more important factor of Kashmir conflict; this is ethnic 
diversity in the state. 
3.b.1. Political Dimension: 
Politics in Jammu and Kashmir since October 1947 onwards has 
taken a radical turn. As after war broke out between India and 
Pakistan in October 1947, the last monarch of the state Hari Singh 
left Kashmir and shifted himself to Jammu. In view of this 
development, government of India proclaimed prominent Kashmiri 
leader Sheikh Abdullah as an Interim head of the state in October 
1947^\ Abdullah was convinced that the Kashmiri identity could be 
best protected in the Indian secular and democratic polity.^^ 
Infact, on 17*^  October 1949, Government of Indian respecting the 
identity urges of people and also recognizing the particular nature of 
a problem had awarded Kashmir a 'special status" through article -
370. 
It allows the state to have its own constitution, restricts the 
parliament's powers to three subjects: defense, communication and 
foreign affairs. If other constitutional provisions or union powers are to 
be extended to Kashmir not only the prior "concurrence" of the state 
Government is required but also it has to be ratified by the state's 
constituent Assembly.^^ 
Following this, in October 1950, as an intern head of the state 
Abdullah had formally demanded election to create constituent 
assembly in the state. Therefore, in 1951 elections for the state 
assembly were held first time in which National conference led by 
Sheikh Abdullah got sweeping victory. Accordingly in November 1951 
Shiekh Abdullah was sworn as the first Prime Minister of the state, 
Jammu & Kashmir. Because of this political development power and 
authority which was monopolized by Dogra monarchy shifted to 
Sheikh Abdullah who belonged to Kashmiri ethnic group.^'* 
In the initial years of his government to improve the socio-economic 
conditions of the people land reforms were introduced in the state. 
Under it ownership rights were granted to landless Kashmiri 
peasantry. It is because of these humanitarian land reforms Abdullah 
became popular figure among lower and middle class Muslims of 
Kashmir and got their vote and support till his death. Moreover, the 
electorate especially, Kashmiri Muslims changed from a politically 
passive to an increasingly assertive population. In fact, through land 
reforms the foundation for the emergence of a new generation of 
Kashmiris was laid^^. 
In 1952, a group of communal organizations led by Jan Sangh 
President Shyam Prasad Mukherjee along with Hindu Mahasaba, 
RSS ( Rashtriya Suyam Savak Sangh) Jammu Praja Parishad^^ and 
others started demanding that state's special status (article-370) 
should be abolished^^. Renowned Indian Journalist M.J. Akbar says 
at Jammu these communal organizations had the backing of. the 
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Hindu landlords, which have lost economic and political monopoly 
after Sheikh introduced land reforms in the state. He argues in the 
state Hindu landlords may have lost economic power but they 
especially elites still retain their influence In the politics of the state. 
Landlords whose property has been redistributed to the landless 
Muslim peasantry spread the rumor that the Sheikhs reforms were 
actually nothing but well disguised anti-Hinduism, since it was the 
Hindu whose land had gone to the Muslim peasantry^^. 
It merits mention here that "Mukherjee's agitation only served to 
resurrect fears in the national conference about how sharp the edge 
of Hindu fanaticism could be. The temptation to keep the ultimate 
control of Kashmir's destiny in the hands of Kashmiris rather than 
surrender it to India played its part"^^. 
During 1952 crisis political elites at centre especially Nehru remained 
Ineffective to stop these communal agitators. In response to this 
unexpected development, Sheikh Abdullah (On July 10, 1952) at the 
party's head quarters in Srinagar is quoted as having said that even 
Nehru could not control communal elements in India and the time 
might come when Kashmir would have to say "goodbye" to secular 
India. This speech was used to prove that he had now become 
"traitor" to India and was dismissed from power on 8*^  August, 1952^°. 
After the arrest of Sheikh Abdullah, separatist political space had 
developed in politics of Jammu & Kashmir. As in 1953, a movement 
(Plebiscite front) was launched to secure the right of plebiscite for 
Kashmiris^V Moreover, government of India had allowed only those 
politicians to come in power who were not opposed to Jammu & 
Kashmir's full constitutional integration with India. Among these 
politicians names of G.M. Bakshi (1953-63),Sadiq (1964-1971) & Mir 
Qasim (1971-75) deserves mention. As it is during the tenure of these 
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ministers most of the provisions of article - 370 were diluted and 
treated Jammu & Kashmir at par like any other Indian state^^. 
Meanwhile at the political level the ruling regional party national 
conference was dissolved and made a branch of All India congress 
party^^. This led to suppression of democratic politics in post 1953-
period. In fact, these hasty measures were perceived in Kashmir as a 
threat to its identity. They caused an unprecedented wave of anger in 
Kashmir against relations with India "^*. 
It is in this situation, the Indian leadership went back on its promise of 
the right of self-determination as ruling elites at centre felt sure now 
that the Muslims of Kashmir would not vote to join India if plebiscite is 
held there^^ 
Even after bringing these radical politico-constitutional changes in 
Jammu & Kashmir, relationship of the state with the central 
government has remained weak and full of suspicion^®. However, in 
1975 ruling national party realizing that the state could not be 
controlled/ run by weak and unpopular leaders had started political 
bargaining with national conference leader. Sheikh Abdullah. That led 
to signing of accord referred as " the Kashmir accord 1975". This 
accord paved the way for S. Abdullah to re-enter into politics of 
Jammu and Kashmir on 24'^ February, 1975^^. 
As a consequence of this, the separatist forces were significantly 
marginalized. The plebiscite front was dissolved and most of its 
leaders had now joined the mainstream politics^®. 
M.J. Akbar says that Farooq Abdullah was unanimously chosen as 
Chief Minister of the state (on 8*^  September 1982) after his fathers 
death. At that time the congressrren of Kashmir had an additional 
problem they had been kept out of power since 1975.After the 
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Sheikhs death they faced the prospect of another long spell out of 
power in case Farooq Abdullah succeeded in his political career. In 
1983 assembly elections in order to keep congress out of power 
national conference came in alliance with another regional party, 
Awami Action committee^^ (AAC). This resulted in NC-AAC alliance in 
Kashmir. After winning 1983 assembly elections, central government 
had started conspiracy to dismiss elected government of Farooq by 
encouraging defection within his party through then governor 
(Jagmohan) of the state''°. 
That defection led to dismissal of the elected government of Farooq 
in 1984. Accordingly G.M. Shah, though sponsored by Governor of 
the state, was allowed to form a government (in 1984). Because of 
this development moderate Kashmiris faith in Indian democracy has 
again shaken. Although Farooq was not as popular as his father but 
his dismissal began a new phase of alienation''^ 
However after a brief period of Governor's rule Farooq was once 
again brought back in an alliance with congress led by Raju Gandhi 
at centre in 1987. This alliance totally undermined the party's 
popularity and capacity of representing the distinctive Kashmiri 
sentiments and the identity urges of the people. 
It was after this alliance (Congress-NC) extremist trends in Kashmir 
politics started emerging and gaining strength. Parties with proven 
secular nationalist credentials like national conference started losing 
ground. This situation helped to strengthen the Muslim united Front"*^  
(MUF) and made it a major force in Kashmir's politics. So much so 
that Congress National Conference alliance had to resort to large 
scale rigging in assembly elections (1987) in order to remain in power 
there^^ 
By doing so, a golden opportunity of exercising an influence of 
moderation on the Muslim United front was missed by denying it an 
opportunity of participating in India's rich democratic experience. It is 
in this situation people got completely alienated from the mainstream 
politics. This situation led many unemployed youth to shift directly 
from the electoral politics to armed militancy. 
In fact, groups of young men who took to violence comprised mostly 
those who had actually worked during the 1987 assembly elections 
on the side of MUF (Muslim United Front). These people were 
subjected to severe torture for their association with the opposition. 
The objective situation thus created provided a good opportunity to 
Pakistan to get involved in Kashmir as never before. 
Moreover, since the emergence of militancy India resorted to heavy 
deployment of troops there in order to quite militancy. In fact, this 
deployment led to indiscriminate violation of human rights of the 
common men, which further alienated them from the political 
system'*'*. 
To give militancy a political face various militant organizations came 
together and formed the Hurriyat conference in 1993. As an 
amalgam, the Hurriyat incorporates almost the full spectrum of 
ideologies prevalent in Kashmir at that time. Despite its internal 
contradictions, to ensure the right of self-determination for Kashmiris 
peacefully and politically, it is providing opposition to the agencies of 
Indian state through its activities of calling strikes, demonstrations 
against the excesses committed by the security forces'*^. 
In fact, after a long gap of Governor's rule in 1996 Government of 
India have revived the political processes again there. Since then 
elected governments working there under a number of constraints 
has not been able to deliver anything worthwhile. The state authority 
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is still largely dependent on coercive and repressive agencies. It is a 
major reflection of its weakness rather than strength. This situation of 
lawlessness with all its attributes of insecurity and uncertainty is likely 
to prevail if the problem is not addressed in all its vital dimensions'*^. 
It is therefore; conflict in Jammu & Kashmir is a political phenomenon. 
As the genesis of the conflict gets traced in the political sub-system 
which failed to fulfill the legitimate political aspirations of people. And, 
it is in this situation people resorted to militancy/ violence. In fact, 
when political system fails to articulate the grievances of politically 
alienated people they challenge it and resort to violence. 
3.b.2. Economic Dimension: 
More than politics it is economy, which plays an important role in 
integrating or alienating people to any social system. Karl Marx and 
many other scholars have given primacy to economic factor in 
understanding and analyzing social reality. But scholars have not fully 
explored the role of economic factors in Kashmir conflict. It is 
generally political factors, which have been given primary in the 
analysis of Kashmir conflict. This has resulted an incomplete analysis 
of the conflict. 
We have mentioned in the preceding chapter that Kashmir is a land 
scarce and labour abundant state, with less than 30 percent of its 
total area under cultivation''^ Agriculture is the main source of state's 
income as about 80 percent of the population depends on it. The 
state does not produce enough food and relies on imports from 
India"*®. It is because of this reason; Kashmir's imports are about four 
times its exports. The excess of imports over exports has to be made 
up through payments from other incomes - from tourism, which 
accounts for one - third of the state's income (1983), from earnings in 
Handicrafts, agriculture and others'*^. 
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However, exports from Kashmir are those of fruit, mainly apples, and 
handicrafts, mainly carpets and shawls. Knowledgeable observers 
estimate that fruit growers in the valley-Kashmir get only about 20.00 
percent of the auction price at Deihi. As the trade, in the apples is 
controlled (at Azadpur, Delhi) by Panjabi Khatri traders^°. The state is 
famous for its forests^^ and water resources - according to one 
estimate the state has a 10,000 Mw power generation potential 
Besides, the state is industrially very backward. Most of the large and 
medium scale industries are under the control of the state 
government and contribute only 0.1% to the state's income. 
Moreover, the contribution of the manufacturing sector to the state's 
domestic product does not exceed 9.0 percent^^. 
Renowned political scientist, Sumit Ganguly says that before 
independence the state was ruled by Dogra monarchs who did little 
to improve the socio-economic condition of the people especially of 
Muslims. The principle source of income, land was held by two 
classes of landlords: Jagirdars and muafidars - who were mostly 
non-Muslims. These landlords used to exploit landless Muslim 
peasantry that comprised the bulk of population. 
Due to its level of economic backwardness, the state has been 
categorized as one of the backward states of India after 
independence. The backwardness of the state was largely attributed 
to landlordism. Therefore, the first measures taken by the newly state 
Government led by late Sheikh Abdullah were land reforms. Under it 
excess of land was confiscated from the landlords and were 
distributed among the landless Muslim peasantry. In fact, these 
reforms led to the emergence of a new class of Muslims in Kashmir, 
which are more prosperous than their earlier exploited peasantry. 
However, due to many shortcomings in land reforms implementation 
and policies it could not achieve the desired results". 
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No doubt over the years state's agricultural production has increased 
but due to increase in its population the state's dependence on 
outside market for consumer goods has consistently increased. It is 
because of this reason; consumers within the state have to devote 
two-thirds of their earnings to basic necessities such as food and 
clothing. The increased dependence on imports caused inflation and 
raised the cost of living for the majority of poor Kashmiris^'*. 
However, to overcome the hardships of Kashmiris, the government of 
India has heavily subsidized the state with large-scale grants. In case 
of Jammu & Kashmir alone, this central assistance is 70 percent loan 
and 30 percent grants, as against 90 percent grants and 10 percent 
loan for the other states^^. 
This policy of central government proved misguided/ misused 
because these large-scale central grants encouraged corruption and 
did not allow the state to mobilize its own resources for self-reliance. 
In view of this, the state is now facing debt crisis. According to RBI 
report (1995), the debt servicing liability on one rupee loaned by the 
centre to jammu & Kashmir today is Rs. 5.53.^^ 
Besides, even more than those of other states Jammu and Kashmir 
government expenditure is determined by security considerations. 
Educated estimates suggest 60.00 percent of the annual 
administrative expenses of the state are now devoted to security 
related activities'^. 
In Jammu & Kashmir "with a rapidly increasing population, expanding 
and easily accessible education and growing pressure on land, the 
creation of non-agricultural employment has become a pressing 
need. The development of modern industry would be one such 
alternative to provide opportunities for absorbing technically qualified 
people"'^ 
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Ironically, investment in Kashmir by Delhi and pan-Indian bourgeoisie 
has been basically in two fields - roads and communications for 
military and commercial purposes. Capital investment in the field of 
Industry was virtually non-existant^^. Therefore, most of the large and 
medium scale industries were state owned which contribute only 
0.1% to state's income. Several factors are responsible for 
discouraging investors to invest there; such as: being land-locked, on 
the boarder with Pakistan and the special status granted to the state 
by the centre under article 370 which bars non-Kashmiris from 
owning property within the state. Now for the Indian bourgeoisie it is a 
captive market for its manufactures. 
By the mid 1970's corruption and nepotism began to escalate to 
unprecedented levels. The government of Jammu and Kashmir 
favoured the supporters in making appointments in the administration 
and the state owned corporation. As a result of such generous 
distributions of administrative patronage, the bureaucracy proliferated 
and the wage bill of the state consumed 43 percent of its non-plan 
expenditures. It is in this situation, the economic planning and 
development have been relegated to the background by politicians in 
the state^°. 
In the light of the aforementioned information, it is suffice to say that 
the backward economy of the state has a relation with politics. 
Moreover, with economic planning being relegated to the background 
by politicians and the increase in unemployment and corruption in the 
state led many unemployed youth of the state to join militant 
organizations. 
3.b.3. Ethnic Dimension: 
Jammu and Kashmir, as we have dsscribed in the preceding chapter, 
is a multi-ethnic society. Broadly, it could be divided into three 
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physiographic regions these. Three regions are called Jammu, 
Kashmir and Ladakh, respectively. Each region is again plural in 
nature as in each region there are people belonging to different 
religious, linguistic, tribal and racial communities. 
Although the state has been multi-ethnic all through ages. Its culture 
was earlier defined in terms of what is called as Kashmiriyat. 
Kashmiriayat appears to have declined there. According to Riyaz 
Panjabi, well-known political scientist, the unprincipled politics 
pursued by central government for Jammu & Kashmir resulted into 
the rupture of Kashmiriyat and division of people on the basis of 
religion. Today Jammu and Kashmir state is thought to be divided 
into three broad communities: Muslims of Kashmir valley, Hindus of 
Jammu and Buddhists of Ladakh^\ 
As a result of many political developments, the three different 
demands are coming out from the ethnic groups who are dominant in 
respective provinces of the state. For instance, in Jammu, particularly 
from the dogra dominant belt (like district Jammu, Udhampur and 
Kuthua) the demand for separate Jammu state is being raised from 
time to time. In ladakh were Buddhists especially from Leh district are 
asserting of the "union territory status". While, Muslims of Kashmir 
mostly seek "Independence" from Inda^^. Moreover, Muslims of valley 
Kashmir who always feared that the policies of Hindu government at 
centre would pursue a policy of annihilating the rights and the cultural 
identity of Muslims in the state. It is, therefore, Gautam Navlakha, 
renowned human rights activist, rightly says that: 
"The roots of the crisis in Kashmir lie in the Kashmir's fears for the 
loss of the cultural identity in the face of the Hindu/ Hindu notion of 
nationalism. A telling instance of this is provided in a circular issued 
on January 12 (1990) by the Director of the News Services Division of 
All India Radio which says "attention is drawn of all concerned and 
particularly news readers, translators in the respective languages 
including, Hindi, Urdu and Kashmiri, that 'rashtrapati" will be used for 
president, 'Uprashtrapati" of the vice president and "Pradhanmantri" 
for the Prime Minister. For India, the language version will be Bharat. 
Innocuous (not harmful) as this appears in attempting to bring about 
linguistic uniformity, there is an insidious attempt to force through 
assimilation. By singling out Urdu and Kashmiri the attempt to 
establish the hegemony of Hindu/ Hindi nationalism is evident. This 
manifests the single most important source of the crisis in Kashmir 
valley - cultural marginalization of a group of people due to a 
processes of state sponsored imposition of pan-indianess derived 
from a Sankritic Brahmanical notion of Bhartiya culture and 
civilization''^^ 
3.b.4. Religious Dimension: 
Kashmir conflict can also be looked from religious angle. The role of 
religion in fomenting the Kashmir conflict can be analysed in three 
ways. The first way is to explain that because of Muslim dominance in 
Kashmir valley, the conflict is generated and promoted by Muslims. 
Many scholars believe that Muslims are separatists and Islam 
teaches the ideology of Jihad or not to live with non-Muslims. This is 
a very parochial view. As the evidence from the different parts of the 
world do not support this view. 
The second way is to explain religion as a force of mobilizing and 
encouraging them to fight for their rights. We have already seen in 
preceding pages that Kashmiris have been politically alienated, 
economically deprived and culturally marginalized. It is this alienation, 
marginalization and deprivation, which are being expressed through 
religion. 
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It is within this context, one must see the call for Jihad (holy war). 
This is fact that religious militancy in Kashmir had developed after 
Islamic revolution in Iran, and defeat of Soviet Union in Afghanistan. 
In both the cases it was Islamic Jihad, which was propagated and 
understood by people as a winning force. This is possible that many 
Kashmiri youth might have encouraged with the slogan of jihad in 
these two cases. 
Professor, Iftikhar Malik also says that militants in Jammu & Kashmir 
are inspired by religious and cultural power that emanated from the 
Iranian revolution and Soviet expulsion from Afghanistan. In both 
cases, powerful, modern, well-equipped armies were defeated by a 
dedicated, purposeful power, motivated by religion and culture. 
The third way is to understand role of religion in Kashmir as a 
reaction against modernization and globalization. All over the world 
movements struggling in the name of religion have emerged in post-
modern and post-cold war era. This is an era were the hegemony of 
one superpower is established in all fields of life through the 
mechanism which are now being called globalization. All over the 
world-marginalized people are mobilizing themselves to fight against 
the hegemony of superpower and within their country the hegemony 
of the state. For this fight, they ute religion for fighting against the 
hegemony. Kashmir conflict can also be understood as a fight against 
the hegemony of Indian state and Kashmiris use religion for this kind 
of struggle. 
Whatever may be the way of analyzing the role of religion in Kashmir-
conflict. This is a fact, that Islam is being used for mobilizing people 
to fight against the Indian state and to internationalize the conflict^^. 
We have explained in the preceding pages how much economically 
backward Kashmiris. And, how did politicians rig political process and 
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alienate people. Economic backwardness and political corruption and 
alienation of people are no doubt potential factors of sustaining 
conflict. But no conflict can be sustained without consciousness of 
people about the conflict and this has happened in Kashmir. Kashmir 
has witnessed growth in education and mass media rapidly, which 
play an important role in making people aware about the conflict. 
Growth of educated unemployed youth proved as catalysts for 
conflict in Kashmir. 
Muslims, majority of Jammu and Kashmir, who were poor and 
illiterate during the Dogra reign, were discriminated also. However, 
after independence with the transformation of power to the people 
Sheikh Abdullah became the chief. He had initiated many 
programmes like land reforms, which had speeded up processes of 
social transformation. Despite economic backwardness and political 
corruption in the state, education and mass media have rapidly 
grown. According to Sumit Ganguiy "in the ten years from 1971 to 
1981, the overall literacy rate in Jammu and Kashmir grew by more 
than 43 percent, the third fastest growth rate in the nation"® .^ 
Along with education, mass media also increased rapidly in the state. 
Between 1965 and 1984 tremendous growth occurred in the print 
media, in India in general and in Kashmir in particular. For example, 
in 1965 only 46 newspapers were published in Kashmir. Ten years 
later, 135-newspapers were being published. By 1991, the number 
had grown to 254. Essentially, in the span of approximately twenty-
five years, the number of newspapers published grew by 450 
percent^ ®. 
Growth of education and mass media has played an important role in 
flaring up Kashmir conflict. It makes people aware and conscious 
about the way in which their rights are violated and also promoted 
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leadership among them. Mass media makes the conflict national and 
International^''. 
In India there is evident gap between education and unemployment. 
This has also occurred in Kashmir. Almost all Kashmiri educated 
youth want to get jobs in Kashmir, which are not available in 
abundance in their state. Educated youths do also not have good 
opportunities of self-employment as small scale Industries and 
business prospects have not developed in the Kashmir and whatever 
development has taken place in this area got devastated since 1989, 
the year from which militancy started. As a result unemployed 
educated youth proved like oil in the fire. 
An alienated and frustrated many of them turn their attention towards 
earning livelihood with innovative means i.e., militancy. Humra 
Quraishi has observed in her book Kashmir The Untold Story that 
"three lakh educated people are currently unemployed in Kashmir..." 
"Huge numbers of the young are unemployed, many more are 
underemployed". The principal of a school in Srinagar confessed to 
being frightened by the rising numbers of the jobless 'just last week 
one of my nephews told me that bekaari (unemployment) was making 
him so desperate that he might have to consider becoming a killer... 
the going rate for hired killers is rupees ten thousand per murder, he 
told me! What more can I tell you about the deterioration around^®? 
P.S.Verma, has also observed a critical relationship between the 
phenomenon of militancy and unemployment in his study. In case of 
Kashmir valley, the highest rate of unemployment was found in the 
border districts of Kupwara and Baramulla from where there has been 
a maximum contribution to the ranka of Kashmir's militants®^. 
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Above discussion explicitly suggest us to say that conflict in Kashmir 
is not due to simple factors i.e., Kashmir is a Muslim majority state 
whereas rest of India is dominated by Hindus so there is a conflict 
between Muslims and Hindus or the conflict is due to Pakistan's 
hostility towards India which encourages terrorism in the area. These 
factors are commonly perceived by people, contrary to common 
perception conflict in Kashmir is multidimensional which involves the 
question of international law, rights of people, mismanaging politics of 
the state, increasing poverty and alienation among people. All these 
and other such factors facilitate persistence of conflict in Kashmir. In 
such a situation we think religion is used for mobilizing public opinion 
for the purpose of fighting for what Kashmiris think as their right. 
Furthermore, we think fragile socio-economic condition and growing 
alienation among people peeved the way for Pakistan to exploit the 
situation against the interests of India. Therefore, conflict in Kashmir 
should be tackled at various levels. 
In the next two chapters we will present the analysis of the responses 
of respondents concerning about causes and consequences of the 
conflict as well as measures for its resolution. 
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CHAPTER - IV 
FACTORS OF JAMMU & KASHMIR 
CONFLICT: AN Analysis 
This and next chapter are concerned with the analysis of empirical 
data which we have collected through the mechanism of Interview -
schedule and participant observation. From 310 respondents of 
three different regions of the state and of four major religious 
communities i.e., Muslims, Hindus, Sikhs and Buddhists. As the 
interview-schedule contains questions about causes, consequences 
and ways for resolving conflict, we have analyzed these questions 
under these major headings. In this chapter we have analyzed those 
questions, which are related with various factors of the conflict like 
political, economic, ethnic & religious. 
4.8. Political Factors: 
We have seen in the preceding chapter that scholars have greatly 
emphasized on political factors in order to understand and analyze 
the sources of Kashmir conflict. Political factors are of various kinds 
like the nature of freedom struggle, hasty partition of India and 
political corruption in the state etc. It is, therefore, we have asked our 
respondents which factor is more important for them. In question-
number fourteen (14) we have given five options or political factors 
and asked respondents to select the one that they think is most 
important. These five options are as follows: 
(a) Hasty partition of the subcontinent. 
(b) Strategic location of the state 
(c) Boundary commission's award of Muslim majority district 
Gurdaspur to India. 
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(d) Policy of the British to retain the state with India as India could 
better defend it against then communist Soviet Union. 
(e) Maharaja's accession of the state to India without consulting 
his people. 
We have tabulated the response of respondents in table 2. 
Table 2 
Region Kashmir 
Q. No. 14 
Hindu (Kashmiri) 20 
Muslim 140 
Sikh 10 
Total 170 
Region Jammu 
Hindu (Dogri) 50 
Muslim 50 
Sikh (Dogri) 10 
Total 110 
Region Ladakh 
Shia(Balti)15 
Buddhist (ladakhi) 15 
Total 30 
State-level 
Hindu 70 
Muslim 205 
Sikh 20 
Buddhist 15 
Grand Total 310 
a 
5.00% 
6.43% 
10.00% 
6.47% 
b 
0.00% 
4.29% 
20.00% 
4.71% 
56.00% 
6.00% 
0.00% 
28.18% 
4.00% 
0.00% 
10.00% 
2.73% 
0.00% 
46.67% 
23.33% 
41.43% 
5.85% 
5.00% 
46.67% 
15.81% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
2.86% 
2.93% 
15.00% 
0.00% 
3.55% 
c 
0.00% 
7.14% 
10.00% 
6.47% 
0.00% 
4.00% 
40.00% 
5.45% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
5.85% 
25.00% 
0.00% 
5.48% 
d 
85.00% 
3.57% 
20.00% 
14.12% 
30.00% 
0.00% 
30.00% 
16.36 
0.00% 
53.33% 
26.67% 
45.71% 
2.44% 
25.00% 
53.33% 
16.13% 
e 
10.00% 
78.57% 
40.00% 
68.24% 
10.00% 
90.00% 
20.00% 
47.27% 
100.00% 
0.00% 
50.00% 
10.00% 
82.93% 
30.00% 
0.00% 
59.03% 
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The table shows that 59.03% respondents at the state level are of the 
view that Maharaja's signing of accession treaty with India and not 
consulting people of the state became responsible for creating 
background of the conflict (option-e). Whereas, 16.13% respondents 
have expressed their view in favour of option-d (Policy of the British) 
of the question. While, 15.81% choose option-a i.e., the hasty 
partition of India (by British) for their response. 
Religion-wise analysis at the state-level shows difference in the 
opinion of Muslims and Hindus. Majority of Muslim respondents 
(82.93%) hold Maharaja's policy of accession responsible for creating 
background of the conflict. Whereas, 45.71% Hindus of the state 
think British policy responsible for it. Remaining 54.29% Hindu 
respondents gave their opinion differently. Highest percentage of 
Sikh respondents (30.00%) has opinion similar to Muslim 
respondents. While 70.00% of them have different opinion. 53.33% 
Buddhist respondents of the state have opinion similar to those of 
Hindus i.e., they think then policy of British became responsible for 
creating Background of the Kashmir conflict. 
In this way, we found similarity in the response of Muslims and Sikhs 
on the one hand, Hindus and Buddhists on the other hand. 
Region - wise pattern of responses show that 68.24% respondents of 
region - Kashmir, 47.27% of Jammu and 50.00% of region - Ladakh 
held Maharaja's role in accession of the state to India responsible for 
creating background of the conflict. In this way, there is regional 
similarity in the overall opinion, regarding Maharaja's role. 
Religion-wise analysis at regional-level regions we found shows that 
Muslims of three regions have almost similar opinion regarding the 
alternative-e the Maharaja's role in accession of the state to India. 
As, 100.00% Muslim respondents of region-Ladakh, 90.00% of 
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Jammu and 78.57% of Kashmir held Maharaja responsible for 
creating background of the dispute. While, 40.00% Sikh respondents 
of region - Kashmir opine similarly as Kashmir Muslim respondents 
but their co-religionists in Jammu link background of the conflict with 
Boundary commissions award of Muslim majority district, Gurdaspur 
to India (option-c). 
As far as Hindus of valley-Kashmir and Jammu are concerned they 
have different opinion. 85.00% Hindu respondents of valley believed 
the policy of the British to retain the state with India became 
responsible for the conflict. Whereas, 56.00% Hindus respondents of 
Jammu think hasty partition of united India had created the problem's 
background. 40.00% Sikh respondents of Jammu - region, unlike 
their co-religionists in Kashmir, link background of the problem with 
option-c. Boundary Commission's award of Muslim majority district 
Gurdaspur to India. 
From the foregoing analysis both at state and regional levels we find 
factors like Maharaja's role in accession and policy of the British 
became mainly responsible for creating the background of J&K 
conflict. However, Muslims and Sikhs on the one hand differ in their 
opinion from the Hindus and Buddhists on the other. Majority of 
Muslims and Sikhs in Jammu & Kashmir attribute background of the 
conflict to Maharaja's (Hari Singh's) role in accession of the state to 
India. Whereas, Hindus and Buddhists believe that retaining J&K with 
India was the policy of then colonial British. 
Another question, question number (15) fifteen, of the Interview -
schedule, is concerned with political factors which became 
responsible for promoting conflict in Jammu & Kashmir after its 
accession to India. In table number 3.0, we have tabulated the 
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response of respondents about six different options which are as 
follows: 
(a) Diluting the special status of Jammu & Kashmir 
(b) The centralizing tendency in the Indian constitution. 
(c) Exploitation of Kashmir leadership by central government with 
a view to impose their dictate on the state. 
(d) Promotion of nepotism and corruption by political leaders of 
Kashmir. 
(e) Amendment of Jammu and Kashmir's constitution through 
unpopular Governments. 
(f) Denial of plebiscite right to the people of the state 
Table 3 
Region Kashmir 
Q.No. 15 
Hindu (Kashmiri) 20 
Muslim 140 
Sikh 10 
Total 170 
Region Jammu 
Hindu (Dogri) 50 
Muslim 50 
Sikh (Dogri) 10 
Total 110 
a 
25.00% 
13.57% 
50.00% 
17.06% 
b 
0.0C% 
2.86% 
0.00% 
2.35% 
20.00% 
24.00% 
30.00% 
22.73% 
4.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
1.82% 
c 
20.00% 
6.43% 
20.00% 
8.82% 
8.00% 
18.00% 
10.00% 
12.73% 
d 
15.00% 
8.57% 
30.00% 
10.59% 
54.00% 
6.00% 
40.00% 
30.91% 
e 
0.00% 
9.29% 
0.00% 
7.65% 
0.00% 
2.00% 
0.00% 
0.91% 
f 
40.00% 
59.29% 
0.00% 
53.53% 
14.00% 
50.00% 
20.00% 
30.91% 
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Region Ladakh 
Shia(Balti)15 
Buddhist (ladakhi) 
15 
Total 30 
State-level 
Hindu 70 
Muslim 205 
Sikh 20 
Buddhist 15 
Grand Total 310 
26.67% 
20.00% 
23.33% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
21.43% 
17.07% 
40.00% 
20.00% 
19.68% 
2.86% 
1.95% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
1.94% 
20.00% 
20.00% 
20.00% 
11.43% 
10.24% 
15.00% 
20.00% 
11.29% 
13.33% 
46.67% 
30.00% 
42.86% 
8.29% 
35.00% 
46.67% 
19.68% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
6.83% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
4.52% 
40.00% 
13.33% 
26.67% 
21.43% 
55.61% 
10.00% 
13.33% 
42.90% 
The table (3.0) reveals that in J&K 42.90% respondents have given 
their response to option-f which is the denial of plebiscite right to the 
people, 19.68% respondents each to option 'a'and'd', that is diluting 
the special status of Jammu & Kashmir and promotion of nepotism 
and corruption by political leaders of Kashmir, 11.29% respondents to 
the option-c i.e., the exploitation of Kashmiri leadership by central 
Government. 
Religion-wise analysis shows that 42.86% Hindu respondents of the 
state have chosen the alternative-d which is promotion of nepotism 
and corruption by Kashmiri politicians and 21.43% respondents each 
to option-a, that is, diluting the special status and f, the denial of 
plebiscite right. 
Whereas, majority of Muslim respondents (55.61%) have chosen 
alternative-f the denial of plebiscite right and 17.07% respondents 
option-a, diluting the special status. 
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While, among Sikh respondents option-a have got the highest 
percentage of response (40.00%) followed by alternative-d, 35.00%. 
Buddhist respondents about 46.67% think nepotism and corruption 
by Kashmir politicians (alternative-d) and 20.00% respondents 
diluting the special status of Jammu & Kashmir (alternative-a) are 
responsible for the conflict. 
It could be inferred that at state level differences in opinion exist 
between Muslim and non-Muslim respondents. Majority of Muslims 
held denial of plebiscite right while non-Muslims, promotion of 
nepotism and corruption responsible for the conflict after accession of 
Jammu & Kashmir with India. 
However, over alternative-a (diluting the special status of the state) 
there exist similarity in the opinion of Hindu, Muslim, Sikh and 
Buddhist respondents as among all religions the alternative-a has 
been given the second highest percentage of response. 
Religion-wise analysis of data at regional-level shows that the 
highest percentage of Muslim respondents of the region Kashmir 
(59.29%), of Jammu (50.00%) and of Ladakh (40.00%) have given 
their opinion on alternatlve-f (the denial of plebiscite right) 
Correspondingly, the highest percentage of Kashmiri-Hindu 
respondents (40.00%) too shares the same opinion as majority of 
Muslim respondents share in all the regions of the state. 
Contrary to this, the highest percentage about, 54.00% Hindu 
respondents of Jammu have given their response on alternative 'd' 
(nepotism and corruption) while 40.00% Sikh respondents of region 
Jammu too have opined ovenwhelmingly on the alternative-d. Like 
Sikhs & Hindus of Jammu, 46.67%/ Buddhist respondents of Ladakh 
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have given the highest response on alternative-d (Promotion of 
nepotism & corruption) 
Thus, it is observed that Hindus of Kashmir along with Muslims of all 
the regions of the state share the same opinion regarding the denial 
of plebiscite right (alternative f) on the one hand, Hindus & Sikhs of 
Jammu - region along with Buddhists of Ladakh share the same 
opinion regarding promotion of nepotism and corruption by Kashmiri 
politicians (alternative d) on the other. 
Thus, we find majority of Muslims are of the view that denial of 
plebiscite right to people is the main factor which promotes conflict in 
Jammu & Kashmir after accession, whereas, among non Muslims 
(Hindus, Sikhs and Buddhists) such a factor is nepotism and rampant 
corruption promoted by Kashmiri political leadership. Moreover, 
diluting the various provisions of article - 370 (Which grants special 
status to Jammu & Kashmir) also contributed to increase the 
resentment of Kashmiris against Indian state in post - accession 
period. 
The question number (16) sixteen of the Interview-schedule is 
concerned with exploring views of respondents about the factors, 
which promote violence in J&K (state). We have given four options to 
respondents and asked them to select the one that they think is most 
important. These four options are as follows: 
(a) Non-implementation of promised plebiscite by India. 
(b) Pakistan's inability to compel India for plebiscite. 
(c) Failure of UNO to persuade India for plebiscite. 
(d) Disappointment of Kashmiris in 1987 assembly elections. 
Responses about these options are presented in table number 4.0. 
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Table 4 
Region Kashmir 
Q.No. 16 
Hindu (Kashmiri) 20 
Muslim 140 
Sil<h10 
Total 170 
a 
0.00% 
42.14% 
20.00% 
35.88% 
b 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
c 
65.00% 
42.14% 
30.00% 
44.12% 
d 
35.00% 
15.71% 
50.00% 
20.00% 
Region Jammu 
Hindu (Dogri) 50 
Muslim 50 
Sikh (Dogri) 10 
TotalHO 
0.00% 
36.00% 
0.00% 
16.36% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
4.00% 
56.00% 
60.00% 
32.73% 
96.00% 
8.00% 
40.00% 
50.91% 
Region Ladal<h 
Shia(Balti)15 
Buddhist (ladakhi) 15 
Total 30 
53.33% 
0.00% 
26.67% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
40.00% 
60.00% 
50.00% 
6.67% 
40.00% 
23.33% 
State-level 
Hindu 70 
Muslim 205 
Sikh 20 
Buddhist 15 
Grand Total 310 
0.00% 
41.46% 
10.00% 
0.00% 
28.06% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
21.43% 
45.37% 
45.00% 
60.00% 
40.65% 
78.57% 
13.17% 
45.00% 
40.00% 
31.29% 
The table reveals 40.65% respondents in Jammu & Kashmir have 
given their response to option-c that is, failure of UNO to persuade 
India for plebiscite, 31.29% respondents to alternative options-d, i.e.. 
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disappointment of Kashmiris in 1987 assembly elections and 28.06% 
respondents to option-a i.e., non-implementation of plebiscite in 
Kashmir by India. 
Religion-wise analysis shows in Jammu & Kashmir, 78.57% Hindu 
respondents give their response to option-d (disappointment of 
Kashmir from electoral politics in 1987). 45.00% Sikh and 40.00% 
Buddhist respondents share the same opinion on alternative-d. 
Whereas, the highest percentage of Muslim respondents (45.37%) 
have given their opinion on option-c i.e., failure of the UNO to 
persuade India for plebiscite. Similarly, 45.00% Sikh and 60.00% 
Buddhist respondents too have opined on options-c like Muslim 
respondents. 
In this way analysis shows that Muslims and Buddhist respondents in 
Jammu & Kashmir share similar opinion as both attribute shifting of 
Kashmiris toward violence to the failure of UNO to persuade India for 
plebiscite (Option-c). Contrary to this, majority of Hindus at state level 
attribute violence to disenchantment of Kashmiris from politics in 
1987 (Option-d). However, 45.00% Sikh respondents each in their 
opinion vacillate equally between option-c and d that are, failure of 
UNO to held plebiscite' in Kashmir and disillusionment of Kashmiris 
from politics in 1987, respectively. 
Religion-wise analysis at regional-level shows that 65.00% Hindu 
respondents of region-Kashmir, 60.00% Sikh respondents of Jammu, 
60.00% Buddhists of Ladakh, 56.00% Muslims of Jammu, 42.14% 
Muslims of Kashmir have expressed their opinion to option-c i.e., the 
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failure of UNO to persuade India for plebiscite is the main factor 
which promotes violence in Kashmir. 
Contrary to this, 96.00% Hindus of Jammu-region, 50.00% Sikhs of 
Kashmir have similar opinion related to option-d that is, 
disillusionment of Kashmiris from electoral politics of the state in 
1987. 
It is, therefore, at regional-level we find that people in different 
regions of the state held two factors responsible for shifting Kashmiris 
towards violence i.e., disappointment of Kashmiris from electoral 
politics (especially by Hindus of region-Jammu and Sikhs of region-
Kashmir) and the failure of UNO to held plebiscite in Jammu & 
Kashmir (Muslims of all regions, Hindus of region-Kashmir and Sikhs 
of region-Jammu). 
In question-number seventeen (17) of the Interview - schedule our 
aim Is to ascertain the root cause of Kashmir conflict among five 
prominent political factors explored in the reviewed of literature. In 
this regard we have given five options to our respondents in order to 
find out the option, which has been given the highest percentage of 
response by respondents. These five options are as follows: 
a) Mishandling of politics in Jammu and Kashmir by Government 
of India. 
b) Undemocratic and dishonest polifics by political leaders of 
Jammu and Kashmir. 
c) Rise of Islamic resurgence 
d) Pak support to insurgency 
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e) Political and economic alienation. 
Responses about these options are tabulated in table number 5.0. 
Table 5 
Region Kashmir 
Q.No. 17 
Hindu (Kashmiri) 20 
Muslim 140 
Sikh 10 
Total 170 
a 
35.00% 
47.86% 
40.00% 
45.88% 
b 
10.00% 
14.29% 
30.00% 
14.71% 
c 
0.00% 
1.43% 
0.00% 
1.81% 
d 
10.00% 
0.71% 
10.00% 
2.35% 
e 
45.00% 
35.71% 
20.00% 
35.88% 
Region Jammu 
Hindu (Dogri) 50 
Muslim 50 
Sikh (Dogri) 10 
Total 110 
40.00% 
52.00% 
50.00% 
46.36% 
20.00% 
10.00% 
20.00% 
15.45% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
8.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
3.64% 
32.00% 
38.00% 
30.00% 
34.55% 
Region Ladakh 
Shia(Balti)15 
Buddhist (ladakhi) 
15 
Total 30 
60.00% 
6.67% 
33.33% 
20.00% 
40.00% 
30.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
6.67% 
33.33% 
20.00% 
13.33% 
20.00% 
16.67% 
State-level 
Hindu 70 
Muslim 205 
Sikh 20 
Buddhist 15 
Grand Total 310 
38.57% 
49.76% 
45.00% 
6.67% 
44.84% 
17.14% 
13.66% 
25.00% 
40.00% 
16.45% 
0.00% 
0.98% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.65% 
8.57% 
0.98% 
5.00% 
33.33% 
4.52% 
35.71% 
34.63% 
25.00% 
20.00% 
33.55% 
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The table reveals that 44.48% respondents in J&K (State) have given 
their response to option-a (mishandling of politics....), 33.55% 
respondents to option-e (political and economic alienation), 16.45% 
to option-b (undemocratic and dishonest politics by political leaders of 
Jammu and Kashmir), 4.52% to option-d (Pak support to insurgency), 
0.65% to option-c (rise of Islamic resurgence). 
Religion-wise analysis at state - level shows that the highest 
percentage of Muslim (47.76%), Sikh (45.00%) & Hindu (38.57%) 
respondents think that root cause of Kashmir conflict lies in 
mishandling of politics in Jammu & Kashmir by government of India 
(option-a). 
Whereas, the highest percentage of Buddhist respondents (40.00%) 
attribute main cause of the conflict to undemocratic and dishonest 
politics by state's political leadership (option-b). 
About, 35.71% Hindu, 34.63% Muslim, 25.00% Sikhs, 20.00% 
Buddhist respondents almost share the same opinion about the role 
of political and economic alienation (option 'e') in promoting conflict in 
Kashmir. 
It is commonly believed outside the state that Pak support to 
insurgency (option 'd') is the root cause of conflict in the state but this 
view does not have support in majority population of any religious 
group. Only 0.98% Muslims, 5.00% Sikhs & 8.57% Hindus share the 
opinion that Pak support in crucial. However, we have got 33.33% 
response among Buddhists who think Pak support to insurgency is 
the root cause of the conflict. We think Buddhists live in an area 
where boarder skirmishes between India and Pakistan are routine 
affairs. This might have led them to form this view. 
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There is wide spread notion among both scholars and laymen in the 
country that rise of Islamic resurgence is the factor which make 
Muslims everywhere militant and "terrorist". This view is also held 
about the rise of violent conflict in Kashmir. It is therefore we have 
included this factor in the question. But surprisingly we have found 
only 0.98% Muslims who support the view. More surprisingly we do 
not find any Hindu (0.00%), Sikhs (0,00%) and Buddhist (0.00%) 
respondent who share the view (on options-c) 
Thus, religion-wise analysis at slate-level shows, root cause of 
Kashmir conflict lies more in mishandling of politics in Jammu and 
Kashmir by Government of India, political and economic alienation 
and undemocratic and dishonest politics by Kashmiri politicians than 
any other factors. 
Religion-wise analysis within regions in table number 5.0 shows that 
in the region of Kashmir the highest percentage of Muslim (47.86%) 
and Sikh respondents (40.00%) think that Kashmir conflict is the 
product of political mishandle (option-a). About, 35.00% Kashmiri 
Hindus too share the same opinion over option-a. 
Whereas, the highest percentage of Kashmiri Hindus (45.00%) held 
political and economic alienation of people (option-e) responsible for 
the conflict. 
In the region of Jammu, the highest percentage of Muslim, (52.00%), 
Sikh (50.00%) & Hindu (40.00%) respondents opine similarly that 
mishandling of politics by central Government (option-a) is 
responsible for promoting conflict there. 
While, in the region of Ladakh Muslim and Buddhist respondents 
differ in their opinion from each other. As, majority of Muslim 
respondents (60.00%) in Ladakh held Government of India's 
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mishandling of politics (in Jammu & Kashmir) responsible for 
promoting conflict in Kashmir (option-a). whereas, the highest 
percentage of Buddhist respondents (40.00%) hold undemocratic and 
dishonest politics by politicians responsible for the conflict (option-b). 
Moreover, on Pal^  support to insurgency (option-d) the table 5.0 
reveals that the percentage of Muslims (0.71% of Kashmir; 0.00% of 
Jammu, 6.67% of Ladakh) who think Pak support to insurgency 
promotes conflict is very less than the percentage of Sikh (10.00% of 
Kashmir; 0.00% of Jammu), Hindus (10.00% of Kashmir; 8.00% of 
Jammu) and 33.33% Buddhists respondents of Ladakh. 
While only 1.43% Muslim respondents in the region of Kashmir 
attribute root cause of Kashmir conflict to rise of Islamic resurgence in 
different parts of the world. 
It is, therefore, we find that Muslims of all regions, Sikhs of region 
Kashmir and Jammu as well as Hindus of region - Jammu share 
similar opinion regarding the role played by Govt, of India in 
mishandling politics in Jammu & Kashmir (Option-a). 
Unlike Hindus of region-Jammu, Hindus of region-Kashmir attribute 
root cause of the conflict to political and economic alienation of the 
people (option-b). 
Whereas, Buddhists of ladakh held undemocratic and dishonest 
politics by Kashmiri politicians responsible for the conflict. 
Hence, like at state-level we find differences at regional-level too i.e., 
option-a, e, b have got adequate response among all religions. 
Moreover, overall response at regional-level corresponds with overall 
response at state level. 
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Thus, we find at regional-level too that for the root cause of Kashmir 
conflict factors like mishandling of politics by government of India in 
Jammu & Kashmir, political and economic alienation of people and 
undemocratic and dishonesty in politics by political leaders of the 
state are responsible. 
4,b. Economic Factors: 
More than politics it is economy, which plays an important role in 
integrating or alienating people to any social system. In fact, Karl 
Marx had given primacy to economic factor in understanding and 
analyzing social reality. In case of Kashmir conflict, economic factors 
are not fully explored by scholars. 
Economic factors could be seen in the form of lack of Government 
will to create better economic and employment opportunities, feeling 
of economic deprivation among the people. In order to ascertain the 
role of economic factors in Kashmir conflict we have asked our 
respondents two main questions (see Q. no. 18 & 19 of the Interview 
- schedule). 
First, through question number twenty-three of the interview -
schedule, we have asked respondents to give your opinion on the 
following. 
Would there be conflict in the state if government had created better 
economic and employment opportunities? 
In order to record their view we have given them two alternatives like 
'yes' & 'No' and asked them to select the one, which they like most. 
Responses given by respondents (over 'yes' & 'No' alternatives) have 
been tabulated in the following table. 
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Table 6 
Region Kashmir 
Q.No. 18 
Hindu (Kashmiri) 20 
IVIuslim 140 
Sil<h10 
Total170 
Yes 
0.00% 
42.14% 
0.00% 
34.71% 
No 
100.00% 
57.86% 
100.00% 
65.29% 
Region Jammu 
Hindu (Dogri) 50 
IVIuslim 50 
Sil^li (Dogri) 10 
TotalHO 
0.00% 
16.00% 
0.00% 
7.27% 
100.00% 
84.00% 
100.00% 
92.73% 
Region Ladakh 
Shia(Balti)15 
Buddiiist(ladal<hi)15 
Total 30 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
100.00% 
100.00% 
100.00% 
State-level 
Hindu 70 
IVIuslim 205 
Sikh 20 
Buddhist 15 
Grand Total 310 
0.00% 
32.68% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
21.61% 
100.00% 
67.32% 
100.00% 
100.00% 
78.39% 
The table 6.0 reveals that in Jammu & Kashmir 78.39% respondents 
have chosen the 'No' alternative (there would have been no conflict if 
government had created better economic and employment 
opportunities). Whereas, 21.61% respondents have given their 
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response to 'yes'-alternative, that is, there would have been conflict 
even if economic and employment opportunities in the state 
increased adequately. 
Religion-wise analysis in J&K shows that 100.00% Hindu, 100.00% 
Sikh, 100.00% Buddhist and 67.32% Muslim respondents are of the 
view that there would have been no conflict if government had 
created better economic and employment opportunities 
This shows that, 32.68% Muslim respondents thinly that there would 
have emerged conflict even if government had created employment 
opportunities there. 
Religion-wise analysis at regional-level shows that Hindus of both 
region (100.00% of Kashmir, 100.00 of Jammu), Sikhs (100.00% of 
Kashmir; 100.00% of Jammu), Buddhists (100.00% of Ladakh), 
Muslims (57.86% of Kashmir; 84.00% of Jammu and 100.00% of 
Ladakh) opine similarly that inadequate economic and employment 
opportunities promote conflict in Jammu and Kashmir. 
However, the percentage of Muslims (42.14% of Kashmir; 16.00% of 
Jammu) who don't think that lack of economic and employment 
opportunities lure kashmiri youth towards militancy are found more in 
the region of Kashmir than Jammu and Ladakh regions, respectively. 
Like at state level, the overall response in the region of Ladakh 
(100.00%), Jammu (92.73%) and Kashmir (65.29%) also show that in 
all the religions majority of respondents are of the opinion that lack of 
governmental initiatives for the creation of better economic and 
employment opportunities in the state promote militancy in Jammu 
and Kashmir. 
In order to probe further the views of people in regard with economic 
factor and the rise of militancy in Kashmir we asked the question: Do 
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economic hardships promote militancy in Jammu & Kashmir? Like 
preceding question, in this question also we have given two 
alternatives in the form of 'yes' and 'no'. Respondents were asked to 
choose the one, which is most important. Responses given by 
respondents were tabulated in table number 7. 
Table 7 
Region Kashmir 
Q. No. 19 
Hindu (Kashmiri) 20 
Muslim 140 
Sikh 10 
Total 170 
Yes 
100.00% 
76.43% 
80.00% 
79.41% 
No 
0.00% 
23.57% 
20.00% 
20.59% 
Region Jammu 
Hindu (Dogri) 50 
Muslim 50 
Sikh (Dogri) 10 
Total 110 
96.00% 
78.00% 
90.00% 
87.27% 
4.00% 
22.00% 
10.00% 
12.73% 
Region Ladakh 
Shia(Balti)15 
Buddhist (ladakhi) 15 
Total 30 
100.00% 
93.33% 
96.67% 
0.00% 
21.82% 
3.33% 
State-level 
Hindu 70 
Muslim 205 
Sikh 20 
Buddhist 15 
Grand Total 310 
97.14% 
78.57% 
85.00% 
93.33% 
83.87% 
2.86% 
21.40% 
15.00% 
6.67% 
16.13% 
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The table reveals that in Jammu & Kashmir 83.87% respondents are 
of the view that economic hardships act as a source of motivation for 
Kashmiri militant (yes alternative), whereas, 16.13% respondents do 
not support this view. 
Religion - wise break-up of figures in Jammu & Kashmir shows that 
97.14% Hindu, 93.33% Buddhist, 85.00% Sikh, 78.57% Muslim 
respondents have given their response to 'yes' alternative (economic 
hardships promote militancy). 
Religion-wise examination of data within three regions like valley-
Kashmir, Jammu and ladakh shows the following trends. 
In region-Kashmir 100.00% Hindu. 80.00% Sikh & 76.43% Muslim 
respondents have chosen the "yes" alternative (Economic hardships 
lure Kashmiri youth towards militancy. This shows, 23.57% Muslim 
and 20.00% Sikh respondents in valley-Kashmir do not think that 
economic hardships promote conflict militancy in Kashmir. 
In the region of Jammu also 96.00% Hindu, 90.00% Sikh and 78.00% 
Muslim respondents opine that prevailing economic insecurity in the 
state motivates Kashmir, educated, unemployed youth towards 
militancy. Whereas, 22.00% Muslim, 10.00% Sikh and 4.00% Hindu 
respondents in Jammu do not attribute militancy to economic 
hardships. 
While, within the region of Ladakh 100.00% Buddhist and 93.33% 
Muslim respondents are of the opinion that economic hardships 
promote militancy. 
Thus, religion-wise analysis at regional-level shows that economic 
hardship is a problem of this hilly state and it promotes militancy. 
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4.C. Religfous Factor: 
social movements or struggle for achieving collective goals generally 
! : e When people experience or perceive political d i s c r — 
and economic deprivations. Both political and economic depnvat ons 
have been experienced by people of Jammu & Kashmir as we have 
explained it in preceding pages. Indeed, negative economic and 
political experience is the root of any political struggle or conflict. 
However, people are mobilized on the basis of symbols of identity 
and beliefs. There are innumerable examples in Indian society were 
people have been mobilized on the basis of caste, language, tribe 
and religion for expressing their political and economic grievances 
and achieving their goals. Religion is very important basis of 
exploiting sentiments of people or mobilizing them for struggle. 
Therefore, many commentators have reflected upon that Islam has 
been used in fomenting Kashmir conflict not only among Kashmiris 
but also world over. It is, therefore, we have included some 
questions, which aim to explain the role of religion in Kashmir conflict. 
The question number twenty (20) of the Interview - schedule is about 
to know whether religion motivates people for struggle/ militancy in 
Kashmir. We have tabulated response of the respondents in table 
number 8. 
Table 8 
Region Kashmir 
Q.No. 20 
Hindu (Kashmiri) 20 
Muslim 140 
Sikh 10 
Total 170 
Yes 
25.00% 
67.14% 
50.00% 
61.18% 
No 
75.00% 
32.86% 
50.00% 
38.82% 
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Region Jammu 
Hindu (Dogri) 50 
Muslim 50 
Sikh (Dogri) 10 
Total 110 
72.00% 
72.00% 
60.00% 
70.91% 
28.00% 
28.00% 
40.00% 
29.09% 
Region Ladakh 
Shia(Balti)15 
Buddhist (ladakhi) 15 
Total 30 
80.00% 
40.00% 
60.00% 
20.00% 
40.00% 
40.00% 
State-level 
Hindu 70 
Muslim 205 
Sikh 20 
Buddhist 15 
Grand Total 310 
58.57% 
69.27% 
55.00% 
40.00% 
64.52% 
41.43% 
30.73% 
45.00% 
60.00% 
35.48% 
The table reveals that In Jammu & Kashmir 64.52% respondents are 
of the view that religion motivates Kashmiri youth for militancy (yes 
alt.). Whereas, 35.48% respondents do not share this view (No alt.) 
Religion-wise analysis at state-level shows that 69.27% Muslim, 
58.57% Hindu, 55.00% Sikh, 40.00% Buddhist respondents have 
chosen the alternative-yes (religion motivates Kashmiri militant). 
Contrary to this, 60.00% Buddhist, 45.00% Sikh, 41.43% Hindu, 
30.73% Muslim respondents opine that in Jammu and Kashmir 
religion hardly motivates Kashmiri youth for militancy. 
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This shows that, except Buddhist the highest percentage of Hindu, 
IVIuslim and Sil<h respondents opines that religion promotes conflict in 
Kashmir. 
Religion-wise analysis in different regions (of Jammu & Kashmir) 
shows that in the region of Kashmir the highest percentage of Muslim 
respondents (67.14%) have given their response to yes option of the 
question (religion is a source of motivation for Kashmiri militant). 
Similarly in the region 50.00% Sikh respondents too share the same 
view as shared by Muslim respondents. 
Whereas, the highest percentage of Hindu respondents (75.00%) in 
Kashmir have given their response to option-No (Religion hardly 
motivates Kashmiri militants). 
Similarly, 50.00% Sikh respondents in Kashmir have expressed the 
same opinion on no option. 
In the region of Jammu about 72.00% Hindu, 72.00% Muslim and 
60.00% Sikh respondents have chosen the yes option. That is, in 
Jammu-region people irrespective of religion maintain 
overwhelmingly that religion motivates Kashmiri youth. 
While, in the region of Ladakh, Buddhists and Muslim are divided in 
their opinions. As, the highest percentage of Muslim respondents 
(80.00%) maintains that religion acts as a source of motivation for 
Kashmiri militants. Whereas, Buddhist respondents about 60.00% in 
the region do not think so. 
Therefore, religion-wise analysis at regional-level shows that except 
Buddhists of region Ladakh and Hindus of Kashmir, majority of 
Muslims in all regions, Sikhs and Hindus of region-Jammu opine 
similarly that religion motivates Kashmiri militant in the current 
struggle. 
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Muslims are largest minority community of India. Even after 58 years 
of independence a problem of tpjst between majority community 
(Hindus) and minority community (Muslims) exist. There are many 
socio-historical reasons for the mistrust between the Hindus and 
Muslims. In fact, there are certain indicators on the basis of which it 
could be said that Hindu as a majority community has doubt in 
patriotism of Muslims and Muslims have lack of confidence in majority 
community due to factors like frequently occurring communal violence 
and low socio-economic condition of the community. Mistrust 
between Hindus and Muslims in the country is one of the factors with 
the persistence of conflict in Kashmir. Projecting Jammu as the 
region of Hindus and promise to scrape article-370 by Hindu right 
wing political party BJP and other anti-Muslim rectories and activities 
by Hindu organizations like RSS prevent Muslims to have confidence 
in Hindu controlled polity. It is, therefore, we have asked a question to 
know the viewpoint of respondents in this regard. Question number 
twenty one (21) of the Interview-schedule is: Do you think that crucial 
to Kashmir problem is the question of trust and Hindu doubts about 
the quality of Muslim patriotism? In order to unearth this reality we 
have given two alternatives (Yes or No) in the question and 
respondents were asked to select the one, which is crucial. We have 
tabulated the response given by respondents in table number 9.0. 
Table 9 
Region Kashmir 
Q.No. 21 
Hindu (Kashmiri) 20 
Muslim 140 
Sikh 10 
Total 170 
Yes 
45.00% 
90.00% 
80.00% 
84.12% 
No 
55.00% 
10.00% 
20.00% 
25.88% 
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Region Jammu 
Hindu (Dogri) 50 
Muslim 50 
Sikh (Dogri) 10 
TotalHO 
36.00% 
92.00% 
30.00% 
60.91% 
64.00% 
8.00% 
70.00% 
39.09% 
Region Ladakh 
Shia(Balti)15 
Buddhist (ladakhi) 15 
Total 30 
100.00% 
20.00% 
60.00% 
0.00% 
80.00% 
40.00% 
State-level 
Hindu 70 
Muslim 205 
Sikh 20 
Buddhist 15 
Grand Total 310 
38.57% 
91.22% 
55.00% 
20.00% 
73.55% 
61.43% 
8.73% 
45.00% 
80.00% 
26.45% 
The table reveals that in Jammu & Kashmir about 73.55% 
respondents are of the view that Hindu doubts about the quality of 
Muslim patriotism fuels militancy in the state (yes), whereas, 26.45% 
respondents do not support this view (no alt.) 
Religion-wise analysis of data shows that 91.22% Muslim and 
55.00% Sikh respondents have chosen the 'Yes' alternative of the 
question (Crucial to Kashmir problem is the question of trust and 
Hindu doubt about Muslim patriotism). 
Contrary to this, the highest percentage of Buddhist (80.00%) and 
Hindu (61.43%) respondents in Jammu & Kashmir has chosen the 
No-alternative of the question. That is, they do not think that crucial to 
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Kashmir conflict is the question of trust and Hindu doubts about the 
quality of IVIuslim patriotism. 
Analysis shows majority of Muslims and Sikhs in Jammu & Kashmir 
are of the view that crucial to Kashmir problem is the question of trust 
and Hindu doubts about the loyalty of Muslims in India, unlike 
Buddhists and Hindu. 
Religion-wise analysis at regional level shows that in the region of 
Kashmir 90.00% Muslim and 80.00% Sikh respondents share similar 
opinion as both have chosen 'yes' alternative of the question (root 
cause of conflict in Kashmir lies in Hindu doubts about Muslim 
patriotism in India). 45.00% Kashmiri Hindus also share the same 
opinion. 
Whereas, the highest percentage of Kashmiri Hindus (55.00%) have 
chosen the no-alternative of the question. That is, they do not 
attribute Kashmir conflict to Hindu doubts about the quality of Muslim 
patriotism. 
Analysis shows in valley-Kashmir, Muslim and Sikh respondents think 
alike as both attribute conflict in Kashmir to Hindu doubts about the 
quality of Muslim patriotism in India. 
In the region of Jammu, division of opinion exists between Muslims 
on one hand and Hindus and Sikhs on the other. As, 92.00% Muslims 
in the region agree that Hindu doubts about Muslims promote conflict 
in Kashmir (yes-alternative), whereas, 70.00% Sikhs and 64.00% 
Hindu respondents do not think so (no alt.) 
While, in the region of Ladakh all Muslims (100.00%) have chosen 
the yes-alternative of the question. Whereas, the highest proportion 
of Buddhists (80.00%) have chosen the no-alternative of the 
question. 
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It is therefore, at regional-level, we find that Muslims of all the regions 
and Sikhs of region-Kashmir are of the view that Hindu doubts or their 
lack of trust on Muslims play crucial role in fomenting conflict in 
Kashmir, however, this view is not shared by majority of Hindus of 
Kashmir, region-Jammu, Sikhs of Jammu and Buddhists of Ladakh, 
respectively. 
4.d. Ethnic Factor: 
It has so far been established by the preceding analysis that there 
are differences between Hindus and Muslims of Jammu & Kashmir 
state on issues related with plebiscite, the way in which Maharaja 
(Hari Singh) signed accession treaty and mistrust of Muslims in Hindu 
controlled polity. Besides religion there are many issues, which come 
under the scope of ethnic diversity. These are socio-cultural, linguistic 
and tribal differences. Both intra-religious and inter-regional ethnic 
divisions exist in Jammu & Kashmir (state). We have explained such 
divisions in chapter number two & third. In order to find out relevance 
of such differences to Kashmir conflict, we have asked two questions. 
The first question, question twenty two (22) of the Interview-schedule 
very simply asks respondents whether ethnic and cultural diversity in 
the state is the internal source of Jammu & Kashmir conflict? 
Responses given by respondents are tabulated in table 10. 
Table 10 
Region Kashmir 
Q.No. 22 
Hindu (Kashmiri) 20 
Muslim 140 
Sikh 10 
Total 170 
Yes 
50.00% 
78.57% 
40.00% 
72.94% 
No 
50.00% 
21.43% 
60.00% 
27.06% 
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Region Jammu 
Hindu (Dogri) 50 
Muslim 50 
Sil^ h (Dogri) 10 
Total 110 
Region Ladakh 
Shia(Balti)15 
Buddhist (ladakhi) 15 
Total 30 
State-level 
Hindu 70 
IVIuslim 205 
Sikh 20 
Buddhist 15 
Grand Total 310 
100.00% 
80.00% 
90.00% 
90.00% 
53.33% 
100.00% 
76.67% 
85.71% 
77.07% 
65.00% 
100.00% 
79.35% 
0.00% 
20.00% 
10.00% 
10.00% 
46.67% 
0.00% 
23.33% 
14.29% 
22.93% 
35.00% 
0.00% 
20.65% 
The table reveals that in Jammu & Kashmir 79.35% respondents 
have given their response to yes-option (ethnic and cultural diversity 
in the state is the internal source of Jammu & Kashmir conflict). 
Whereas, 20.65% respondents have chosen the No-option (ethnic & 
cultural diversity is not the internal source of Jammu and Kashmir 
conflict). 
Religion-wise analysis at state-level shows that 100.00% Buddhist, 
85.71%, Hindu, 77.07% Muslim and 65.00%, Sikh respondents 
attribute internal source of conflict in Jammu & Kashmir to ethnic & 
Cultural diversity (option-yes) of the state. 
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Contrary to this, 35.00% Sikh, 22.93% Muslim, 14.29% Hindu, 0.00% 
Buddhist respondents have chosen the No-option (ethno-cultural 
diversity of the state is not the internal source of Jammu & Kashmir 
conflict). 
It is, therefore, at state level the percentage of respondents who 
opine ethno-cultural diversity is the endogenous source of Jammu & 
Kashmir conflict is more than those who do not think so. 
Religion-wise analysis within regions show that in the region of 
Kashmir Muslim and Sikh respondents differ In their opinion from 
each other. As the highest percentage of Muslim respondents 
(78.57%) in Kashmir have chosen the option-Yes (ethnic and cultural 
diversity of Jammu & Kashmir is the internal source of the conflict). 
50.00% Kashmiri Hindu and 40.00% Sikh respondents too share the 
same opinion. 
Whereas, the highest percentage of Sikh respondents (60.00%) in 
the region have chosen the No-option. Similarly, 50.00% Hindu & 
21.43% Muslim respondents do not think ethnic and cultural diversity 
of the state is the internal source of Jammu & Kashmir conflict. 
In the region of Jammu 100.00% Hindu, Sikh 90.00%, 80.00% 
Muslim respondents have given their response to 'Yes' option. 
Like in Jammu, in the region of Ladakh too the highest percentage of 
Buddhist (100.00%) and Muslim (53.33%) respondents think that 
ethno-cultural diversity is the endogenous source of Jammu & 
Kashmir conflict (Yes-option). However, 46.67% Muslim respondents 
do not think so (no-option). 
It is therefore, like at state-level, in different regions too Hindu, Sikh, 
and Buddhist respondents are of the opinion that the presences of 
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different ethnic groups in Jammu & Kashmir constitute the internal 
source of conflict in the state. 
There is a section of scholars who believe that Kashmir conflict has 
emerged and persisted due to quest of Kashmiri speaking Muslims to 
establish there political hegemony. They also believe Kashmiri 
speaking Muslims discriminate against non-Muslims and non-
Kashmiri speaking people. In order to confirm this view we have 
included a question (Q.no. 23) in the Interview - schedule which very 
explicitly asks respondents: "Do you agree that Kashmiri conflict 
persists because Kashmiri-speaking Muslims endeavor to impose 
there hegemony/ superiority over other-ethnic groups? In this 
question too respondents were given two options, in the form of 'yes' 
& No, and were asked to select the one, which they think important. 
We have tabulated the response of respondents in table number 11. 
Table 11 
Region Kashmir 
Q.No. 23 
Hindu (Kashmiri) 20 
Muslim 140 
Sikh 10 
Total 170 
Yes 
0.00% 
10.71% 
0.00% 
8.82% 
No 
100.00% 
89.29% 
100.00% 
91.18% 
Region Jammu 
Hindu (Dogri) 50 
Muslim 50 
Sikh (Dogri) 10 
Total 110 
96.00% 
10.00% 
40.00% 
51.82% 
4.00% 
90.00% 
60.00% 
48.18% 
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Region Ladakh 
Shia(Balti)15 
Buddhist (ladakhi) 15 
Total 30 
13.33% 
93.33% 
53.33% 
86.67% 
6.67% 
46.67% 
State-level 
Hindu 70 
Muslim 205 
Sikh 20 
Buddhist 15 
Grand Total 310 
68.57% 
10.73% 
20.00% 
93.33% 
28.39% 
31.43% 
89.27% 
80.00% 
6.67% 
71.61% 
The table shows that at state-level about 71.61% respondents have 
chosen the 'no' option. That Is, Kashmir conflict does not persist 
because of Kashmiri speaking Muslim's hegemony over other ethnic 
- groups, whereas, 28.39% respondents think so in Jammu & 
Kashmir (option-yes). 
Religion-wise analysis at state-level shows that the highest 
percentage of Buddhist (93.33%) and Hindu (68.57%) respondents 
agree that Kashmiri speaking Muslim's superiority over other ethnic 
groups sustain conflict there, unlike the highest percentage of Sikh 
(80.00%) and Muslim (89.27%) respondents who do not attribute 
persistence of the conflict in Jammu & Kashmir to Kashmiri-speaking 
Muslims hegemony over other ethnic groups (option-no). 
Religion-wise analysis at regional level shows the following pattern of 
opinion/ response. That, in the region of Kashmir, 100.00% Hindu, 
100.00% Sikh, 89.29% Muslim respondents have given their opinion 
to option 'No'. That is, a respondent whether Hindu, Muslim and Sikh 
in valley-Kashmir do not agree that Kashmir conflict is the outcome of 
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Kashmiri-speaking Muslim hegemony over other ethnic groups in the 
state. 
In the region of Jammu the highest percentage of Muslim (90.00%) 
and Sikh (60.00%) respondents have chosen the option-No. That is, 
in Jammu Muslim and Sikh respondents almost share similar opinion 
as both groups believe that Kashmir conflict does not persist because 
of Kashmiri Muslim's dominance on other groups in the state, unlike 
Hindu respondents (96.00%) who speak dogri language have given 
their response to Yes-alternative, i.e., Hindus in Jammu link 
persistence of conflict in Jammu & Kashmir to Kashmiri speaking 
Muslim's dominance over other ethnic groups. 
While in the region of Ladakh Muslims and Buddhists are divided in 
their opinion. As, the highest percentage of Buddhist respondents 
(86.67%) has chosen the yes option. That is, they agree Kashmiri 
Muslim's superiority over other ethnic groups is responsible for the 
promotion of conflict in Jammu & Kashmir. Whereas, the highest 
percentage of Muslims (86.67%) who speak baiti language think 
Kashmiri-speaking Muslims hegemony over other ethnic-groups is 
not responsible for the sustenance of ethnic conflict in Jammu & 
Kashmir. 
Thus, analysis at regional level shows that only dogri-speaking 
Hindus of region-Jammu and Ladakhi-speaking Buddhists of region-
Ladakh support the view that ethnic conflict in Kashmir is the 
outcome of Kashmiri speaking Muslim's dominance over other ethnic 
groups. Remaining ethnic groups Tke Kashmir-Muslims, Hindus and 
Sikhs, Sikhs and Muslims of region-Jammu, baIti- speaking Muslims 
of ladakh do not attribute conflict in Kashmir to Kashmiri Muslim 
dominance over other ethnic groups. 
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4.e. The Factor/ Factors of Jammu & Kashmir Conflict: 
Although we have asked respondents separate questions related with 
political, economic, religious, ethnic factors responsible for creating 
and sustaining the Kashmir conflict. There is a question (Q.no. 24) in 
the Interview-schedule which asks respondents to select the factor 
which they think is the most important. The purpose of this question is 
two fold: to cross-examine the response and to persuade 
respondents for the identification of the most important factor of the 
Jammu & Kashmir conflict. Responses given by respondents are 
presented in table number 12. 
Table 12 
Region Kashmir 
Q.No. 24 
Hindu (Kashmiri) 20 
Muslim 140 
Sikh 10 
Total 170 
Region Jammu 
Hindu (Dogri) 50 
Muslim 50 
Sikh (Dogri) 10 
Total 110 
Region Ladakh 
Shia(Balti)15 
Buddhist (ladakhi) 
15 
Total 30 
A 
30.00% 
52.14% 
50.00% 
49.41% 
b 
45.00% 
27.85% 
30.00% 
30.00% 
36.00% 
50.00% 
40.00% 
42.72% 
28.00% 
30.00% 
30.00% 
29.09% 
53.33% 
46.66% 
50.00% 
20.00% 
13.33% 
16.66% 
c 
10.00% 
7.14% 
10.00% 
7.64% 
d 
5.00% 
8.57% 
0.00% 
7.64% 
12.00% 
10.00% 
10.00% 
10.90% 
0.00% 
8.00% 
10.00% 
4.54% 
13.33% 
6.67% 
10.00% 
6.66% 
0.00% 
3.33% 
e 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
f 
10.00% 
4.28% 
10.00% 
5.29% 
14.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
6.36% 
10.00% 
2.00% 
10.00% 
6.36% 
0.00% 
13.33% 
6.66% 
6.66% 
20.00% 
13.33% 
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state-level 
Hindu 70 
Muslim 205 
Sikh 20 
Buddhist 15 
Grand Total 310 
34.28% 
51.70% 
45.00% 
46.66% 
47.09% 
32.85% 
27.80% 
30.00% 
13.33% 
28.38% 
11.42% 
8.29% 
10.00% 
6.66% 
9.03% 
1.42% 
8.29% 
5.00% 
0.00% 
6.12% 
10.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
13.33% 
2.90% 
10.00% 
3.90% 
10.00% 
20.00% 
6.45% 
The table shows that in Jammu & Kashmir about 47.09% 
respondents have chosen the option-a (political factor), 28.38% the 
option-b (economic factor), 9.03% the option-c (cultural factor), 6.45% 
the option-f (outside support), 6.12% the option-d (religious factor), 
2.90% the option-e (regional factor), respectively. 
Religion-wise analysis at state-level shows that 34.28% Hindu 
respondents have given their opinion to option-a (political factor) 
32.85% respondents to option-b (economic factor), 11.42% to option-
c (cultural factor), 10.00% to option-f (outside support factor), 10.00% 
to option-e (regional factor), 1.42% to option-d (religious factor). It 
shows that majority of Hindus respondents considered political and 
economic factors crucial to the conflict. 
Among Muslims (in J&K) 51.70% respondents have chosen the 
option-a (political factor), 27.80% the option-b (economic factor), 
8.29% the option-c (cultural factor), 8.29% the option-d (religious), 
0.00% the option-e (regional factor), 3.90% the option-f (outside 
support factor), respectively. 
As far as Sikhs in Jammu & Kashmir are concerned, 45.00% 
respondents have expressed their opinion on option-a (political 
factor), 30.00% on the option-b (economic factor), 10.00% the option-
c (cultural factor), 10.00% the option-f (outside support factor) 5.00% 
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the option-d (religious factor), 0.00% the option-e (regional factor), 
respectively. 
While, 46.66% Buddhist respondents have chosen the option-a 
(political), 20.00% the option-f (outside support factor), 13.33% the 
option-b (economic factor), 13.33% the option-e (regional factor), 
6.66% the option-c (cultural factor), 0.00% the option-d (religious 
factor), respectively. 
It is, therefore, religion-wise analysis at state level shows that Hindu, 
Muslim, Sikh and Buddhist respondents almost share similar opinion 
regarding political factor as all have given the highest percentage of 
response to it (political factor). 
Concerning economic factor in Jammu & Kashmir, Muslims, Hindus & 
Sikhs show similarly in their opinion by giving second highest 
response to it (economic factor) but Buddhists have expressed the 
second highest percentage of response to outside support factor (i.e., 
the Pak support to militants in Kashmir). 
As far as the cultural factor is concerned, Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs 
in the state show similarity in their view by giving third highest 
response to it (Cultural factor), unlike Buddhists who have given 
fourth highest percentage of response to it. 
Regarding regional factors' involvement in Jammu & Kashmir conflict, 
only 13.33% Buddhists and 10.00% Hindus have expressed their 
opinion, unlike Muslims and Sikhs who expressed no opinion on 
regional factor. 
About the involvement of outside support factor we find the 
percentage of Buddhists (20.00%), Hindus (10.00%) and Sikhs 
(10.00%) are more than the percentage of Muslims (3.90%). It means 
in Jammu & Kashmir as compared to Muslims more non-Muslims in 
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the state are of the view that outside support particularly the support 
provided by Pakistan to Kashmiri militants is involved in the conflict 
(in J&K). 
Religion-wise analysis at regional-level shows that 52.41% Muslims 
in the region of Kashmir have chosen the political factor (option-a), 
27.85% the economic factor (option-b), 8.57% the religious factor 
(optlon-d), 7.14% the cultural factor (option-c). 4.28% the outside 
support factor (option-f) and none to regional factor (option-e). 
While, among Sikhs in the region of Kashmir 50.00% respondents 
have expressed their opinion on political factor (option-a), 30.00% on 
the economic factor, 10.00% each to cultural factor (option-e) and 
outside support factor (option-f) over regional & religious factors 
Sikhs in the region have expressed no opinion. 
Whereas, 45.00% Hindu respondents in the region of Kashmir have 
expressed their opinion on the economic factor (option-b), 30.00% 
the political factor, (option-a), 10.00% the cultural factor (optional-c), 
10.00% the outside support factor (option-f), 0.00% the regional 
factor (option-e). 
It is, therefore, in region-Kashmir like at state level, the political and 
economic factors have got the highest percentage of response. In 
respect of cultural and outside support factors we find the opinion of 
Hindus and Sikhs have remained more than the opinion of Muslims. 
Moreover, regarding religious factor the response of Kashmiri Hindus 
(5.00%) and Muslims (8.57%) have remained not so much, whereas, 
Sikhs (0.00%) have expressed no opinion to it (religion factor). 
However, Kashmiris whether Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs have 
expressed no opinion on regional factor. 
Next, in the region of Jammu regarding political factor Muslim 
(50.00%), Sikhs (40.00%) and Hindus (36.00%) show similarity in 
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opinion as all have given the first highest percentage of response to 
the political factor. 
The economic factor in the region of Jammu has got the second 
highest percentage of response from Muslims (30.00%), Sikhs 
(30.00%) and Hindus (28.00%), respectively, like in region Kashmir. 
Following this, in Jammu 12.00% Hindus, 10.00% Muslims and 
10.00% Sikhs share similar opinion regarding Cultural factor. 
This shows as compared to region-Kashmir (7.64%) the magnitude of 
response over cultural factor is more in region Jammu (10.90%). In 
the region of Jammu regarding regional factor about 14.00% Hindus 
have expressed their opinion, unlike Muslims (0.00%) and Sikhs 
(0.00%), respectively. 
Like in region-Kashmir concerni.ig outside support factor, the 
response of Hindus (10.00%) and Sikhs (10.00%) have remained 
more than the response of Muslims (2.00%). 
Thus, we find in the region of Jammu the political, economic and 
cultural factors are considered as crucial factors of Jammu & Kashmir 
conflict. Moreover, over outside support factor the response of Hindus 
and Sikhs have remained more than the response of Muslims. 
Besides Muslims and Sikhs in the region of Jammu have expressed 
no opinion on regional factor but among Hindus about 14.00% think it 
is involved in the conflict. 
While in the region of Ladakh 53.33% Muslim respondents have 
given their response to political factor (option-a), 20.00%, the 
economic factor (option-b), 13.33% the cultural factor (option-c). 
Remaining 6.66% each to religious factor (option-d) and outside 
support factor (option-f). 
Among Buddhist 46.66% respondents have chosen the political factor 
(option-a), 20.00% the outside support factor, (option-f) 13.33% each 
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to economic (option-b) and regional factor (option-e). About 6.67% 
respondents have given their response to cultural factor (option-c). 
They have expressed no opinion on religious factors (option-d). 
It is therefore, for Muslims of Ladakh political economic and cultural 
factors are more important while, among Buddhists factors like 
political, outside-support, economic and regional are important. 
Thus, region-wise analysis shows that in all the regions political, 
economic and cultural factors have got the highest percentage of 
response. Moreover, over regional factor only Buddhists of Ladakh & 
dogri speaking Hindus of Jammu have expressed their opinion. While 
about the role of religion in conflict only 7.64% people in Kashmir, 
4.54% in region-Jammu and 3.33% in Ladakh have expressed their 
view. 
Foregoing analysis leads us to say that conflict in Kashmir is multi-
dimensional. However, major factors of the conflict, which 
respondents, have identified are political and economic. Some 
importance has also been given to religious and cultural factors. As 
far as economic factors are concerned we have got almost 
unanimous views that economic hardships promote conflict in 
Kashmir. Over political factors we found differences between Muslims 
and Hindus. Former give more priority to denial of right of plebiscite 
and hold Maharaja (Hah Singh) responsible for creating the conflict. 
While, later think political corruption or undemocratic politics is the 
major factor sustaining the conflict. 
Whatever may be the factor or factors of conflict in Kashmir it has 
been found out most destructive and devastating not only for people 
of Jammu & Kashmir and of India but also to the question of peace 
and development in South Asia. We will analyze the consequences of 
Jammu & Kashmir conflict in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER V 
Consequences and Resolution of Conflict in Jammu and 
Kashmir: An Analysis 
5.3. Consequences: 
Every conflict is the product of some factors and it has some 
consequences. Consequences may be both positive and negative, 
depending upon the nature, scale and location of the conflict. 
Kashmir conflict has its long history and is the cumulative result of the 
various factors, which we have explained, in the preceding chapter. 
Kashmir conflict is of a nature, which has largely negative 
consequences. Internally, the conflict appears to be between the 
Kashmiri-nationality and an Indian State, between Muslims and non-
Muslims. Externally, this is a conflict between the two states, that is, 
India and Pakistan in which Kashmiri nationality is smashed. It is, 
therefore, the conflict has more negative consequences for the 
relationship between state and nationality, among various ethnic 
groups and for the socio-economic development of the Jammu and 
Kashmir (State). 
Large-scale state power is used for controlling or combating conflict 
in Jammu & Kashmir but the use of force has very serious 
repercussions in almost all conflicts involving issue of nationality. We 
therefore asked a question related with integration or faith of people 
in political process. Question number twenty-five (25) is related with 
alienation, in it we asked respondents: Do you feel alienated from the 
political system? There are two options, in the form of Yes & No, in 
the question and respondents were persuaded to select the one, 
which is important. We have tabulated the response of respondents 
in table 13. 
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Table 13 
Region Kashmir 
Q.No. 25 
Hindu (Kashmiri) 20 
Muslim 140 
Sikh 10 
Total 170 
Ye3 
100.00% 
92.86% 
80.00% 
92.94% 
No 
0.00% 
7.14% 
20.00% 
7.06% 
Region Jammu 
Hindu (Dogri) 50 
Muslim 50 
Sikh (Dogri) 10 
Total 110 
28.00% 
80.00% 
60.00% 
54.55% 
72.00% 
20.00% 
40.00% 
45.45% 
Region Ladakh 
Shia(Balti)15 
Buddhist (ladakhi) 
15 
Total 30 
100.00% 
0.00% 
50.00% 
0.00% 
100.00% 
50.00% 
State-level 
Hindu 70 
Muslim 205 
Sikh 20 
Buddhist 15 
Grand Total 310 
48.57% 
90.24% 
70.00% 
0.00% 
75.16% 
51.43% 
9.76% 
30.00% 
100.00% 
24.84% 
The table shows that in Jammu & Kashmir 75.16% respondents said 
that they feel alienated from, the present political system (yes-
alternative), whereas, 24.84% respondents do not feel so (no-
alternative). 
Religion-wise analysis shows that 90.24% Muslims and 70.00% Sikhs 
in the state feel alienated, whereas, 51.43% Hindus and 100.00% 
Buddhists do not feel so. This shows at state-level Buddhists and 
Hindus feel less alienation than Muslims and Sikhs. 
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Region-wise analysis shows that in the region of Kashmir 100.00% 
Hindus, 92.86% Muslim and 80.00% Sikh respondents feel alienated 
from the political mainstream. 
Whereas, in the region of Jammu 72.00% Hindus, unlike their co-
religionists in Kashmir, said that they do not feel alienated from the 
political system. Contrary to this, the highest percentage of Muslim 
(80.00%) and Sikh (60.00%) respondents in the region said that they 
feel alienated from the politics. 
In the region of Ladakh the opinion of Muslims differ with the opinion 
of Buddhists. As, 100.00% Muslims in the region said they feel 
alienated from the political process in the state, unlike, Buddhists 
(100.00%) who do not feel so. 
Thus, we find Muslims in all the regions of the state feel 
ovenA^helmingly alienated from the present political system, unlike 
Hindus & Buddhists in the region of Jammu and Ladakh respectively. 
Growing alienation of Muslims reflect in their attitudes towards 
Muslim political elites of Kashmir. It is for the first time that the 
National conference led by Sheikh's family became irrelevant in 
Kashmir. As their faith in political elites declined Muslims turn their 
attention towards the call Hurriyat (freedom) Infact, the growing 
alienation among people has led them to have soft attitude towards 
extremismV Alienation among people has cemented to very large 
extent due to rampant political corruption in the state also^. Alienation 
of people as we have seen earlier has led people to form soft opinion 
about the slogan like freedom, rhetoric and extremism. 
Therefore, we have asked a specific question about what is called in 
Kashmir valley freedom movement. In question number twenty-six 
(26) of the interview-schedule, we asked respondents: Do you 
support the freedom movement in the state? There are two 
alternatives (yes &No) in the question, respondents were asked to 
145 
select the one, which is important. Responses given by respondents 
are tabulated in table 14. 
Table 14 
Region Kashmir 
Q.No. 26 
Hindu (Kashmiri) 20 
Muslim 140 
Sikh 10 
Total 170 
Yes 
5.00% 
82.14% 
20.00% 
71.76% 
No 
95.00% 
17.86% 
80.00% 
28.24% 
Region Jammu 
Hindu (Dogri) 50 
Muslim 50 
Sikh (Dogri) 10 
Total 110 
0.00% 
92.00% 
10.00% 
42.73% 
100.00% 
8.00% 
90.00% 
57.27% 
Region Ladakh 
Shia(Balti)15 
Buddhist (ladakhi) 
15 
Total 30 
86.66% 
0.00% 
43.33% 
13.33% 
100.00% 
56.67% 
State-level 
Hindu 70 
Muslim 205 
Sikh 20 
Buddhist 15 
Grand Total 310 
1.43% 
84.88% 
35.00% 
0.00% 
58.71% 
98.57% 
15.12% 
65.00% 
100.00% 
41.29% 
The table reveals that 58.71% respondents in the state (J&K) 
maintain that they support the freedom movement, whereas, 41.29% 
respondents do not support it. 
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Religion-wise analysis shows tiiat the highest percentage of 
Buddhists (100.00%), Hindus (98.57%) and Sikhs (65.00%) do not 
support the movement, whereas, 84.88% Muslims said that they 
support the freedom movement. Similarly, 35.00% Sii^ h respondents 
share their opinion with Muslim respondents in the state. 
Thus, we find that only majority of Muslims support the ongoing 
freedom movement in (J&K). 
Region-wise analysis shows that the highest percentage of Muslims 
(82.14%) in the region of Kashmir is in support of the movement, 
unlike Hindus (95.00%) and Sikhs (80.00%), respectively. 
In the region of Jammu, like in Kashmir-region, the highest 
percentage of Muslims (92.00%) is in support of the movement, 
Unlike Hindus (100.00%) and Sikhs (90.00%) who do not support it. 
While in the region of Ladakh Muslim (86.66%) is in support of the 
movement, unlike Buddhists (100.00%) who do not support it. 
Thus, analysis shows us that only Muslims in different regions of the 
state (J&K) are in support of the ongoing freedom movement, like at 
state level. Contrary to this non-Muslims minorities in the state do not 
support the movement. 
Apart from political alienation, the conflict has badly affected the 
economic prospects in the state. In order to ascertain or confirm the 
impact of conflict on the economic prospects of people in J&K we 
have formulated a question (Q.no.27) of the interview-schedule) in 
which we have asked respondents: Did your economic prospects 
decline during the period of militancy? There are two alternatives 
(Yes and No) in the question, respondents were asked to choose the 
one that is important. Responses given by respondents are tabulated 
in table 15. 
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Table 15 
Region Kashmir 
Q.No. 27 
Hindu (Kashmiri) 20 
Muslim 140 
Sikh 10 
Total 170 
Region Jammu 
Hindu (Dogri) 50 
Muslim 50 
Sikh (Dogri) 10 
Total 110 
Region Ladakh 
Shia(Balti)15 
Buddhist (ladakhi) 15 
Total 30 
State-level 
Hindu 70 
Muslim 205 
Sikh 20 
Buddhist 15 
Grand Total 310 
Yes 
90.00% 
90.00% 
100.00% 
90.59% 
16.00% 
84.00% 
80.00% 
52.73% 
100.00% 
40.00% 
70.00% 
37.14% 
89.27% 
90.00% 
40.00% 
75.16% 
No 
10.00% 
10.00% 
0.00% 
9.41% 
84.00% 
16.00% 
20.00% 
47.27% 
0.00% 
60.00% 
30.00% 
62.86% 
10.73% 
10.00% 
60.00% 
24.84% 
The table reveals that at state-level 75.16% respondents are of the 
view that their economic prospects declined since the emergence of 
militancy (yes-alternative). Whereas, 24.84% respondents are of the 
view that their economic prospects hardly declined during militancy. 
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Religion-wise analysis at state-level shows that 90.00% Sikhs, 
89.27% Muslims, 40.00% Buddhists and 37.14% Hindu respondents 
have opined in favour of the alternative-yes i.e., their economic 
prospects shrinked because of militancy. Contrary to this, 62.86% 
Hindu, 60.00% Buddhists, 10.73% Muslims and 10.00% Sikhs in J&K 
opined in favour of alternative-no i.e. militancy has not influenced 
their economic prospects. 
Thus, we find in Jammu & Kashmir, economic prospects of Muslims 
and Sikhs have declined more than the economic prospects of 
Hindus and Buddhists, since the emergence of conflict there. 
Region-wise analysis shows that in the region of Kashmir the highest 
percentage of Muslims (90.00%), Hindus (90.00%) and Sikhs 
(100.00%) are of the view that militancy has declined their economic 
prospects (yes-alternative). This shows conflict has evenly influenced 
the economic prosperity of people who belongs to different religious 
communities in the region of Kashmir. 
In the region of Jammu the highest percentage of Muslims (84.00%) 
and Sikhs (80.00%) think that conflict has declined their economic 
prospects, unlike Hindus among whom 84.00%opine that their 
economic prospects in Jammu increased since the emergence of 
militancy. 
While, Muslims in the region of Ladakh (100.00%) think unanimously 
that the prevailing conflict has declined their economic prospects 
(yes-alterative), unlike Buddhists (60.00%) who said conflict has not 
shattered their economic prospects (no-alternative). 
It merits mention here that conflict has less serious repercussion on 
the economic prospects of Hindus (of Jammu) and Buddhists (of 
Ladakh) than Muslims and Sikhs (of Jammu). The reason is Muslims 
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and Sikh respondents whom we interviewed belong to Muslim 
dominated belts in Jammu like district Doda, Poonch and Rajouri. 
These districts of Jammu region are more in the throes of militancy 
than other districts where the influences of militants are less, 
especially district Jammu, Kathua and Udhampur. It is in these Hindu 
dominated districts we interviewed Hindu respondents. In view of this 
differential concentration of the communities in the region, it is 
feasible the consequences of conflict on the economic prospects of 
Hindus in Jammu would be less than its impact on the economic 
prospects of Muslims and Sikhs. Similarly, in the region of ladakh 
Muslims and Buddhists are differentially concentrated. In district 
Kargil Muslims are in majority, whereas, in Leh Buddhists are 
numerically preponderant. The incidents of firing or boarder 
skirmishes between Indian and Pakistani troops have badly shattered 
the economic prosperity of Muslims at Kargil than the Buddhists of 
Leh district where the influence of boarder clashes are minimum. 
Thus, we find, the conflict has negative repercussions on the 
economic prospects of people irrespective of religion in Kashmir, 
However, in the region of Jammu and Ladakh the economy of 
Muslims and Sikhs has suffered more than the economy of Hindus & 
Buddhists. 
Most of the respondents during survey narrated us that ongoing 
conflict in Kashmir has disrupted the economic prosperity in the 
Kashmir valley. As the tourist industry in the valley has come to a 
grinding halt and people connected with it have either changed their 
occupation or been reduced to conditions of severe hardships and 
misery. From pony-walas to the hotel owners, all are disappointed a 
lot in Kashmir. Moreover, frequent bandhs, curfews, strikes, violence, 
bomblasts etc. have disrupted entire commercial activity in the 
Kashmir valley. 
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Like-wise, most developmental activities in the state have come to a 
stand still. The state government has turned almost non-existent and 
bankrupt and found itself unable to make payments for plan and non-
plan expenditures including salaries to its employees. The internal 
resources of the state are considerably depleted as most people 
particularly in valley-Kashmir, in vie/v of current crisis have ignored to 
pay tax and tariff since 1990. 
Development of education in Jammu & Kashmir has started picking 
up since 1970's. Number of schools and colleges were established in 
different parts of the state, which enabled Muslims, who were earlier 
denied educational opportunities, to become educated. Rise of 
militancy has disrupted educational development of the state in 
general and Muslims in particular. 
For knowing the impact of militancy on education we have formulated 
a question (Q.no.28 of the Interview-schedule), which asks 
respondents: Do you think conflict led to devastation of educational 
infrastructure? In order to unearth these reality respondents were 
given two choices (in the form of yes and no) and persuaded to select 
the one, which is most important. Responses given by the 
respondents have been tabulated in table number 16. 
Table 16 
Region Kashmir 
Q.No. 28 
Hindu (Kashmiri) 20 
Muslim 140 
Sikh 10 
Total 170 
Yes 
80.00% 
95.71% 
80.00% 
92.94% 
No 
20.00% 
4.29% 
20.00% 
7.06% 
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Region Jammu 
Hindu (Dogri) 50 
Muslim 50 
Sikh (Dogri) 10 
Total 110 
0.00% 
84.00% 
20.00% 
40.00% 
100.00% 
16.00% 
80.00% 
60.00% 
Region Ladakh 
Shia(Balti)15 
Buddhist (ladakhi) 15 
Total 30 
80.00% 
6.67% 
43.33% 
20.00% 
93.33% 
56.67% 
State-level 
Hindu 70 
Muslim 205 
Sikh 20 
Buddhist 15 
Grand Total 310 
22.86% 
91.71% 
50.00% 
6.67% 
69.35% 
77.14% 
8.29% 
50.00% 
93.33% 
30.65% 
The table shows that 69.35% respondents at state level think the 
conflict led to loss of educational infrastructure, however, 30.65% 
respondents do not think so. 
Religion-wise analysis of data at state-level reveals that the highest 
percentage of Muslim respondents (91.71%) opines that devastation 
of educational infrastructure is the outcome of militancy. Similarly 
50.00% Sikh respondents shared the same opinion. 
However, 77.14% Hindu and 93.33% Buddhist respondents have 
expressed different opinion i.e. in the period of conflict they have 
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observed no loss of educational infrastructure. 50.00% Sikh 
respondents have shared the same opinion. 
Thus, at state-level we find only majority of Muslims and some Sikhs 
too opine that prevailing conflict has severely damaged the 
educational infrastructure of the state government. 
Religion-wise analysis of data at regional level shows that 95.71% 
Muslim, 80.00% Hindus and 80.00% Sikh respondents in valley 
Kashmir attribute devastation of school buildings to militancy. 
In Jammu-region 84.00% Muslim respondents differ in their opinion 
from Hindus (100.00%) and Sikh (80.00%). The former hold 
educational buildings were set ablaze in their area while the latter do 
not hold so. 
While in Ladakh-region Muslims (differ in their opinion from Buddhists 
the former (80.00%) observed demolition of educational infrastructure 
due to cross border skirmishes between Indian and Pakistani troops. 
While the latter (93.33% do not observe any loss of educational 
buildings. 
Thus, we find in region-Kashmir tfie conflict has severely damaged 
the educational infrastructure of all religions communities in the 
region. However in region-Jammu and Ladakh consequences of the 
conflict upon educational structures have remained uneven as in both 
regions as compared to non-Muslims, the educational prospects of 
Muslims have declined more. 
Thus, we find the on-going conflict has badly suffered the education 
of all religious communities in the region of Kashmir. However, the 
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consequences of conflict in region-Jammu and Ladakh are uneven as 
in both regions as compared to non-Muslims the education of Muslim 
community received a severe jolt. 
According to official sources, 265 educational institutions, including 
21 Higher Secondary, 64 High and 71 Middle schools were set 
ablaze by mid 1991 or so 
Apart from the arrest or disruption of politico-economic development 
of the state, devastation of infra-structural base, growing alienation 
and poverty among people, conflict in Kashmir has serious 
repercussions for family and marital relations. In order to explore 
consequences of conflict for the ins'iitutions of family and marriage we 
have formulated a question (Q.no.29 of the Interview schedule). The 
question is: what kind of impact militancy has on family organization 
and marriage system? There are five options in the question which 
are as follows: 
(a) Parental authority has declined 
(b) Divorce rate has increased 
(c) Increasing number of widows and their children, created 
problems in the family and marriage systems. 
(d) Illegitimate relations increased. 
(e) Practice of dowry has declined 
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Of the five options, respondents were encouraged 
which is most important. Responses given by 
tabulated in table number 17. 
to select the one, 
respondents are 
Table 17 
Region Kashmir 
Q.No. 29 
Hindu (Kashmiri) 20 
Muslim 140 
Sikh 10 
Total 170 
A 
20.00% 
20.71% 
20.00% 
20.59% 
b 
0.00% 
8.57% 
0.00% 
7.06% 
c 
80.00% 
70.71% 
80.00% 
72.35% 
d 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
e 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
Region Jammu 
Hindu (Dogri) 50 
Muslim 50 
Sikh (Dogri) 10 
TotalHO 
4.00% 
8.00% 
0.00% 
5.45% 
0.00% 
6.00% 
0.00% 
2.73% 
32.00% 
68.00% 
0.00% 
45.45% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
Region Ladakh 
Shia(Balti)15 
Buddhist (ladakhi) 15 
Total 30 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
100.00% 
0.00% 
50.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
State-level 
Hindu 70 
Muslim 205 
Sikh 20 
Buddhist 15 
Grand Total 310 
8.57% 
16.10% 
10.00% 
0.00% 
13.23% 
0.00% 
7.32% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
4.84% 
45.71% 
72.20% 
40.00% 
0.00% 
60.65% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
The table shows in Jammu & Kashmir about, 60.65% respondents 
have expressed their response in favour of option-C (increasing no. 
of windows and their children have created problems in the family 
and marriage systems, 13.23% respondents in favour of the option-A 
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(Parental authority has declined), 4.84% respondents in favour of 
option-b (divorce rate has increased). 
Religion-wise analysis at state-level shows that the highest 
percentage of Muslim (72.20%) respondents have chosen the option-
C (Increasing no. of windows and their children created problems in 
the family and marriage systems). 
Except Buddhist (0.00%), the highest percentage of Hindu (45.71%) 
and Sikh (40.00%) respondents in Jammu& Kashmir has expressed 
similar view on option-c. That is, since the emergence of militancy 
Hindu, Muslim and Sikh respondents in Jammu & Kashmir think 
unanimously that increasing number of widows and their children 
have disrupted the familial and marriage systems there. 
Table 17 also shows that conflict has also declined the parental 
authority in the family. As 16.10% Muslim, 10.00% Sikh, and 8.57% 
Hindu respondents expressed their second highest opinion in favour 
of option-a. Buddhist (0.00%) respondents in the state have 
expressed no opinion. 
Moreover, the impact of conflict on marital system shows that only 
7.32% Muslim respondents think that since the emergence of 
militancy divorce rate has increased (option-b), unlike Hindu (0.00%), 
Sikh (0.00%) & Buddhists (0.00%) respectively. 
Thus, analysis at state-level shows the prevailing conflict has thrown 
negative consequences over the family and marriage systems. 
Religion-wise analysis at regional level shows that in the region of 
Kashmir Hindu (80.00%), Sikh (80.00%) and Muslim (70.71%) 
respondents maintain that since the emergence of conflict increasing 
number of windows and their children have created problems in the 
family and marriage systems (option c), like at state level. 
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In the region of Kashmir the second highest percentage of IVluslim 
(20.71%), Hindu (20.00%) and Sikh (20.00%) respondents show that 
the decline of parental authority in family is the result of militancy. 
However, only 8.57% Muslim respondents in the region of Kashmir 
are of the view that since the emergence of conflict the divorce rate 
has increased. 
Thus, we find in the region of Kashmir the prevailing conflict has 
destabilized the family and marriage institutions especially of those 
families, which have become the victims of violence. Moreover, it has 
declined the parental authority in some families irrespective of region. 
In the region of Jammu, the highest percentage of Muslims (68.00%) 
and Hindus (32.00%) are of the view that the since the emergence of 
militancy the increasing number of widows and their children have 
created problems in the family and marriage systems (option-C), but 
Sikhs (0.00%), unlike their co-religionists in Kashmir (80.00%), have 
expressed no opinion on the option-c. 
As compared to Hindus (4.00%) the percentage of Muslim 
respondents (8.00%) is more regarding the role of militancy in 
declining parental authority in the family. Sikhs (0.00%) in the region 
of Jammu have expressed no opinion on the option-a. 
This shows as compared to region Kashmir the impact of militancy on 
the parental authority the family is less in Jammu. Like in region 
Kashmir, Hindu and Muslim respondents in the region of Jammu too 
think increasing number of widows and their children are proving 
destabilizing factors for the organization of family and marriage. 
While, in the region of Ladakh only Muslim (100.00%) respondents 
think that since the emergence of militancy increasing no. of widows 
and their children have created problems in the family and marriage 
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systems(option-c) unlike Budclhists(0.00%). The impact of conflict 
over parental authority and divorce rate are less in Ladakh. 
The survey, which we conducted last year (July 2004) in the strife-
torn state, we also came across a number of Muslims in Kashmir who 
during their conversation informed us about the following. 
"That the women who become widows in the period of militancy have 
now become a source of conflict in most of the families in Kashmir. 
Widows whose husbands were militants after the loss of their 
husbands have been facing a number of problems in the families of 
their in-laws. Firstly, lack of marriageable male substitute in the family 
of In-laws led many widows to leave the family of in-laws forever. 
Secondly, after leaving the family of in-laws, most of widows have 
been facing the problem of re-marriage in the society. As the men-
folk in the mainstream Kashmiri society shows a lot of hesitation to 
marry with a widow whose husband has remained a militant. Thirdly, 
leaving the family of in-laws and the re-entry of widows into the family 
of the parents has become a source of burden for the parents of 
widows. It is, therefore, the conflict has not only destabilized the 
family & marriage systems but also created the problem of widow re-
marriage, particularity, in the families, which have become the victims 
of violence. 
Next, the children who became orphans in the conflict created 
another social problem there. That is, the problem of bringing up the 
orphans, their schooling, and care. And, whose responsibility is it to 
look after the orphans, widows, in -laws or the government? 
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Moreover, due to lack of any adequate social mechanism for the 
welfare of orphans have created a new challenge of integrating these 
orphans with mainstream society. In view of this, it has now become 
responsibility of all philanthropic persons in Jammu & Kashmir society 
and outside of it to address the problem of orphans on priority basis 
as if this is not done immediately possible in future it is they may 
become deviants/ militants and will bring future disaster for a state 
which has been starving for peace with dignity since long". 
Thus, analysis shows that institution of family and marriage are badly 
affected by the on-going conflict in the state. Adverse consequences 
are more for Muslims than other communities in the state. 
Kashmiryat is a mosaic of different cultural traits brought by different 
people who have come to Kashmir and made it as their homeland. In 
fact, various groups belonging to different parts of the world, tribes, 
races and professing different faiths contributed in the development 
of pluralistic culture in Kashmir". 
In Jammu and Kashmir the on-going conflict, which is the cumulative 
effect of the various factors, appears to have ruptured the syncretic 
cultural identity called Kashmiryat. In this regard we have formulated 
a question (Q.no. 30 of the Interview Schedule) that Is as follows. 
Kashmiri culture was defined in terms of the Kashmiryat, which used 
to cement communities together; do you feel Kashmiryat still holds its 
influence? There are two alternative (yes & no) in the question and 
respondents were asked to select the one, which seems most 
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important to them. The responses of respondents are tabulated in 
table number 18. 
Table 18 
Region Kashmir 
Q.No. 30 
Hindu (Kashmiri) 20 
Muslim 140 
Sikh 10 
Total 170 
Yes 
85.00% 
86.43% 
100.00% 
87.06% 
No 
15.00% 
13.57% 
0.00% 
12.94% 
Region Jammu 
Hindu (Dogri) 50 
Muslim 50 
Sikh (Dogri) 10 
Total 120 
16.00% 
44.00% 
50.00% 
31.82% 
84.00% 
56.00% 
50.00% 
68.18% 
Region Ladakh 
Shia(Balti)15 
Buddhist (iadakhi) 15 
Total 30 
80.00% 
0.00% 
40.00% 
20.00% 
100.00% 
60.00% 
State-level 
Hindu 70 
Muslim 205 
Sikh 20 
Buddhist 15 
Grand Total 310 
35.71% 
75.61% 
75.00% 
0.00% 
62.90% 
64.29% 
24.39% 
25.00% 
100.00% 
37.10% 
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The table shows that at state-level about 62.90% respondents have 
expressed their view on alternative-yes (Kashmiryat still holds its 
influence to cement communities together). Whereas, 37.10% 
respondents have expressed their opinion on alternative-No 
(Kashmiryat does not. hold its influence to cement communities 
together). 
Religion-wise analysis in J&K shows that the highest percentage of 
Buddhist (100.00%) and Hindu (64.29%) respondents in the state feel 
that Kashmiryat has lost its influence to hold communities together 
(yes-alternative). Contrary to this, the highest percentage of Muslim 
(75.61%) and Sikh (75.00%) respondents think that Kashmiryat still 
holds its influence to bind communities together in the state. 
This shows in Jammu & Kashmir difference in the opinion of religious 
communities regarding the sprit of Kashmiryat exist between Hindus 
& Buddhists on the one hand and Muslims on the other. The former 
hold that the conflict in Jammu & Kashmir has damaged the syncretic 
cultural identity of the state, whereas, the latter do not hold so. 
Region-wise analysis reveals that in the region of Kashmir, the 
highest percentage of Sikh (100.00%), Muslim (86.43%) and Hindu 
(85.00%) respondents in the region are of the view that kashmiriyat 
still unites communities together. 
Thus, we find in the region of Kashmir respondents, irrespective of 
religion, feel that Kashmiryat still holds its influence to bind 
communities together. 
However, in the region of Jammu the highest percentage of Hindu 
(84.00%), Muslim (56.00%) and 5C.00% Sikh respondents think that 
in the present circumstances the influence of Kashmiryat to cement 
communities is nil or no more. 
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Thus, we find in the region of Jammu, Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs 
think mostly that Kashmiryat has lost its influence to hold 
communities together, unlike thei; co-religionists in the region of 
Kashmir who think it is still alive in the state. 
While in the region of Ladakh opinion of Muslims differ from the 
opinion of Buddhists. Muslims (80.00%) in the region say that 
Kashmiryat still hold communities together, whereas, Buddhists 
(100.00%) in the region do not think so. 
Our result contradicts opinion of Riyaz Panjabi and P.S. Verma on 
the one hand; on the other it substantiates the view of Balraj Puri 
also. Riyaz Panjabi has said that in Jammu & Kashmir unprincipled 
politics of central government has damaged the syncretic cultural 
identity of the state^. While P.S. Verma has said same thing in 
different words, the current crisis has also made the one-community, 
on region phenomenon a reality. Kashmir valley has become virtually 
Muslim, Leh Buddhist, Kargil Muslim and the Jammu, Kathua and 
udhampur districts Hindu. It is reported that in Jammu region too, lots 
of people on community lines have migrated from the Muslim 
dominated districts of Doda and poonch^. 
No doubt we find some reflection of these two scholar's views in our 
result (Hindus and Buddhists do think that Kashmiryat has lost its 
influence). But this is not complete reality major communities of 
valley-Kashmir still think Kashmiryat is alive. This result is in tune with 
the opinion of Balraj Puri who said that 'even in the present 
circumstances Kashmiryat is still alive in Kashmir"^. 
Another question in our Interview-schedule is concerned with the 
relationship among different religious communities that have 
emerged in the context of ongoing conflict. In this regard we have 
asked a question (Q.no.31 of the Interview-schedule) which is as 
follows: Do you think that militancy in Kashmir has increased the gulf 
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between different religious communities in the state and outside of it? 
There are two options in the question and respondents were 
persuaded to select the option, which is most important. We have 
tabulated the response of respondents in table number 19. 
Table 19 
Region Kashmir 
Q.No. 31 
Hindu (Kashmiri) 20 
Muslim 140 
Sikh 10 
Total 170 
Region Jammu 
Hindu (Dogri) 50 
Muslim 50 
Sikh (Dogri) 10 
Total 110 
Region Ladakh 
Shia(Balti)15 
Buddhist (ladakhi) 15 
Total 30 
State-level 
Hindu 70 
Muslim 205 
Sikh 20 
Buddhist 15 
Grand Total 310 
Yes 
20.00% 
21.43% 
20.00% 
21.18% 
80.00% 
10.00% 
60.00% 
46.36% 
60.00% 
100.00% 
80.00% 
62.86% 
21.46% 
40.00% 
100.00% 
35.81% 
No 
80.00% 
78.57% 
80.00% 
78.82% 
20.00% 
90.00% 
40.00% 
53.64% 
40.00% 
0.00% 
20.00% 
37.14% 
78.54% 
60.00% 
0.00% 
64.19% 
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The table shows that at state-level 64.19% respondents have 
expressed their view on option-no (militancy in Kashmir has not 
increased the gulf between the religious communities) and, 35.81% 
respondents have chosen the option-yes (militancy has increased the 
gap between religious communities) 
Religion-wise analysis at state-level shows that the highest 
percentage of Hindu (62.86%) respondents is of the view that 
militancy is responsible for increasing the differences between 
religious communities. Similarly, in the state & outside of it 
correspondingly, cent percent (100.00%) Buddhist respondents have 
expressed the same opinion on Option-yes. Contrary to this, the 
highest percentage of Muslims (78.54%) and, Sikhs (60.00%) 
respondents in J&K are of the view that militancy is not responsible 
for increasing the gulf between different religious communities in the 
state and outside of it (no-option). 
This shows in J&K related to the role communities difference exist 
between Hindus and Buddhists on the one hand and Muslims and 
Sikhs who do not think so on the other. 
Religion-wise analysis at regional-lever shows that in the region of 
Kashmir the highest percentage of Hindu (80.00%), Sikh (80.00%) 
and Muslims (89.57%) respondents are of the view that emergence of 
militancy is not responsible for increasing the gulf between the 
religious communities in the state and outside of it. 
Whereas, in the region of Jammu the highest percentage of Hindu 
(80.00%) and Sikh (60.00%) respondents attribute increasing gulf 
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between the religious communities to militancy, whereas, 90.00% 
Muslim respondents do not think so. 
Thus, in Jammu-region except Muslims, non-Muslims in the region 
think that increasing gulf between the religious communities is the 
out-come of militancy. 
While, in the region of Ladakh the highest percentage of Buddhists 
(100.00%) and Muslims (60.00%) have expressed their view in favour 
of option - a (Militancy in Kashmir has increased the gulf between the 
religious communities). 
Thus, we find that Muslims & Buddhists in Ladakh and Hindus & 
Sikhs of Jammu-region, unlike their co-religionists in the region of 
Kashmir, opines that widening of gulf between religious communities 
in the state and outside of it is the outcome of ongoing militancy in 
Kashmir. 
Apart from breaking the syncretic cultural identity, widening the gap 
between religious communities, the conflict in Jammu & Kashmir 
resulted in loss of respect of Kashnr.ir people, especially in other parts 
of India. In this regard we have formulated a question (Q.No.32 of the 
Interview-Schedule) for knowing the response or viewpoint of 
respondents. The question is: Do you think that after the emergence 
of militancy you are not getting due respect from the people living in 
other parts of India? There are two options in the question (Yes and 
No) and respondents were persuaded to select the one which they 
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thinks is the most important we have tabulated the response of 
respondents in table 20. 
Table 20 
Region Kashmir 
Q.No. 32 
Hindu (Kashmiri) 20 
Muslim 140 
Sikh 10 
Total 170 
Yes 
0.00% 
95.71% 
20.00% 
80.00% 
No 
100.00% 
4.29% 
80.00% 
20.00% 
Region Jammu 
Hindu (Dogri) 50 
Muslim 50 
Sikh (Dogri) 10 
Total 110 
0.00% 
90.00% 
20.00% 
42.73% 
100.00% 
10.00% 
80.00% 
57.27% 
Region Ladakh 
Shia(Balti)15 
Buddhist (ladakhi) 15 
Total 30 
40.00% 
0.00% 
20.00% 
60.00% 
100.00% 
80.00% 
State-level 
Hindu 70 
Muslim 205 
Sikh 20 
Buddhist 15 
Grand Total 310 
0.00% 
90.24% 
20.00% 
0.00% 
60.97% 
100.00% 
9.76% 
80.00% 
100.00% 
39.03% 
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The table shows that in Jaminu & Kashmir about 60.97% 
respondents have opined in favour of option-a (since the emergence 
of militancy we are not getting due respect from the people living in 
other parts of India). 
Whereas, 39.03% respondents do not opine so (even after the 
emergence of militancy in the state they are getting due respect from 
the people living in other parts of India) 
Religion-wise analysis at state-level shows that Muslims (90.24%) are 
of the view that since the emergence of militancy they are not getting 
due respect from the people living in other parts of India, unlike the 
Hindus (100.00%), Buddhists (100.00%) and Sikhs (80.00%) who 
generally think that since the emergence of conflict they are getting 
due respect from the people living in other parts of India. This shows 
the prevailing conflict has badly influenced the respect of people 
especially Muslims. 
Religion-wise analysis at regional-level shows that 95.71% Muslims 
of region-Kashmir have opined in favour of option-yes, whereas, non-
Muslims-Sikhs (80.00%) and Hindus (100.00%) have expressed their 
view in favour of option-no. 
This shows in the region of Kashmir Muslims, like at state-level, are 
of the view that since the emergence of militancy they have 
experienced loss of respect in other parts of India, unlike non-Muslim 
Kashmiris. 
In the region of Jammu the highest percentage of Muslim 
respondents (90.00%) think that people in other states of India are 
not giving due respect to Muslim Kashmiris, unlike Hindu (100.00%) 
and Sikh (80.00%) respondents. 
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While, in the region of Ladakh, the Buddhist (100.00%) and Muslim 
(60.00%) respondents think unanimously that after the rise of 
militancy they experience no loss of respect from people living in 
different parts of India. 
In fact, during survey we come across a number of Muslims, who 
work outside Jammu & Kashmir, they said that some people in other 
parts of India are suspecting them as "terrorists" 
Moreover, while frisking disdainful remarks by police or security 
agencies are other examples of humiliation. 
The prevailing conflict appears to have adversely affected the 
religious life of people in the state. In this regard, we have formulated 
a question (Question-number 43 of the Interview-Schedule) to know 
the viewpoint of respondents to what extent the ongoing conflict has 
influenced their religious life. The question is: did your religious 
freedom suffer during the period of militancy? There are two 
alternatives in the question and respondents were persuaded to 
select the one, which is important. Response given by respondents is 
tabulated in table number 21. 
Table 21 
Region Kashmir 
Q.No. 33 
Hindu (Kashmiri) 20 
Muslim 140 
Sikh 10 
Total 170 
Yes 
0.00% 
81.43% 
0.00% 
67.06% 
No 
100.00% 
18.57% 
100.00% 
32.94% 
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Region Jammu 
Hindu (Dogri) 50 
Muslim 50 
Sikh (Dogri) 10 
Total 110 
0.00% 
56.00% 
0.00% 
26.45% 
100.00% 
44.00% 
100.00% 
74.55% 
Region Ladakh 
Shia(Balti)15 
Buddhist (ladakhi) 15 
Total 30 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
100.00% 
100.00% 
100.00% 
State-level 
Hindu 70 
Muslim 205 
Sikh 20 
Buddhist 15 
Grand Total 310 
0.00% 
69.27% 
0.00% 
C.00% 
45.81% 
100.00% 
30.73%> 
100.00% 
100.00% 
54.19% 
The table shows that at state-level about 54.19% respondents think 
that their religious freedom did not suffer during the period of 
militancy (no-alternative). Whereas, 45.81% respondents said that 
their religious freedom did suffer (yes-alternative). 
Religion-wise analysis at state-level shows that Hindu (100.00%) Sikh 
(100.00%) and Buddhist (100.00%) respondents opined unanimously 
that in the period of militancy they suffered no loss of religious 
freedom, unlike Muslims (69.27%) whose religious freedom did 
suffer. 
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It is, therefore, the conflict in Jammu & Kashmir has serious 
repressions for the religious freedom of Muslims. In fact during 
fieldwork most of the Muslim respondents in Kashmir told us that the 
fear of military patrolling, movement of militants and crackdown at 
night are the factors that discourages them to offer prayers like Fajir 
and Isha in mosques. They do not hold Ijtemas in mosques and in 
their homes because of the fear that security forces may consider 
them militants. It is because of this reason since the emergence of 
militancy Ijtema-culture (one of the religious duties) got worst hit in 
Kashmir -valley. 
Religion-wise analysis at regional-level shows that in the region of 
Kashmir except Hindus (100.00%) Sikhs (100.00%) and Muslims 
(81.43%) in the region are of the view that their freedom of religion 
has suffered since the emergence of militancy. 
In the region of Jammu only Muslims (56.00%) respondents are of 
the view that conflict resulted in loss of the religious freedom. 
While in the region of Ladakh Muslims (100.00%) and Buddhists 
(100.00%) opined unanimously that their religious freedom did not 
suffer. 
It is, therefore, we find the ongoing conflict has serious repercussions 
for the religious freedom of Kashmir Muslims and Muslims in Jammu-
region too. However, in the region of Ladakh Muslims do not 
experience any loss of religious freedom. 
Consequences of the ongoing conflict in Jammu & Kashmir could be 
seen in the form of curtailing the rights and liberties of people as the 
fundamental rights guaranteed to every citizen of India under the 
Indian constitution have been denied to them. The emergence of 
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militancy is no doubt one of the factors responsible for this unhealthy 
development. But the various policies that central government 
formulated for checking militancy in Kashmir, in practice, turned out to 
be an exercise directed against the vast masses of Kashmiri people®. 
In order to explore the consequences of conflict over rights and 
liberties of people we have formulated a question (question number 
34 of the Interview-schedule) for knowing the viewpoint of 
respondents in this regard. The question is: Did conflict curtail your 
freedom including freedom of speech, right to protest and elect a 
government of your choice? There are two alternatives, in the form of 
'Yes and 'No', in the question and respondents were asked to select 
or answer the one which is most important. Response given by 
respondents has been tabulated in table number 22. 
Table 22 
Region Kashmir 
Q.No. 34 
Hindu (Kashmiri) 20 
Muslim 140 
Sikh 10 
Total 170 
Yes 
100.00% 
89.29% 
60.00% 
88.82% 
No 
0.00% 
10.71% 
40.00% 
11.18% 
Region Jammu 
Hindu (Dogri) 50 
Muslim 50 
Sikh (Dogri) 10 
Total 120 
100.00% 
86.00% 
80.00% 
91.82% 
0.00% 
14.00% 
20.00% 
8.18% 
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Region Ladakh 
Shia(Balti) 15 
Buddhist (ladakhi) 15 
Total 30 
100.00% 
80.00% 
40.00% 
0.00% 
20.00% 
60.00% 
State-level 
Hindu 70 
Muslim 205 
Sikh 20 
Buddhist 15 
Grand Total 310 
100.00% 
89.27% 
70.00% 
80.00% 
90.00% 
0.00% 
10.73% 
30.00% 
20.00% 
10.00% 
The table reveals that at state level about 90.00% respondents opine 
that their freedom of speech, to protest and form the government of 
their choice got curtailed in the ongoing conflict in Jammu & Kashmir 
(alternative-yes). However 10.00% respondents do not share the 
view as expressed by majohty of respondents in the state. 
Religion-wise analysis at state-level shows that 100.00% Hindu, 
89.27% Muslim, 80.00% Buddhist and 70.00% Sikh respondents 
have chosen the yes alternative of the question. At state-level 
analysis shows that conflict has curtailed the freedom of people, 
irrespective of religion. 
Religion-wise analysis at regional-level shows that in the region of 
Kashmir cent percent Hindu (100.00%), 89.29% Muslim, 60.00% Sikh 
respondents have expressed their view in favour of alternative-yes of 
the question (Conflict has serious repercussions for the freedom of 
people). 
Similarly, in the region of Jammi. about 100.00% Hindu, 86.00% 
Muslim, and 80.00% Sikh respondents have expressed their opinion 
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in favour of yes alternative of the question. That is, like in region 
Kashmir, in the region of Jammu too people generally relate loss of 
freedom of speech, to protest and form a Government of their own 
choice to the ongoing violent conflict in Jammu & Kashmir. 
While in the region of Ladakh cent percent (100.00%) Muslims and 
80.00% Buddhists have expressed their view in favour of alternative-
yes of the question. 
Thus, we find people in all the regions of the state irrespective of 
religion are almost unanimous in their view that the ongoing conflict 
has curtailed the freedom of people especially the freedom of 
speech, to protest and form a government of their own choice. 
In fact, Balraj Purl writes in his article that "looking back objectively, 
one can trace the beginning of the Kashmir problem and its 
aggravation to the denial to the people of the state of civil liberties, of 
democratic and human rights including the right to freedom of 
speech, of the right to protest and form an opposition party, of the 
right to vote and to elect a government of their choice^. 
Another impact of Kashmir conflict could be seen in the form of 
migration of Kashmiri Hindu families from the region-Kashmir to 
region-Jammu. Though, some Kashmiri Hindu families have migrated 
to other states of India. In this way, the migration led by Kashmir 
conflict is of intra-state and inter-state in nature. 
Here in question number 35 of the Interview - Schedule our aim is to 
explore: who is responsible for the migration of Kashmiri Pandits from 
valley? There are three options in the question, which are as follows. 
(a) Rise of militancy in the valley. 
(b) Policy of the government to migrate Pandits (Kashmiri Hindus) 
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(c) Pandits migrated because of employment and other economic 
opportunities (present in other states of India) 
Of the three options, respondents were asked to select the one, 
which is most important. We have tabulated the response of 
respondents in table number 23. 
Table 23 
Region Kashmir 
Q.No. 35 
Hindu (Kashmiri) 20 
Muslim 140 
Sikh 10 
Total 170 
A 
100.00% 
20.71% 
60.00% 
32.35% 
b 
0.00% 
77.14% 
20.00% 
64.71% 
C 
0.00% 
2.14% 
20.00% 
2.94% 
Region Jammu 
Hindu (Dogri) 50 
Muslim 50 
Sikh (Dogri) 10 
Total 110 
100.00% 
22.00% 
50.00% 
60.00% 
0.00% 
58.00% 
20.00% 
28.18% 
0.00% 
20.00% 
30.00% 
11.82% 
Region Ladakh 
Shia(Balti)15 
Buddhist (ladakhi) 15 
Total 30 
46.67% 
100.00% 
73.33% 
20.00% 
0.00% 
10.00% 
33.33% 
0.00% 
16.67 
State-level 
Hindu 70 
Muslim 205 
Sikh 20 
Buddhist 15 
Grand Total 310 
100.00% 
22.93% 
55.00% 
100.00% 
46.13% 
0.00% 
68.29% 
20.00% 
0.00% 
46.45% 
0.00% 
8.78% 
25.00% 
0.00% 
7.42% 
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The table shows that at state-lavel 46.45% respondents have 
expressed their opinion in favour of option-b (policy of the 
Government to migrate Pandits), 46.13% respondents have chosen 
the option-a (Rise of militancy in the valley) and 7.42% respondents 
the option-c (Pandits migrated because of employment and other 
economic opportunities. 
Religion-wise analysis in Jammu & Kashmir shows that Hindus 
(100.00%) Buddhists (100.00%) and Sikhs (55.00%) have opined in 
favour of option-a. That is, rise of militancy is responsible for the 
migration of Kashmiri Pandits from the valley Kashmir. 
Contrary to this, 68.29% Muslims in the state think that migrating 
Pandits from valley was the policy of the Government. 
At state-level analysis shows that opinion of Muslims differ from the 
opinion of non-Muslims. The former held the policy of the government 
responsible for migration of Kashmiri-Hindus. While the latter held 
rise of militancy in valley responsible for the migration of Pandits. 
Religion-wise analysis at regional-level shows that in the region of 
Kashmir Hindus (100.00%), and Sikhs (60.00%) have opined in 
favour of option-a (Rise of militancy in the valley), whereas, 77.14% 
Muslim respondents have chosen the option-b (policy of the 
Government). 
Thus, we find in region Kashmir Hindus and Sikhs attribute migration 
of Kashmiri Pandits to the rise of militancy, while, Muslims to the 
policy of the government. 
In the region of Jammu Hindus (100.00%) maintain migration of 
Kashmiri Pandits is the outcome of militancy. Similarly, 50.00% Sikhs 
are of the same view. Whereas, 90.00% Muslims in the region held 
the policy of the government responsible for the migration of Pandits. 
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While in tlie region of Ladakii the highest percentage of Buddhists 
(100.00%) and Muslims (46.67%) have opined that for the migration 
of Kashmiri Pandits militancy is responsible. 
Thus, we find that for the migration of Kashmiri Hindus the militancy 
and the policy of the government to migrate them have got the 
highest percentage of response among the people both at state and 
regional-levels. 
P.S. Verma also writes in his book 'Jammu and Kashmir at the 
Political Cross Roads' (1994) that migration of Kashmir Pandits who 
belongs to the same ethnic, cultural and linguistic group as Kashmiri 
Muslims shows a reversal of Kashmir traditions! He says the killing of 
some popular minority leaders such as Tikka Lai Taploo (BJP) on 
September 15, 1989 had created a fear psychosis among the 
Kashmiri Pandits. 
According to a publication by the Kashmir migrant cell: "More than 
50,000 families registered themselves with the relief organizations in 
Jammu and another 5,000 families went to Delhi and other places" 
Thousands of Muslim families in the boarder areas of Uri, Keran, 
Tangdhar, Machel, Kupwara, Poonch, Rajouri & Mendhar fled to 
Pakistan part of Kashmir. Most of them migrated either due to the 
fear of combing operations or were lured away by agencies across 
the boarder^°. 
In fact, during survey while discussion with certain Hindu migrants at 
Jammu they mostly said that their Muslim neighbours rather told them 
that they would help them against any eventuality. But keeping in 
view the deteriorating conditions they did not stop them from 
migrating till the return of normally. 
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After the emergence of Militancy (1989) in Jammu & Kashmir the 
government of India facing the immanent threat to the territorial 
integrity of the country resorted to heavy deployment of security 
forces there. Ironically, heavy deployment of security forces for 
suppressing ongoing militancy lead to sharp escalation of human 
rights violations, particularly custodial deaths, reprisal killings rape, 
torture and assaults on innocen* people, incidents of firing on 
peaceful demonstrations, humiliating body searches and arresting 
someone on suspicious grounds^ V 
Various organizations, both Indian and International, have reported 
the violations, especially since 1989. A report by Barbara Crossett 
illustrates the type and extent of human rights violation: 
"For three days in March the people of Batmaloo, a middle-class 
neighborhood, were victims of India's war against an independent 
movement it can no longer contain except by force. They call it 
crackdown and it can happen without warning in the Kashmir valley. 
An area is surrounded, shops are close, people are confined to their 
houses, other houses are ransacked, women abused, graveyards 
dug up, mosques violated. People in the village report that a large 
number of armed personnel entered into the houses of villages and at 
gun-point gang-raped 23-ladies without any consideration of their 
age, married, unmarried, pregnant, etc.... a women had subsequently 
given birth to a child with bones that were fractured during the rape 
... Neighborhood residents, many of whom lived on water for three 
days until the troops left, said the raid was by paramilitary troops of 
the central Reserve Force and the Boarder security Force units with a 
reputation of brutality and poor discipline. They were said to have 
broken windows, smashed bathroom mirrors and Television screens, 
and confiscated money and Jewelry "^ .^ 
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No doubt, anti-militancy operations in Kashmir iiave succeeded at a 
small scale to check militant operation but more than that 
inconvenience and misery to the innocent people are other 
consequences related to these military operations. It is significant that 
the local civil authorities of Srinagar are not consulted before the 
raids are conducted because military in Kashmir have been given 
special powers. Thus, failure of the forces active in Kashmir to 
discriminate between masses one the one hand and groups of armed 
militants on the other has been responsible to a large extent for 
pushing the general public to the ar"ti-lndian position that the militants 
adopt or a position where masses feel that independence from India 
is the only escape from state repression^^. 
Human rights are not merely violated by armed forces they are also 
violated by the militants. There are two kinds of militants operating in 
the state. One kind is of those who claim themselves as freedom 
fighters and fight against Indian forces in Kashmir. They are 
fundamentalist Muslims who dictate people to follow what they call 
Islamic edicts. Thus, women are forced to wear burkas, wine-shops, 
cinema halls and dish antennas are forcibly closed down. They also 
dictate rules of eating, drinking, marriage ceremonies etc. In short. 
People do not have freedom to choose life style, which they prefer 
most. 
Another kind of militant group is of those who surrendered 
themselves before Indian military and working on the behest of it. 
They are known as Ikhwanis or Nabedis in Kashmir. They terrorize 
people, loot and plunder their property and kill those whom they 
consider their enemies. 
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In this way, both types of militants brazenly violate human rights of 
people. In order to verify these assumptions we asked respondents a 
very simple question (Q.no. 36 of the Interview-schedule). The 
question is: who is the violator of human rights in Kashmir? There are 
five options in the question, which are as follows. 
(a) Indian security forces. 
(b) Ikhwanis (surrendered Kashmiri militants) 
(c) Militants 
(d) Pakistan 
(e) Local Kashmiris. 
Of the five options respondents were asked to choose the one, which 
is most important. Responses given by respondents are tabulated in 
table number 24. 
Table 24 
Region Kashmir 
Q.No. 36 
Hindu (Kashmiri) 20 
Muslim 140 
Sikh 10 
Total 170 
Region Jammu 
Hindu (Dogri) 50 
Muslim 50 
Sikh (Dogri) 10 
Total 110 
A 
70.00% 
84.29% 
40.00% 
80.00% 
10.00% 
86.00% 
40.00% 
42.72% 
b 
20.00% 
15.00% 
40.00% 
17.06% 
0.00% 
8.00% 
0.00% 
3.64% 
C 
10.00% 
0.71% 
20.00% 
2.94% 
70.00% 
6.00% 
40.00% 
38.18% 
d 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
20.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
9.09% 
e 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
1.82% 
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Region Ladakh 
Shia(Balti)15 
Budclhist(ladakhi)15 
Total 30 
State-level 
Hindu 70 
Muslim 205 
Sikh 20 
Buddhist 15 
Grand Total 310 
80.00% 
0.00% 
40.00% 
27.14% 
84.39% 
40.00% 
0.00% 
64.52% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
5.71% 
12.20% 
20.00% 
0.00% 
10.65% 
0.00% 
100.00% 
50.00% 
52.86% 
1.95% 
30.00% 
100.00% 
20.00% 
20.00% 
0.00% 
10.00% 
14.29% 
1.46% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
4.19% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
10.00% 
0.00% 
0.65% 
The table reveals that in Jammu & Kashmir people generally think 
that security forces of India (64.52%), militants (20.00%) and 
Ikhwanis (10.65%) are involved mostly in the violation of human 
rights. 
Religion-wise analysis at state-level shows that the highest 
percentage of Hindu respondents (52.86%) opine that Kashmiri 
militants are responsible for the violation of human rights. Similar 
view is also expressed by Buddhist respondents (100.00%). About 
30.0% Sikh respondent also shares the same view that militants are 
the main culprits of human rights violation in Kashmir. 
Unlike Hindu and Buddhist respondents, in Jammu & Kashmir about 
84.39% Muslim and 40.00% Sikh respondents are of the view that 
security forces of India are responsiole for the human rights violation. 
In Jammu & Kashmir 20.00% Sikh, 12.20% Muslim and 5.71% Hindu 
respondents are of the view that surrendered Kashmiri militants 
(Ikhwanis) who now work with paramilitary forces of India are 
responsible for the violation of human rights of people. 
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In this way we find that in Jammu & Kashmir about human hghts 
violations opinion of religious communities differ from each other. 
Muslims and Sikhs think that security forces are responsible for 
violation of human rights. Whereas, Hindus and Buddhists in the 
state held militants responsible for it. Moreover, except Buddhists, 
Sikhs, Muslims and some Hindus in the state maintain that Ikhwanis 
are involved in human rights violations. 
Religon-wise analysis at regional level shows that in the region of 
Kashmir 84.29% Muslim, 70.00% Hindu and 40.00% Sikh 
respondents have expressed their opinion in favour of option number 
'a' i.e., security forces of India. Thus, in the region of Kashmir the first 
highest percentage of opinion of every community shows that as 
compared to militants, security forces have violated the human rights 
of people most. 
The second highest percentage of Sikh (40.00%), Hindu (20.00%) 
and Muslim (15.00%) respondents in Kashmir-region show Ikhwanis 
as violators of human rights. Therefore, in valley-Kashmir 
respondents generally think that Indian security forces and Ikhwanis 
are violators of human rights. 
In the region of Jammu 86.67% Muslim, 40.00% Sikh and 10.00% 
Hindu respondents have expressed their opinion on option-a. 
(security forces). This shows as compared to Hindus, the response of 
Muslims regarding the violation of human rights by paramilitary forces 
of Indian is more significant. 
Whereas, the first highest percentage of Hindu respondents (70.00%) 
in the region of Jammu reveals that militants are responsible for 
violation of human rights of people. Similarly, 40.00% Sikh 
respondents share the same viewpoint regarding option number-c. 
Therefore, in the region of Jammu Hindu respondents unlike their co-
religionists in valley-Kashmir hold that militants are mainly involved in 
violation of human rights of people. 
While, in the region of Ladakh opinion of Muslim and Buddhist 
respondents differ from each other. The former (80.00%) make 
security forces responsible for violation of human rights while the later 
(100.00%) hold militants responsible. 
Thus, we find in Jammu & Kashmir and its various regions opinion of 
religious communities differ from each other. Hindus of Jammu-region 
and Buddhist respondents of Ladakh consider Kashmir militants the 
violators of human rights. Muslims in all the regions hold paramilitary 
forces of India responsible. Though, similar is the view of Kashmiri 
Hindus. While the Sikhs have taken an intermediate position as 
according to their view both security forces of India and militants are 
equally responsible for violating the human rights of people. 
Balraj Puri also says "that looking back objectivity, one can trace the 
beginning of Kashmir problem and its aggravation to the denial to the 
people of the state of civil liberties, of democratic and human 
rights...."''^ 
5.b. Conflict Resolution: As we nave seen in preceding analysis, 
Kashmir conflict is complex and multi-layered phenomenon. It has a 
long history, which involves legal questions and international 
diplomacy. It is not merely an ethnic conflict but also an issue of 
conflict between two sovereign states (India and Pakistan) and 
occupies a place in international peace keeping agenda. Scholars 
have suggested various strategies for resolving conflict in Kashmir. 
Some of these strategies are coercive in nature while others are 
reconciliatory in nature. We have discussed major strategies of 
conflict resolution in the following pages. 
182 
Ethnic flooding: It means alteration or bringing about change in 
demographic composition of an area was conflict persisting. In the 
case of Kashmir scholars believe that Muslim majority Kashmir valley 
and some Muslim majority districts of Jammu and Ladakh are 
potential factors of conflict in Kashmir. Thus, if state takes some 
measures of increasing population of non-Muslims in these areas, 
potential demographic factor of conflict would be ineffective. It is 
therefore some scholars have suggested this strategy for resolving 
Kashmir conflict. Radical demographic strategy of this kind was 
proposed by the Bhartiya Janta Party and many other Hindu 
nationalist organizations. The BJP has called for revocation of article 
370 of the Indian constitution, which gives special status to Kashmir 
among the Indian states. And, under this article non-Kashmiris may 
not seek residence or purchase property in Kashmir. By abrogating 
article 370 and opening Kashmir to Hindu and Sikh settlement India 
could transform Kashmir into a non-Muslim majority state. 
In India right-wing Hindu jingoists have realized the difficulty of 
flooding the valley with Hindus, given its predominantly Muslim 
population. Instead, they are now arguing that Ladakh and Jammu be 
settled with Hindus. If a plebiscite were held, all three provinces 
would be included and thereby affect its final outcome. 
The strategy of ethnic flooding although it may be superficially 
attractive, is fundamentally unworkable. Because, a first difficult step 
towards this end would be to repeal Article-370 of the Indian 
constitution. Second, at the present time, after the flight of some 
250,000 Hindus from valley, the population of Kashmir is composed 
almost entirely of Muslims. Transforming the demographic profile of 
Kashmir would require an enormous Hindu migration ensuring the 
safety and security of migrants in a region racked by militancy is task 
well beyond the capabilities of an Indian state. 
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The mailed- First strategy: This strategy is currently being applied in 
Kashmir for suppressing militarily the ongoing struggle for 
independent Kashmir. Widespread coercion appeared to have 
produced the necessary condition for peace in Panjab, before the use 
of this strategy in Kashmir. But this option is as deeply flawed as the 
preceding one. First, the demographic composition of Kashmir is 
markedly different from that of Panjab. In the Panjab, the Sikh 
population barely out-numbered the Hindu population. 
Whereas, Kashmir has a clear Muslim majority. Moreover, the vast 
Majority of Sikhs in the Panjab did not support the creation of a 
separate state of Khalistan. In the Kashmir valley, the seat of 
militancy, the vast majority of the population is already in favour of the 
movement. 
Second, the political status of the territory of Kashmir is an important 
factor. Unlike Panjab, Kashmir has been the subject of a territorial 
dispute between India and Pakistan; hence, upon the use of 
unbridled military power by India, Pakistan can raise the question of 
Human rights violation and Kashmir issue in different international 
forums. 
Third, the success of any counter insurgency strategy depends 
largely on the ability of the Government forces to deny the insurgents 
sanctuary and sources of material support. Sealing the Panjab 
boarder created conditions conducive to implementation of such an 
approach. A similar tactic would be all but impossible in Kashmir 
because the terrain does not permit it Kashmir's physical proximity to 
Pakistan, coupled with its highly mountainous territory, makes 
creating a cordon sanitaria around the valley exceedingly difficult. 
Lastly, this coercive strategy would also bring overwhelming pressure 
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from a variety of international quarters for India to reign in its security 
forces. 
The Wear-down strategy: In Wear-down option government's strategy 
remains to crush the fighting spirit of the insurgents over an extended 
period of time through its coercive agencies. It was used by the 
government of India in northeastern region during the 1960's and the 
1970's. Even though the northeast is hardly trouble free but India's 
experience in it counts as one o1 the few genuinely successful 
examples of counter insurgency operations. It is hardly surprising, 
then, that some of the Indian government agencies have inferred that 
this model can be applied in Kashmir also. 
Nevertheless, due to contextual differences between the northeastern 
experience and Kashmir situation, international dimension of the 
problem, public and international scrutiny of forces actions that 
involve human rights violation make wear-down strategy highly 
condemnable. 
Despite all these problems, in India it is supposed that the staying 
power of the Indian state is considerable and through the wear-down 
approach militants could be worn-down and their numbers reduced. 
Furthermore, Pakistan may also tire of supporting the insurgents. 
There is already growing resentment among Kashmiris against the 
presence and harsh tactics of militants especially foreign militants 
whose presence have been damaging the pristine quality of the 
movement. It is supposed that in the future a war-weary and violence-
fatigued population may decide about making a deal with India for 
ending violence and maintenance of the status quo. 
Conceding the valley to Pakistan: A small section of Individuals in 
India have suggested that it may be best for India to declare victory 
and concede the valley (Kashmir) to Pakistan. This proposal would 
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enable India to retain control of Jammu, Kargil and Leh. Moreover, it 
would bring an end to the insurgency, enable the Indian army to 
withdraw from the Kashmir and satisfy Pakistan's claim to the 
Kashmir valley. 
However, this proposal masks a range of problems. First, conceding 
the valley to Pakistan as a proposal is politically indefensible in India. 
Second, it might not satisfy all the militant groups, most notably the 
JKLF (Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front) who remains committed to 
the notion of a unified, independent Kashmir. Third, the government 
of India might not make such a bold territorial concession for fear of 
demonstration effects. Furthermore, conceding the valley to Pakistan 
would leave the northern portions of the state, the districts of Leh and 
kargil, militarily vulnerable. 
Shared Sovereignty: This strategy proposes that Kashmir become a 
condominium between India and Pakistan. The two sides would 
jointly administer the state of Jammu and Kashmir, with Kashmiris 
able to move freely across a porous boarder. 
However, any attempt to implement this proposal would encounter 
number of political and administrative obstacles. Would India and 
Pakistan share sovereignty over all of Kashmir's affairs or only in the 
area of defense? Who would be responsible for maintaining civil 
order in the face of disturbance? Who would assume responsibility for 
the collection of revenue? Who would assume responsibility for 
economic development? 
Holding a plebiscite: Another strategy and democratic way to solve 
the problem is to ascertaining the wishes of the people through an 
impartial plebiscite under the auspices of UN body various 
arrangements for holding a plebiscite, in Jammu & Kashmir are 
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contained in tlie UN security counc'l resolutions of April 21, 1948 and 
August 13, 1948 as well as in subsequent UN resolutions. 
A number of compelling arguments can also be made against a 
plebiscite. First, both Pakistan and Indian Governments. Would insist 
that the options in any plebiscite be limited to two: a choice between 
joining India or joining Pakistan. Whereas, Kashmiris, however, would 
insist that the independence option be part of any plebiscite. 
Second, if the majority of Kashmiris did vote for independence, what 
guarantees would be made to the minority Hindu and Buddhist 
populations of the state? As Amitai Etzioni has cogently argued, 
plebiscite and other strategies of self-determination in the 
postcolonial age do very little to address the rights of minorities within 
minorities. 
Independence: In recent years the demand for an independent 
Kashmir has been gaining support, even thought India has refused to 
consider any arguments questioning the legality of Kashmiris 
accession to India. The people of Kashmir, however, are united in 
their desire for Independence, through their struggle has lacked a 
coherent definition of goals and modalities. The Jammu and Kashmir 
liberation Front (JKLF) has demanded democracy and independence 
but opposed the state's becoming a part of Pakistan. The Hizbul 
Mujahideen and other groups active in the state have demanded 
accession to Pakistan. The three regional powers stakes in the 
conflict - India, Pakistan and china would oppose to the creation of 
an independent state of Kashmir because they fear the 
demonstration effect that such a territorial loss could have on their 
respective politics. 
The Protectorate Option: Another innovative and bold option for the 
conflict resolution in Jammu & Kashmir is turning the valley Kashmir 
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into an Indian protectorate. According to this proposal the 
government in the valley, under a treaty arrangement with India 
would be able to control all domestic and external policy issues 
except that of defense. This would go well beyond returning the 
valley to its pre-1952 status (in which it controlled all but defense, 
foreign affair and communication). Simultaneously, the government in 
the valley would have to agree to five critical terms: a guarantee of 
minority rights, the continued secular status of the region, the 
maintenance of democratic representative institutions, the safe return 
of Kashmiri Hindus to the valley and the restoration of their property, 
and a demobilization of all militant groups in the valley. The districts 
of Leh, and Kargil, and Jammu would be made into Union Territories. 
This strategy meets the demands of various Kashmir insurgent 
groups to a very large extent. Although this arrangement falls short of 
the independence, that is the demand of most of the Kashmiris. 
Moreover it grants the Kashmir valley an unparalleled degree of 
autonomy. Finally, it effectively removes Pakistan from any 
discussion of the settlement of the dispute. 
Despite the obvious advantages of this arrangement, IT has some 
potential shortcomings. How would a semi-independent Kashmir 
valley ensure its own economic viability? Would India have to 
subsidize it? How would India subsidize it? What legal rights would 
Kashmiris have in the rest of India? What would be the basis of 
citizenship? Finally, would a semi-independent Kashmir be able to 
content with an unrequited Pakistan across the boarder? 
An Alternative Strategy: Sumit Ganguly after analyzing various 
strategies for resolving the conflict in Kashmir has presented his own 
strategy, which he calls an alternative strategy. This strategy contains 
both short-term and long-term steps for resolving the conflict. 
Among short-term steps, first he suggests on the international front, 
the United States should be persuaded to pressure Pakistan to stop 
supporting the Kashmiri militants. Following this India should 
undertake a number of steps to restore both law and order In 
Kashmir. Second, negotiations should be initiated with Pakistan. In 
these negotiations, India could offer Pakistan a package of 
concessions, especially in three areas of contention: Sir Creek, the 
Wullar Barrage, and the Siachen Glacier. Additionally, it could offer 
Pakistan limited territorial concessions along the LOG (line of Control) 
in Kashmir. These consessions could repeat the offer that Sardar 
Swaran Singh made to Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto in 1963, during a series of 
bilateral talks on the subject of Kashmir. Third, within Kashmir India 
will have to negotiate with the insurgents/ Kashmiri militants and also 
offer a time-bound cease-fire arrangement. 
Once the principal groups have agreed to a cease-fire, the 
government can continue negotiations with representatives from the 
insurgent movement. In these negotiations, as a means of building 
trust and confidence, the government can offer an unconditional 
amnesty to the militants. Moreover, it could also take legal action 
against the members of armed forces who have committed human 
rights violation while on duty. 
Over the longer term, the government could offer several key 
concessions to the militants. First, government should ensure free 
and fair election in J&K since many of the grievances in Kashmir are 
related to electoral irregularities. Second, the government could 
return Kashmir to its pre-1952 status, when the central government in 
New Delhi controlled only defense, foreign affairs and 
communications. It could also allow the Kashmiris to write their own 
constitution for a second time. Such a constitutional dispensation 
could strengthen weak institutional arrangements within Jammu and 
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Kashmir. It could strengthen existing judicial bodies and electoral 
procedures and alter recruitment practices into administrative 
agencies. Such efforts would contribute significantly toward improving 
institutional procedures at the state and local levels. Improving the 
functional efficacy and capabilities of such organizations is cntical for 
responding to the needs of a highly mobilized population. It needs to 
be underscored that the erosion of such institutional arrangements 
contributed to the militancy^^. 
A "Trieste" Type Solution: Trieste was partitioned based on an 
agreement between Italy and former Yugoslavia and residents on 
either side of city were given free access to the other side. Such an 
agreement was discussed by president Ayub Khan and Prime 
Minister Nehru in their 1964 negotiations, but the negotiations lapsed 
following Nehru's death in 1964^ .^ Selig Harrison also proposed such 
a solution at an international seminar on Kashmir at Oxford University 
in June 1990. Later, he wrote his views in an article: 
As a first step towards a solution of the dispute over Kashmir, India 
would have to split the state, integrating most of Jammu and Ladakh 
with the Indian Union, while giving special autonomous status to a 
new state in which the Kashmir valley would be united with sizeable 
pockets in Jammu and Ladakh. India could then offer to give this new 
state a far-reaching autonomy as part of a Trieste-type solution under 
which Pakistan would grant the same degree of autonomy to Azad 
Kashmir. Both India and Pakistan would look after defense, to foreign 
affairs, communication and currency while withdrawing their troops 
from the territory under UN-supervised arrangements... the present 
Kashmir cease-fire line would become an international border. As in 
the Trieste settlement, it would be a porous border, with Kashmiris 
free to travel back and forth without Indian or Pakistani visas. 
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Pakistan would retian Gilgit, Hunza, and Baltistan, thus, maintaining 
access to china^^. 
Creation of Sovereignty Associated: Ayesha Jalal suggests that the 
fears and interests of the two main regional powers can be 
accommodated by creating a sovereignty association within a political 
framework for a reunified and independent Kashmir. For a 
Sovereignty association to succeed, India and Pakistan would have 
to agree to extend the right of self-determination to all Kashmiris -
Muslim, Hindu, and Buddhist. A plebiscite or referendum would be 
held in Jammu and Kashmir, including Ladakh, to determine whether 
the people there wish to remain with India or choose independence 
and possible union with Azad Kashmir. Azad Kashmir would be 
included in the first round of voting. If a free and fair vote is caste in 
favor of India, then the Kashmiri right of self-determination would be 
exercised; India and Pakistan could negotiate a treaty settling the 
boundary. If a majority voted for independence, the union with India 
would be annulled. In the event that Jammu with a Hindu majority 
and Ladakh with a Buddhist majority vote overwhelmingly against 
independence, despite an overall majority for independence, these 
regions could remain with India. 
Azad Kahmir (Pakistan part of Kashmir) would then vote to decide 
whether it wants to unite with the ""est of Kashmir on the basis of a 
sovereignty association with Pakistan. If both parts of Kashmir decide 
on independence, a constituent assembly of Kashmir as a whole 
would ratify the terms of association with the two regional powers. 
India and Pakistan could accommodate the new association within 
their constitutions. India and Pakistan troops would be withdrawn; 
Kashmir would become a demilitarized zone with its territorial integrity 
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guaranteed by both countries. The terms of a sovereignty association 
might allow India to maintain a limited military presence in Ladakh, 
and Pakistan at the Afghan border, in order to meet the strategic 
concerns of each country about potential threats emanating from 
outside the south Asian region^®. 
Creation Of Several Independent States: Raju Thomas proposes 
creating several independent states on ethnic and religious 
demarcations in South Asia. This is not probable in Kashmir, but such 
a plan appears plausible in the context of changes occurring in 
Western Europe. Nations of the Common Market (Benelux) countries 
retain considerable autonomy in political and cultural matters. A south 
Asian common-free market may well be a possibility. As in Western 
Europe, countries of South Asia could share natural resources, 
defense and economics, governed by treaties. Within a zone of 
autonomous states including several states in Kashmir, the central 
government of India or Pakistan would deal only with defense, foreign 
affairs, communication, and currency. 
Such a solution assumes that ethnic nationalism in South Asia will 
continue nationalism in South Asia will continue to rise, making it 
difficult for India, Pakistan, or Sri Lanka to survive in their present 
form. The comparative models are the disintegrating federations of 
the former Soviet Union and Yugolavia. India may more closely 
resemble the soviet model than Yugoslavia because of its 
unwillingness to release any part of its territory for fear of its total 
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disintegration. In addition to solving the problem of Kashmir, a south 
Asian common market might resolve the problems of other prevailing 
and potential separatist movements in South Asia. The danger is that 
such an arrangement might produce ongoing population transfers, an 
increase in religious-sectarian dissension, and an outbreak of 
disputes over already scarce national resources^°. 
Apart from describing the design and desirability of various models of 
conflict resolution, we will now seek to know the viewpoint of 
respondents over the resolution of Kashmir conflict. For instance, the 
question number 37 of the interview-schedule is concerned with 
granting autonomy to Jammu & Kashmir. In this question we asked 
respondents, do you think that Kashmir conflict would be resolved if 
government of India restore the autonomy powers of Jammu & 
Kashmir which existed there till 1952? There are two alternatives, in 
the form of 'yes' and 'no', in this question and respondents were 
asked to select the one which is most important. Reponses given by 
respondents are tabulated in table number 25. 
Table 25 
Region Kashmir 
Q.No. 37 
Hindu (Kashmiri) 20 
Muslim 140 
Sikh 10 
Total 170 
Yes 
60.00% 
54.28% 
70.00% 
55.88% 
No 
40.00% 
45.11% 
30.00% 
44.12% 
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Region Jammu 
Hindu (Dogri) 50 
Muslim 50 
Sikh (Dogri) 10 
Total 110 
Region Ladakh 
Shia(Balti) 15 
Buddhist (ladakhi) 15 
Total 30 
State-level 
Hindu 70 
Muslim 205 
Sikh 20 
Buddhist 15 
Grand Total 310 
20.00% 
60.00% 
50.00% 
40.91% 
60.00% 
20.00% 
40.00% 
31.42% 
56.10% 
60.00% 
20.00% 
49.03% 
80.00% 
40.00% 
50.00% 
59.09% 
40.00% 
80.00% 
60.00% 
68.57% 
43.90% 
40.00% 
80.00% 
50.97% 
The table shows that 50.97% respondents have expressed there 
opinion in favour of 'no' alternative of the question i.e., the Kashmir 
conflict would not be resolved if govt, of India restore the autonomy of 
the state that existed there till 1952. Whereas, 49.03% respondents 
have opined in favour of 'yes'-altcrnative of the question. That is, 
Kashmir problem would be resolved if same autonomy is granted to 
the state as existed there till 1952. 
Religion-wise analysis of responses show that majority of Hindu 
(68.57%) and Buddhist (80.00%) respondents in Jammu & Kashmir 
are not in favour of resolving Kashmir problem through the 
mechanism of autonomy that existed there till 1953, unlike Sikhs 
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(60.00%) and Muslims (56.10%) who are in favour of resolving the 
conflict through the mechanism of autonomy to the state. 
Thus, religion-wise analysis shows that Muslim and Sikhs in Jammu 
& Kashmir are of the view that Kashmir problem would be resolved if 
same politico-constitutional position of the state is restored as existed 
there till 1952, unlike Hindus and Buddhists in the state. 
Region-wise analysis of Sikh (70.00%), Hindu (60.00%) and Muslim 
(54.28%) respondents in the region of Kashmir think that the Kashmir 
dispute would be peacefully resolved if autonomy of state is restored. 
In the region of Jammu 80.00% Hindus opined not in favour of the 
autonomy, whereas, 60.00% Muslims in the same region are in 
favour of granting autonomous to the state. Similarly, 50.00% Sikh 
respondents have expressed the same opinion. 
While in the region of Ladakh the opinion of Buddhists varies from the 
opinion of the Muslims in the region. The former are not in favour of 
resolving the Kashmir problem through the mechanism of autonomy 
while the latter are in favour of resolving the problem through the 
mechanism of autonomy to the state. 
Religion-wise analysis shows that Hindus of Jammu-region and 
Buddhists of region Ladakh are similar in their viewpoint as both are 
not in favour of resolving the conundrum through the mechanism of 
autonomy to the state. Whereas, Muslims of all the regions, Hindus & 
Sikhs of Kashmir and some Sikhs in the region of Jammu too are of 
the view that Kashmir conflict would be resolved if Govt, of India 
restore the politico-constitutional status of the state that existed there 
till 1952. 
Related to autonomy, we have asked another question to the 
respondents in order to ascertain their viewpoint on separate regional 
autonomy. In question number forty-nine (49) of the Interview-
schedule we asked respondent; would Kashmir problem be resolved 
if government gives autonomous status to all three regions, like 
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Kashmir-valley, Jammu and Ladakh? There are two alternative ('yes' 
and 'no') in the question and respondents were asked to select the 
one, which is most important. Responses given by respondents are 
presented in table number 26. 
Table 26 
Region Kashmir 
Q.No. 38 
Hindu (Kashmiri) 20 
Muslim 140 
Sikh 10 
Total 170 
Region Jammu 
Hindu (Dogri) 50 
Muslim 50 
Sikh (Dogri) 10 
Total 110 
Region Ladakh 
Shia(Balti)15 
Buddhist (ladakhi) 15 
Total 30 
State-level 
Hindu 70 
Muslim 205 
Sikh 20 
Buddhist 15 
Grand Total 310 
Yes 
0.00% 
4.29% 
10.00% 
4.12% 
68.00% 
0.00% 
20.00% 
32.73% 
0.00% 
80.00% 
40.00% 
48.57% 
2.93% 
15.00% 
80.00% 
17.74% 
No 
100.00% 
95.71% 
90.00% 
95.88% 
32.00% 
100.00% 
80.00% 
67.27% 
100.00% 
20.00% 
60.00% 
51.43% 
97.07% 
85.00% 
20.00% 
82.26% 
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The table reveals that in the state of Jammu & Kashmir about 82.26% 
respondents have expressed their opinion to 'No' alternative of the 
question i.e., they are not in favour of the resolution of the Kashmir 
conflict if government of India grants autonomous status to all the 
regions of the state, unlike 17.74% respondents who are in favour of 
granting regional autonomy to all the regions of the state. 
Religion-wise analysis at state level shows that the highest 
percentage of Muslim (97.07%), Sikh (85.00%) and Hindu (51.43%) 
in Jammu & Kashmir opine unanimously similarly against the 
resolution of the conflict if brought through the mechanism of regional 
autonomy, unlike Buddhists (80.00%) who are in favour of resolving 
the Kashmir dispute if separate regional autonomous status is 
granted to all the regions of the state. Similarly, 48.57% Hindu 
respondents in the state have expressed the same opinion. 
Thus, religion-wise analysis shows that majority of Hindu, Muslim, 
and Sikh respondents in the state of Jammu & Kashmir are of the 
view that Kashmir conflict would not be resolved if government gives 
separate autonomous status to all the three regions of the state, 
unlike the Buddhists. 
Region-wise analysis shows that in the region of Kashmir the highest 
percentage of Hindus (100.00%), Muslims (95.71%), and Sikhs 
(90.00%) are of the view that regional autonomy formula is unsuitable 
for the resolution of the Kashmir conflict. 
In the region of Jammu the opinion of Hindus differ from the opinion 
of Muslim and Sikhs in the region. As, the highest percentage of 
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Hindu respondents (68.00%) think that the conflict would be resolved 
if government gives autonomous status to all the regions of the state, 
unlike Muslim (100.00%) and Sikh (80.00%) respondents who are not 
in favour of the regional autonomy. 
While, in the region of Ladakh, the highest percentage of Muslims 
(100.00%) in the region think against the regional autonomy, 
whereas, 80.00% Buddhist respondents are of the view that Kashmir 
conflict would be resolved if autonomous status is granted to all the 
regions of the state. 
Thus, religion-wise analysis at regional-level shows that only the 
Hindus and Buddhists of region Jammu and Ladakh are of the view 
that Kashmir conflict would be resolved if autonomous status is 
granted to all the regions of the state. 
Contrary to this. Muslims in all the regions, Sikhs of region Kashmir & 
Jammu as well as Kashmih Hindus unanimously think that Kashmir 
conundrum would not be resolved t.irough the mechanism of regional 
autonomy to all the regions of the state (J&K). 
Another legitimate and democratic way to solve the Kashmir problem 
is to ascertain the wishes of the people through an impartial 
plebiscite. In question number thirty-nine (39) of the Interview-
schedule we asked respondents, would holding of plebiscite and 
honouring its result solve the conflict? There are two options, in the 
form of 'yes' & 'no', in the question and respondents were asked to 
select the one. The responses of the respondents have been 
tabulated in table number 27. 
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Table 27 
Region Kashmir 
Q.No. 39 
Hindu (Kashmiri) 20 
Muslim 140 
Sikh 10 
Total 170 
Region Jammu 
Hindu (Dogri) 50 
Muslim 50 
Sikh (Dogri) 10 
TotalHO 
Region Ladakh 
Shia(Balti)15 
Buddhist (ladakhi) 15 
Total 30 
State-level 
Hindu 70 
Muslim 205 
Sikh 20 
Buddhist 15 
Grand Total 310 
Yes 
85.00% 
95.00% 
40.00% 
90.59% 
24.00% 
94.00% 
60.00% 
59.09% 
100.00% 
0.00% 
50.00% 
41.43% 
95.12% 
50.00% 
0.00% 
75.48% 
No 
15.00% 
5.00% 
60.00% 
9.41% 
76.00% 
6.00% 
40.00% 
40.91% 
0.00% 
100.00% 
50.00% 
58.57% 
4.88% 
50.00% 
100.00% 
24.52% 
The table shows that in Jammu & Kashmir 75.48% respondents have 
expressed their view to 'yes' - alternative of the question i.e. holding 
plebiscite and honouring its result would solve the Kashmir conflict, 
whereas, 24.52% respondents in the state are not in favour of 
resolving the dispute through the mechanism of plebiscite. 
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Religion-wise analysis at state-level shows that the highest 
percentage of Muslim respondents (95.12%) opine that plebiscite is 
the suitable way to resolve the Kashmir conflict, similarly, 50.00% 
Sikh respondents have expressed the same opinion. 
Contrary to this, 100.00% Buddhist and 58.57% Hindu respondents in 
the state of Jammu & Kashmir are of the view that plebiscite is not 
the suitable way for the resolution of the Kashmir conflict. 50.00% 
Sikh respondents too share the same view. 
Thus, analysis shows that regarding the plebiscite option the opinion 
of Muslims, who are in favour of resolving Kashmir dispute through 
the mechanism of plebiscite differ from the opinion of Hindus and 
Buddhists who are not in favour of it. About plebiscite, Sikhs opinion 
in the state gets equally divided (i.e. 50.00% respondents are in 
favour of plebiscite, whereas, 50.00% are not in favour of it) between 
the two groups (Muslims and Hindus). 
Region-wise analysis reveals that in the region of Kashmir the highest 
percentage of Muslims (95.00%) and Hindus (85.00%) have 
expressed their opinion in favour of plebiscite, unlike the highest 
percentage of Sikhs (60.00%) in the region who do not think Kashmir 
conflict would be resolved by holding plebiscite. 
In the region of Jammu, the highest percentage of Hindu respondents 
(76.00%), unlike their co-religionists in Kashmir-valley, think that 
Kashmir problem would not be resolved through the mechanism of 
plebiscite, whereas, Muslims (94.00%) and Sikhs (60.00%) in the 
region think that holding plebiscite and honouring its result would 
solve the conflict. 
While, in the region of Ladakh the opinion of Buddhists differ with the 
opinion of Muslims. The former (Buddhists) about 100.0% are not in 
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support of plebiscite, whereas, the latter (Muslims) 100.00% are in 
support of resolving Kashmir conflict by plebiscite option. 
Thus, religion-wise analysis at regional-level shows that in valley-
Kashmir except Sikhs, Muslims and Hindus are of the view that if 
plebiscite is allowed in the state Kashmir problem could be resolved. 
Whereas, Hindus of Jammu have opined against the plebiscite, 
unlike Muslims and Sikhs in the region. 
While, in the region of Ladakh Muslim opinion differ with the opinion 
of Buddhists. The former is in support of the resolution of the Kashmir 
conflict through the mechanism of plebiscite, whereas, the latter is not 
in support of it. 
It becomes clear from the analysis that in Jammu & Kashmir religion 
plays an important role in shaping the viewpoint of people regarding 
the conflict resolution. 
In question-number forty (40) which is also related to the issue of 
plebiscite we asked respondents: What options should be given in 
plebiscite? There are three options in the question which are as 
follows: 
(a) It (Jammu & Kashmir) should go with India 
(b) It should be a sovereign country. 
(c) It should go with Pakistan 
Of the three options, respondents were persuaded to select the one, 
which is crucial. Responses given by respondents are tabulated in 
table number 28. 
Table 28 
Region Kashmir 
Q.No. 40 
Hindu (Kashmiri) 20 
Muslim 140 
Sikh 10 
Total 170 
Region Jammu 
Hindu (Dogri) 50 
Muslim 50 
Sikh (Dogri) 10 
Total 110 
Region Ladakh 
Shia(Balti) 15 
Buddhist (ladakhi) 15 
Total 30 
State-level 
Hindu 70 
Muslim 205 
Sikh 20 
Buddhist 15 
Grand Total 310 
a 
70.C0% 
1.43% 
20.00% 
10.59% 
80.00% 
4.00% 
60.00% 
43.64% 
0.00% 
93.33% 
46.67% 
77.14% 
1.95% 
40.00% 
93.33% 
25.81% 
b 
30.00% 
98.57% 
80.00% 
89.41% 
20.00% 
96.00% 
40.00% 
56.36% 
100.00% 
6.67% 
53.33% 
22.86% 
98.05% 
60.00% 
6.67% 
74.19% 
c 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
The table shows that In Jammu & Kashmir 74.19% respondents have 
expressed their view to option-b of the question i.e., Jammu & 
Kashmir should be a sovereign country. Whereas, 25.81% 
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respondents in the state have chosen the option-a of the question 
i.e., it should go with India. 
Religion-wise analysis at state-level shows, the opinion of Hindus and 
Buddhists vary from the opinion of Muslims and Sikhs in the state. 
As, 93.33% Buddhists and 77.14% Hindus have expressed their 
opinion to option number-a of the question i.e., Jammu & Kashmir 
should go with India, unlike Muslims (98.05%) and Sikhs (60.00%) 
who opined in favour of b-option. That is, plebiscite if held, option-b-
Jammu & Kashmir be a sovereign country, should be given due 
consideration. 
Therefore, analysis shows Hindus and Buddhists opine that the state 
(Jammu & Kashmir) should go with India, unlike Muslims and Sikhs 
who opine, it should be a sovereign country. This also shows the 
urge of independence is found more among the Muslim and Sikh 
communities in the state. 
Region-wise analysis in table 4.0 shows that in the region of Kashmir 
98.57% Muslim & 80.00% Sikh respondents are of the view that if 
plebiscite is held in the state of Jammu & Kashmir the option-b 
should be given priority (it should be a sovereign country). Whereas, 
70.00% Hindus in valley have expressed their opinion to option-a i.e. 
Jammu & Kashmir should go with India. 
In the region of Jammu 80.00% Hindu and 60.00% Sikhs in the 
region think that the state should go with India (alternative-a) Muslims 
(96.00%) in the region wish the option-b i.e., the state should be a 
sovereign country. 
While, in the region of Ladakh 93.33% Buddhist wish that option-a 
should be given due priority, whereas, cent percent (100.00%) 
Muslims in the region maintain option-b should be given in plebiscite. 
2o: 
Thus from religion wise analysis in different regions of the state it 
could be derived that Muslims in all the regions of the state & Sikhs of 
Kashmir in their opinion are placed similarly. That is, they think that in 
plebiscite the option like Jammu & Kashmir should be a sovereign 
country be given. Contrary to this, Hindu and Sikhs of Jammu, Like 
Kashmiri Hindus and Buddhists of Ladakh are unanimous in their 
opinion as all have chosen pro-India option i.e. option-b. 
As we have described in chapter second geographical area of 
Jammu and Kashmir is quite large, however, some of its portion is 
now in the control of Pakistan called Pakistan Occupied Kashmir 
(POK). People who live in POK and those in Indian State of J&K have 
socio-cultural and religious affinity. Many of them are close relatives. 
People feel marginalized and alienated when they are not allowed to 
meet their relatives in POK and vice versa. They are not allowed to 
move freely in the region and cross the border (LOG) and establish 
social contact. It is, therefore, large number of social activists propose 
that both India and Pakistan should encourage free movement of 
people in order to restore peace in the region. Recently the 
governments of both countries have taken steps in this regard. It is 
before implementing these steps by the governments of two countries 
we have conducted our fieidwork. 
Regarding the free movement of Kashmiri people across the border, 
we have formulated a question, the question-number fifty three (41) 
of the interview schedule, in which respondents were asked: "would 
Kashmir conflict be resolved if government of India allow free 
movement of Kashmiri people across the border (LOG)? There are 
two alternative, in the form of 'yes and 'No', in the question and 
respondents were persuaded to select the one which is crucial. 
Responses given by respondents are tabulated in table number 29. 
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Table 29 
Region Kashmir 
Q.No. 41 
Hindu (Kashmiri) 20 
Muslim 140 
Sikh 10 
Total 170 
Region Jammu 
Hindu (Dogri) 50 
Muslim 50 
Sikh (Dogri) 10 
Total 110 
Region Ladakh 
Shia(Balti)15 
Buddhist (ladakhi) 15 
Total 30 
State-level 
Hindu 70 
Muslim 205 
Sikh 20 
Buddhist 15 
Grand Total 310 
Yes 
0.00% 
7.14% 
0.00% 
5.88% 
No 
100.00% 
92.86% 
100.00% 
94.12% 
! 
0.00% 
10.00% 
0.00% 
4.55% 
0.00% 
13.33% 
6.67% 
100.00% 
90.00% 
100.00% 
94.45% 
100.00% 
86.67% 
93.33% 
i 
0.00% 
7.32% 
0.00% 
13.33% 
5.48% 
100.00% 
92.31% 
100.00% 
86.67% 
94.52% 
The table shows that in J&K 94.52% respondents have expressed 
their opinion to alternative-No of the question i.e. if Government of 
India allow the free movement of Kashmiris across the line of control 
Kashmir conflict would not be resolved, contrary to this, only 5.48% 
respondents in the state of Jammu and Kashmir think it (if 
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Government allows free movement of) would resolve the Kashmir 
problem. 
Religion-wise analysis reveals that the highest percentage of Hindu 
(100.00%), Sikh (100.00%) Muslims (92.68%), and Buddhists 
(86.67%) maintain unanimously that softening of border and ensuring 
the free movement of Kashmiris across the LOG would not resolve 
the conundrum, whereas, 13.33% Buddhists and 7.32% Muslims in 
the state think that it would resolve the conflict. 
Thus, from the analysis it could be derived that majority of people 
irrespective of religion in the state of Jammu and Kashmir are of the 
view that if Government of India allow Kashmiris free movement 
across the border, the conflict would not be resolved. 
Religion-wise analysis shows the highest percentage of Hindu 
(100.00%) Sikh (100.00%) and Muslims (92.86%) in the region of 
valley-Kashmir maintains that allowing free movement of people 
across the LOG (Line of Gontrol) is not enough for the resolution of 
the conflict, whereas, only 7.14% Muslims in the region of Kashmir 
think it enough. 
Similarly, in the region of Jammu, the highest percentage of Hindu 
(100.00%), Sikh (100.00%) and Muslims (90.00%) hold that softening 
of LOG would not bring any solution to the long standing Kashmir 
Problem, whereas, only 10.00% Muslims in Jammu hold it would 
bring. 
While, in the region of Ladakh, Muslims (100.00%) and Buddhists 
(86.67%)) in the region are of the view that allowing free movement of 
Kashmiris across the border is not sufficient for the conflict resolution, 
unlike, 13.33% Buddhists in the region who think it will prove helpful 
in resolving the ongoing conflict in Jammu & Kashmir. 
M)6 
Therefore, analysis shows that majority of people who belongs to 
different religions in J&K and in its three regions are unanimous in 
their viewpoint that allowing the free movement of people by 
overcoming border restrictions between the Kashmiris who live in 
divided parts of Jammu and Kashmir would not be sufficient for the 
resolution of the Kashmir conundrum. 
In fact, during interview most of the respondents have generally said 
us that measures like softening of borders would prove helpful in 
easing the tension (between India & Pakistan) and increasing the 
trade prospects of the state. Furthermore, it would also ensure 
people to people contact and also create conducive environment for 
talks between the various parties who have stakes in the conflict. 
They plainly send that only allowing free movement of Kashmiris and 
remaining content that only it would solve the problem is difficult to 
expect. 
As we have already described in the preceding section there is a 
small section of people in India who believe that if Kashmir valley is 
granted to Pakistan, the ongoing conflict in the state would be 
resolved. In this regard, we have sought to know the viewpoint of 
respondents by asking them a very simple question. Question-
number forty-two (42) of the Interview-schedule. The question is: "If 
Government of India allows the valley of Jammu & Kashmir state to 
go with Pakistan would Kashmir problem be resolved? There are two 
alternatives ('Yes' and 'No') in the question and respondents were 
asked to select the one, which they prefer most. Responses of the 
respondents are presented in table number 30. 
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Table 30 
Region Kashmir 
Q.No. 42 
Hindu (Kashmiri) 20 
Muslim 140 
Sikh 10 
Total 170 
Region Jammu 
Hindu (Dogri) 50 
Muslim 50 
Sikh (Dogri) 10 
TotaMIO 
Region Ladakh 
Shia(Balti)15 
Buddhist (ladakhi) 15 
Total 30 
State-level 
Hindu 70 
Muslim 205 
Sikh 20 
Buddhist 15 
Grand Total 310 
Yes 
0.00% 
2.14% 
20.00% 
2.94% 
0.00% 
8.00% 
20.00% 
5.45% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
3.41% 
20.00% 
0.00% 
3.55% 
No 
100.00% 
97.86% 
80.00% 
97.06% 
100.00% 
92.00% 
80.00% 
94.55% 
100.00% 
100.00% 
100.00% 
100.00% 
96.59% 
80.00% 
100.00% 
96.45% 
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The table shows that 96.45% respondents in the state of Jammu and 
Kashmir think that conceding the region of Kashmir to Pakistan would 
not resolve the conflict. Whereas, only 3.41% respondents in the 
state think it would resolve the conflict. 
Religion-wise analysis in the state shows, the highest percentage of 
Hindus (100.00%), Buddhists (100.00%), Muslims (96.59%) and 
Sikhs (80.00%) maintain that conceding the valley to Pakistan is not 
the right or suitable way to resolve the conflict in Jammu & Kashmir, 
however, 20.0% Sikhs and 3.41% Muslims in the state think it would 
help to resolve the dispute. 
Thus, religion-wise analysis at state level shows that majority of 
people irrespective of religion in Jammu & Kashmir do not consider 
the resolution of the ongoing conflict lies in conceding valley-Kashmir 
to Pakistan. 
Region-wise analysis reveals that in the region of Kashmir the highest 
percentage of Hindu (100.00%), Muslim (97.86%) and Sikhs 
(80.00%) hold that granting valley to Pakistan would not resolve the 
Jammu & Kashmir dispute. 
Similarly, in the region of Jammu 100.00% Hindu, 92.00% Muslim 
and 80.00% Sikhs are of the same view that allowing valley to join 
Pakistan is not the appropriate way to resolve the problem. 
While, in the region of Ladakh Muslims (100.00%) and Buddhists 
(100.00%) hold unanimously that clubbing valley with Pakistan is not 
suitable model for the resolution of the Jammu & Kashmir conflict. 
It merits mention here that valley Kashmir which is the epicenter of 
militancy only 2.14% Muslim and 20.00% Sikh respondents have 
viewed in favour of the model, while 20.00% Sikhs in Jammu-region 
like their co-religionists in Kashmir (20.00%) and 80.00% Muslims 
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consider the proposal like conceding the valley to Pakistan suitable 
for the resolution of the conflict. 
It is therefore, like at state-level, at regional level too the viewpoint of 
people irrespective of religion goes against the model. That is, if 
government allows the valley of Jammu & Kashmir state to go with 
Pakistan Kashmir problem would not be resolved. 
Another way to resolve the conflict in Jammu & Kashmir is the 
revitalization of polity and economy of the state. In view of this, we 
have formulated a question, question No.43 of the interview-
schedule, in which respondents were asked: do you think that proper 
functioning of democracy, economic development of the state, 
educational and employment opportunities to the large number of 
people in Jammu & Kashmir would be sufficient for conflict resolution 
there? There are two alternative (yes & no) in the question & 
respondents were persuaded to select the one, which is crucial. The 
responses of the respondents are tabulated in table number 31. 
Table 31 
Region Kashmir 
Q.No. 43 
Hindu (Kashmiri) 20 
Muslim 140 
Sikh 10 
Total 170 
Region Jammu 
Hindu (Dogri) 50 
Muslim 50 
Sikh (Dogri) 10 
Total 110 
Yes 
95.00% 
22.86% 
80.00% 
34.71% 
100.00% 
58.00% 
70.00% 
No 
5.00% 
77.14% 
20.00% 
65.29% 
0.00% 
42.00% 
30.00% 
78.18% 21.82% 
1 
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Region Ladakh 
Shia(Balti) 15 
Buddhist (ladakhi) 15 
Total 30 
State-level 
Hindu 70 
Muslim 50 
Sikh 20 
Buddhist 15 
Grand Total 310 
80.00% 
100.00% 
90.00% 
98.57% 
35.61% 
75.00% 
100.00% 
55.48% 
20.00% 
0.00% 
10.00% 
1.43% 
64.39% 
25.00% 
0.00% 
44.52% 
The table reveals that in Jammu & Kashnnir about 55.48% 
respondents think that proper functioning of democracy, economic 
development of the state, educational and employment opportunities 
to the large number of people in Jammu & Kashmir would be 
sufficient for conflict resolution, however, 44.52% respondents think 
that only political and economic development of the state is not 
sufficient for the resolution of the ongoing conflict in the state. 
Religion-wise analysis at state-level reveals that the highest 
percentage of Buddhist (100.00%), Hindu (98.57%) and Sikh 
(75.00%) respondents hold unanimously that revitalizing the polity, 
economy and providing jobs to unemployed people in Jammu & 
Kashmir would be sufficient for the resolution of the conflict. About, 
35.61% Muslim respondents also share the same view. 
Contrary to this, the highest percentage of Muslim respondents 
(64.39%) maintain that in Jammu & Kashmir the ongoing conflict 
could not be resolved merely by the political and economic 
development of the state. 
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It is therefore, in Jammu & Kashmir religion-wise analysis shows that 
unlike the majority of Muslims, the majority of Hindu, Buddhists and 
Sikhs in the state are of the view that ensuring proper democracy, 
economic development and providing jobs to unemployed-youths in 
the state is the right mechanism for the resolution of the conflict. 
Religion-wise analysis at regional level shows that in the region of 
valley-Kashmir the highest percentage of Hindus (95.00%) and Sikhs 
(80.00%) have expressed their opinion to alternative-yes of the 
question, unlike the highest percentage of Muslim (77.14%) who has 
expressed their opinion to 'No' alternative of the question. 
However, in the region of Jammu cent percent (100.00%) Hindus, 
70.00% Sikhs and 58.00% Muslims have opined, unanimously in 
favour of the "yes' alternative of the question. 
While, in the region of Ladakh the highest percentage of Buddhists 
(100.00%) and Muslims (80.00%) have expressed their opinion to 
'yes' alternative of the question. 
Thus, from the fore-mentioned Information analysis it could be 
derived that majority of Kashmir Muslims do not think that mere 
political and economic development of the strife-torn state is sufficient 
for the resolution of the Kashmir conflict, unlike their co-religionists in 
the region of Jammu and Ladakh who think In favour of the model. 
However, Hindus and Sikhs in the region of Kashmir and Jammu as 
well as Buddhists of region-Ladakh think unanimously that 
revitalization of democracy, economy of the state and providing jobs 
to unemployed people would resolve the conflict in Jammu & 
Kashmir. 
Although many of the Muslim respondents did select the yes 
alternative of this question. Informally they agreed that educational 
political & economic development would be best strategy for resolving 
the conflict. However, they think such kind of strategy could neither 
be implemented in the past nor would it be implemented in the future. 
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In regard with right of property for outsiders in J&K, we asked 
respondents (in Q.no.44): would Kashmir problem be resolved if they 
are allowed to own and purchase property? Responses given by 
respondents are tabulated in table no. 32. 
Table 32 
Region Kashmir 
Q.No. 44 
Hindu (Kashmiri) 20 
Muslim 140 
Sikh 10 
Total 170 
Region Jammu 
Hindu (Dogri) 50 
Muslim 50 
Sikh (Dogri) 10 
Total 110 
Region Ladakh 
Shia(Balti) 15 
Buddhist (ladakhi) 15 
Total 30 
State-level 
Hindu 70 
Muslim 205 
Sikh 20 
Buddhist 15 
Grand Total 310 
Yes 
5.00% 
0.71% 
0.00% 
1.18% 
56.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
25.45% 
0.00% 
40.00% 
20.00% 
41.43% 
0.49% 
0.00% 
40.00% 
11.61% 
No 
95.00% 
99.29% 
100.00% 
98.82% 
44.00% 
100.00% 
100.00% 
74.55% 
100.00% 
60.00% 
80.00% 
58.57% 
99.51% 
100.00% 
60.00% 
88.39% 
The table reveals at state level 88.39% respondents consider 
allowing outsiders to own and purchase property in J&K would not 
resolve the conflict. Remaining (11.61%) respondents have 
expressed their view in support of the model. Thus we found at state-
level majority of respondents have opined against the model. 
Region and religion-wise examination of our data show majority of 
Muslims (99.29% of Kashmir, 100.00% each of Jammu and Ladakh) 
in all regions have opposed the model i.e. not in favour of allowing 
the outsiders to own and purchase property in the state: 
Similarly, majority Sikhs (100.00%) each of Kashmir and Jammu 
regions) along with 95.00% Kashmir Hindus and 60.0)% Buddhists in 
Ladakh have shared the same opinion i.e. the conflict would not be 
resolved if allows outsiders to own and purchase property in the 
state. 
However, majority of Hindu respondents (56.00%) of region-Jammu 
have opined that permitting outsiders to own and purchase property 
in the state would help to resolve the problem. 
Thus, at regional-level we find except Hindus in Jammu, majority of 
Muslims, Hindus, and Sikhs and Buddhist in different regions have 
opposed the strategy of conflict resolution that seeks to settle 
outsiders and allowing them to own and purchase property in J&K. 
This shows strategy like "ethnic flooding" tacks appeal among most of 
the religious communities in the state. 
Another possible way to resolve the conflict in Jammu & Kashmir for 
India is to have direct negotiations with the separatist groups. In this 
regard, we have formulated a question, the question-number forty-
five (45) of the interview-schedule, which asks respondents, would 
there be peace if Govt, of India takes into consideration those who 
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have guns in their hands? There are two alternative ('yes' & 'no') in 
the question and respondents were persuaded to select the one 
which is most important. We have tabulated the response of 
respondents in table number 33. 
Table 33 
Region Kashmir 
Q.No. 45 
Hindu (Kashmiri) 20 
Muslim 140 
Sikh 10 
Total 170 
Region Jammu 
Hindu (Dogri) 50 
Muslim 50 
Sikh (Dogri) 10 
Total 110 
Region Ladakh 
Shia(Balti) 15 
Buddhist (iadakhi) 15 
Total 30 
State-level 
Hindu 70 
Muslim 205 
Sikh 20 
Buddhist 15 
Grand Total 310 
Yes 
5.00% 
90.71% 
60.00% 
78.82% 
24.00% 
94.00% 
20.00% 
55.45% 
100.00% 
20.00% 
60.00% 
18.57% 
92.20% 
40.00% 
20.00% 
68.71% 
1 
No 
95.00% 
9.29% 
40.00% 
21.18% 
76.00% 
6.00% 
80.00% 
45.55% 
0.00% 
80.00% 
40.00% 
81.43% 
7.80% 
60.00% 
80.00% 
31.29% 
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The table shows that in Jammu & Kashmir about 68.71% 
respondents have expressed in their opinion that if govt, of India 
takes into consideration those who have guns in their hands Kashmir 
problem would be resolved (yes-alternative). Whereas, 31.29% 
respondents opined that Kashmir problem would not be resolved 
even if Govt, takes into consideration those who have guns in their 
hands. 
Religion-wise analysis at state-level shows that the highest 
percentage of Hindus (81.43%), Buddhists (80.00%) and Sikhs 
(60.0)%) in Jammu & Kashmir have expressed their opinion to 
alternative 'No' of the question. 
Contrary to this, the highest percentage of Muslims (92.20%) in the 
state have expressed their opinion to alternative 'Yes' of the question. 
Therefore, religion-wise analysis at state-levels shows that except the 
majority of Muslims in the state of Jammu and Kashmir the majority of 
non-Muslims (Hindus, Buddhists and Sikhs) maintain there that there 
would be no peace if government takes Kashmiri militants into 
consideration. 
Religion-wise analysis at regional-level in table 9 shows the following 
trend. 
That in the region of Kashmir the highest percentage of Muslims 
(90.71%) and Sikhs (60.00%) ion have expressed their opinion to 
alternative 'yes' (problem would be resolved if govt, takes into 
account the Kashmiri militants), whereas, the highest percentage of 
Hindus (95.00%) have expressed their opinion to the 'No' alternative 
of the question (there would be no peace if govt, takes militants into 
consideration). 
In the region of Jammu about 80.00% Sikhs and 76.00% Hindus of 
the region have chosen the 'No' alternative of the question, unlike 
94.00% Muslims who have chosen the yes' alternative of the 
question. 
While, in the region of Ladakh about, 100.00% Muslim respondents 
have expressed their opinion in favour of alternative-yes of the 
question, whereas, 80.00% Buddhists to No-alternative of the 
question. 
Thus, religion-wise analysis shows that Muslims in all the regions of 
the state opine unanimously that prospects for peace would enhance 
if Govt, takes militants into consideration. Similar view in expressed 
by majority of Kashmiri Sikhs. 
Contrary to this, Hindus in the region of Jammu think the possibility of 
peace would decline if Government takes into account the militants, 
like their counter parts in Kashmir. Similar view is expressed by 
majority of Sikhs in the region of Jammu, unlike their counter parts in 
the region of Kashmir. Moreover, Buddhists in the region of Ladakh 
do not support the strategy. 
Another possible way to resolve the conflict in Jammu & Kashmir 
(State) is to involve the United Nations organization (UN) in the 
process of conflict resolution. In order to get the view-point of 
respondents regarding to this proposal we have asked them a very 
simple question no. 46. The question is: Can UN play an effective 
role in resolving Kashmir problem? There are two alternatives, in the 
form of 'yes' and "no' in the question and respondents were 
persuaded to select the one which is most important. We have 
tabulated the response of respondents in table number 34. 
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Table 34 
Region Kashmir 
Q.No. 46 
Hindu (Kashmiri) 20 
Muslim 140 
Sikli 10 
Total 170 
Region Jammu 
Hindu (Dogri) 50 
Muslim 50 
Sikh (Dogri) 10 
Total 110 
Region Ladakh 
Shia(Balti)15 
Buddhist (ladakhi) 15 
Total 30 
State-level 
Hindu 70 
Muslim 205 
Sikh 20 
Buddhist 15 
Grand Total 310 
Yes 
45.00% 
90.00% 
40.00% 
81.76% 
20.00% 
94.00% 
20.00% 
53.64% 
40.00% 
0.00% 
20.00% 
27.14% 
87.32% 
30.00% 
0.00% 
65.81% 
No 
55.00% 
10.00% 
60.00% 
18.24% 
80.00% 
6.00% 
80.00% 
46.36% 
60.00% 
100.00% 
80.00% 
72.86% 
12.68% 
70.00% 
100.00% 
34.19% 
The table shows that in the state of Jammu & Kashmir about, 65.81% 
respondents are of the view that United Nations can play an effective 
role in resolving Kashmir conflict (alt. yes), whereas, 34.19% 
respondents maintain it cannot resolve the problem (alt. no.). 
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Religion-wise analysis shows that the highest percentage of Muslims 
(87.32%) in the state think that UN can play an effective role, 
whereas, the highest percentage of Buddhists (100.00%), Hindus 
(72.86%) and Sikhs (70.00%) maintain that it cannot play effective 
role in resolving Kashmir conflict. 
Thus, from the religion-wise analysis at state-level it could be derived 
that only Muslims in the state opine that UN can play an effective role 
in resolving the dispute in Jammu & Kashmir. 
Religion-wise analysis at regional-level shows that in the region of 
Kashmir the highest percentage (90.00%) of Muslim respondents are 
of the view that UN can play an effective role. Whereas, Sikhs 
(60.00%) and Hindus (55.00%) opined against the UN role. 
In the region of Jammu about 94.00% Muslims are of the view that 
sincere efforts if UN takes can resolve the problem, unlike, Hindus 
and Sikhs (80.00%) each. 
While, in the region of Ladakh, the highest percentage of Muslim 
(60.00%) respondents, unlike their co-religionists, in valley and 
Jammu, opined that UN cannot play an effective role in resolving 
conflict in Jammu & Kashmir. About, cent percent (100.00%) 
Buddhists in the region have expressed the same view. 
Thus, religion-wise analysis in different regions of the state shows 
that only Muslims in the region of Kashmir and Jammu have opined in 
favour of UN intervention. Whereas Muslims in Ladakh and non-
Muslim in all the regions do not think UN can play an effective role in 
resolving Kashmir conflict. 
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Another way to resolve the ongoing conflict in Jammu & Kashmir 
(state) is seeking balanced American intervention. 
Indian leaders for years complained that Washington's forging of a 
strategic anticommunist alliance with Pakistan in the early 1950 had 
widened the rift between India and Pakistan. Whatever hopes there 
might have been in those years for a bilateral agreement between 
these two countries over Kashmir were dashed into pieces. 
With memories of those cold war years still fresh, in percent years it 
has been Pakistani leaders who have been complaining that the 
Washington's forging of a steadily close strategic partnership with 
New Delhi threatened to exact a heavy price in Indo-Pakistan 
relation. In view of this, a balanced U.S. Policy is critical to the 
realization of the goals of peace, stability and long-term economic 
development of Asia. It would encourage conflict resolution and foster 
peace and cooperation between India and Pakistan^\ 
So it comes down to the fact that a balanced American diplomatic 
investment, if encouraged, between India and Pakistan would prove 
fruitful in resolving the conflict in Jammu and Kashmir. Similarly, in 
question-number forty-seven (47) of the Interview schedule, 
concerning American intervention, respondents were asked, "do you 
agree that no country, no organization can solve the Kashmir 
problem except balanced American intervention? There are two 
alternatives, in the form of 'Yes' and 'No', in the question and 
respondents were persuaded to express their view. Responses given 
by respondents are tabulated in table number 35. 
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Table 35 
Region Kashmir 
Q.No. 47 
Hindu (Kashmiri) 20 
Muslim 140 
Sikh 10 
Total 170 
Region Jammu 
Hindu (Dogri) 50 
Muslim 50 
Sikh (Dogri) 10 
Total 110 
Region Ladakh 
Shia(Balti)15 
Buddhist (ladakhi) 15 
Total 30 
State-level 
Hindu 70 
Muslim 205 
Sikh 20 
Buddhist 15 
Grand Total 310 
Yes 
5.00% 
85.00% 
20.00% 
71.76% 
4.00% 
86.00% 
20.00% 
42.73% 
80.00% 
0.00% 
40.00% 
4.29% 
84.88% 
20.00% 
0.00% 
58.39% 
No 
90.00% 
15.00% 
80.00% 
28.24% 
96.00% 
14.00% 
80.00% 
57.27% 
20.00% 
100.00% 
60.00% 
95.71% 
15.12% 
80.00% 
100.00% 
41.61% 
The table shows that about 58.39% respondents in Jammu & 
Kashmir has expressed their opinion to 'yes' alternative of the 
question i.e. balanced American intervention can resolve the Kashmir 
221 
conflict, whereas, 41.61% respondents in the state maintain that it 
(American intervention) cannot resolve the Kashmir conflict. 
Religion-wise analysis at state level shows that about 84.88% Muslim 
respondents in the state are of the view that America can resolve the 
Kashmiri problem, whereas the highest percentage of Buddhist 
(100.00%), Hindu (95.71%) and Sikh (80.00%) respondents think that 
America cannot resolve the problem. 
Therefore, analysis shows Muslims seek balanced American 
intervention for the resolution of conflict in J&K (state). Whereas non-
Muslims including Hindus, Buddhists and Sikhs opined not in favour 
of it (American intervention). 
Religion-wise analysis at regional-level shows that in the region of 
Kashmir about 85.00% Muslims have expressed their opinion to 
alternative-Yes of the question (i.e. they said in favour of American 
intervention). Contrary to this, the highest percentage of Kashmiri-
Hindus (95.00%), and Sikhs (80.00%) have opined in favour of 
alternative-No of the question (i.e. against the American Intervention). 
In the region of Jammu about, 86.00% Muslims have expressed their 
opinion to alternative 'Yes' of the question (i.e. they seek American 
intervention). Whereas, the highest percentage of Hindu (96.00%) 
and Sikh (80.00%) respondents have expressed their view against 
the American intervention i.e., alternative-no. 
While, in the region of Ladakh 80.00%Muslims have opined In favour 
of American intervention, whereas, cent percent (100.00%) Buddhists 
in the region have opined against the American intervention. 
Thus, religion-wise analysis in different regions of the state too shows 
that Muslims and non-Muslims (Hindus, Buddhists and Sikhs) widely 
differ in their viewpoint. Muslims hold that no country, no organization 
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can resolve the Kashmir conflict except balanced American 
intervention. Whereas, non-Muslims do not agree with the fact that 
America can resolve the conflict. 
Lastly, clubbing the Muslim majority districts adjacent to Kashmir-
valley and allowing the entity to become a sovereign country is 
another model of conflict resolution over which we have sought to 
know the viewpoint of respondents. 
In question-number forty-eight (48) of the interview schedule 
respondents were asked: Would Kashmir problem be resolved if 
Muslim majority areas of Kargil, Doda, Poonch and Rajouri be 
clubbed with Kashmir valley and allowed to become a sovereign 
country? There are two alternatives in the question ('yes' and 'No') 
and respondents were persuaded to select the one that is most 
important. We have tabulated the responses of respondents in table 
number 36. 
Table 36 
Region Kashmir 
Q.No. 48 
Hindu (Kashmiri) 20 
Muslim 140 
Sikh 10 
Total 170 
Region Jammu 
Hindu (Dogri) 50 
Muslim 50 
Sikh (Dogri) 10 
Total 110 
Yes 
0.00% 
82.14% 
40.00% 
70.00% 
24.00% 
64.00% 
20.00% 
41.82% 
No 
100.00% 
17.86% 
60.00% 
30.00% 
76.00% 
36.00% 
80.00% 
58.18% 
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Region Ladakh 
Shia(Balti)15 
Buddhist (ladakhi) 15 
Total 30 
State-level 
Hindu 70 
Muslim 205 
Sikh 20 
Buddhist 15 
Grand Total 310 
100.00% 
0.00% 
50.00% 
17.14% 
79.02% 
30.00% 
0.00% 
58.06% 
0.00% 
100.00% 
50.00% 
82.86% 
20.98% 
70.00% 
100.00% 
41.94% 
The table shows that in Jammu & Kashmir about 58.06% 
respondents have expressed their opinion to alternative-yes of the 
question i.e., they are infavour of clubbing the Muslim majority 
districts adjacent to Kashmir and allowing the entity to become a 
sovereign country. Contrary to this, 41.94% respondents in the state 
have expressed their view against clubbing of Muslim majority 
districts in the state of Jammu and Kashmir with Kashmir valley (no-
alternative). 
Religion-wise analysis at state-level shows that about, 79.02% 
Muslims have expressed their view to alternative-yes of the question 
(i.e. in favour of the model). Contrary to this, the highest percentage 
of Buddhists (100.00%), Hindus (82.86%) and Sikhs (70.00%) in the 
state have expressed their opinion to alternative-no of the question 
(i.e. viewed against the model). 
Therefore, from the religion-wise analysis of data it could be a derived 
that the opinion of Muslims differs from the opinion of non-Muslims 
(Buddhists, Hindus & Sikhs) In the state. Muslims hold that the 
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ongoing conflict in J& K state would be peacefully resolved if Muslim 
majority districts adjacent to Kashmir valley are joined together it and 
allowing the entity to become a sovereign country, unlike, non-
Muslims (Hindu, Sikh and Buddhists in the state) did not favour the 
model. 
Religion-wise analysis at regional-ievel shows that in the region of 
Kashmir about, 82.14% Muslim respondents have expressed their 
view to alternative-yes of the question (favouring the model). Contrary 
to this, cent percent (100.00%) Hindus and 60.00% Sikhs in the 
region have expressed their opinion to alternative-no of the question 
(i.e. against the model). 
Similarly, in the region of Jammu about 64.00% Muslims are in favour 
of the model, whereas, Sikhs (80.00%) and Hindus (76.00%) in the 
region are against the model. 
While, in the region of Ladakh, Muslims (100.00%) are entirely in 
favour of the model, whereas, Buddhists (100.00%) in the region are 
entirely against the model. 
Thus, analysis shows that except non-Muslims only Muslims in 
different regions of the state opine that the ongoing conflict in Jammu 
& Kashmir would be resolved If Muslim majority areas of Kargil, 
Doda, Poonch and Rajouri are clubbed with Kashmir-valley and 
allowing it to become a sovereign country. 
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CONCLUSION 
This is an exploratory study of conflict in the state of Jammu & 
Kashmir. The conflict has been persisting for very long period of time 
and has intensified since 1989. It is a conflict of both national and 
international importance. The conflict has attracted attention of 
innumerable scholars and media persons. But so far no prominent 
sociological study is available about the conflict. In this way we can 
say our study is first of its kind about the conflict in Kashmir. For this 
study we have selected descriptive research design and collected 
data through the mechanism of interview-schedule and case study 
method. We have selected 310 respondents from three geographical 
regions and from four major religious communities of the state. It is 
not an experimental study so we have not tested any hypothesis. 
Rather we have tried to identify major factors and consequences of 
the conflict as well as strategies for its resolution. 
Sociologically conflict is a universal phenomenon it exists in each and 
every society. Conflict has both functions and dysfunctions for 
society. Sociologists both of functional and Marxist school of thought 
have explained causes of conflict in terms of social structure. Various 
sociologists have identified the causes of various kinds of conflicts 
differently. But among innumerable structural causes of conflict some 
major causes are as follows. 
1. Unequal distribution of scarce resources in a system. 
2. the more subordinate groups become aware of their true 
collective interests, the more likely are they to question the 
legitimacy of the existing pattern of distribution of scarce 
resources. 
3. Opposed interests inherent in the social structure. 
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4. The more membership in privileged group is sought by 
subordinates and the less mobility allowed, the more likely are 
they to withdraw legitimacy. 
5. The fewer are the channels for redressing grievances over the 
distribution of scarce resources by subordinates, the more 
likely are they to question legitimacy. 
6. The more deprivations of subordinates are transformed from 
absolute to relative, the greater will be the sense of injustice 
and hence, the more likely are they to initiate conflict. 
Similar to the causes, consequences of the conflict are differently 
explained by sociologists. A conflict may have both positive and 
negative consequences. 
According to Marx conflict is not a goal but a means to achieve an 
integrated social structure. He is an importance thinker who considers 
social conflict as a driving force of society, and also leads to 
redistribution of scarce resources- wealth and power. 
German sociologist, George Simmel says: "Conflict is thus designed 
to resolve dualisms it is a way of achieving, some kind of unity; even 
if it be through the annihilation of one of the contending parties. This 
is roughly parallel to the fact that it is the most violent symptom of a 
disease, which represents the effort of the organisms to free itself of 
disturbances and damages caused by them". 
Moreover, he conceptualized the consequences of conflict for the 
parties involved in it and for the whole society one of the propositions 
of Simmel is the more violent is the conflict, the greater will be the 
internal solidarity of conflict groups. 
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According to L.A. Coser, Social conflicts allow expression of hostility 
and the mending of strained relationships. It leads to the elimination 
of specific sources of conflict between parties and enables them to 
redress their grievances through the establishment of new norms or 
the affirmation of old ones. Hostility towards the out-group unifies the 
in-group. Social conflicts not only generate new norms and institution 
but also new coalitions and alliances. They bring about technological 
improvements, revitalize economy, and lubricate the social system; 
they facilitate the release of tension and frustration and enable the 
social system to adjust itself. 
Moreover, social conflicts that do not attack the basic values or 
assumptions upon which the foundation of any society is based are 
positively functional or advantageous for the society. These kind of 
conflicts may occur in open or plural societies because these 
societies not only allow the contending parties to express their anger 
but also institute variety of institutional safeguards against the type of 
conflict that might endanger the basic values of the society. These 
institutional safeguards could also be in the form of bringing 
marginalized groups within the fold of mainstream society, that is by 
increasing their share of income, wealth, power or prestige. Infact, 
social conflicts have positive consequences for a society when it is 
waged within the limits of consensus. 
Social conflicts in which the contending parties in conflict do not 
share the basic values upon which the legitimacy of the social system 
rests are dysfunctional or harmful for the social system. Such 
conflicts are rampant in closed societies or in societies, which are 
plural by name, but not in practice e.g. if major strata of a society's 
population are permanently excluded from participation in the 
societies benefits they will tend to reject the very assumptions or 
values of a society upon which the society is built. And, if the systems 
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of legitimation no longer fully operate or solve the problems of the 
people they will attempt to attack the social order through 
revolutionary violence. 
Other destructive or harmful consequences of conflict are: it diverts 
energy from the real task, destroys morale, polarizes individuals and 
groups, deepens differences, obstructs communication and 
cooperation, produces irresponsible behavior, creates suspicion and 
distrust and decreases productivity. Moreover, destruction of public 
property, innocent killings, children migration and refugee problems 
like their displacement, procurement and rehabilitation are other 
consequences of conflicts like war, racial, ethnic and communal 
violence or conflicts between dominant and subordinate groups in or 
between the societies. In such kind of conflicts powerful groups 
frequently use force to suppress voices of powerless or marginalized 
sections and consequently result into extreme form of human rights 
violation. In fact, it is these horrible consequences of conflict with 
which social activists, planners and policy makers are concerned. 
Sociologists generally do not offer any concrete plan for conflict 
resolution. The plan for conflict resolution may be derived from the 
causes of conflict which they have identified. After world war second 
conflict resolution has developed as a major area of study in Europe 
and America. Scholars have identified different techniques for 
resolving conflicts. These techniques differ from one conflict to 
another but some well known approaches are: Avoidance, sanctions, 
war, negotiations and its special forms like use of good offices and 
mediations. Inquiry and conciliation commissions, Arbitration, 
Adjudication etc., these techniques of conflict resolution are generally 
used in track-one diplomacy - term used to describe official 
government-to-government negotiation among instructed 
representatives of sovereign stats, and may prove useful and 
230 
effective in settling conflicts at smaller scale and those conflicts in 
which clash of interest is not very visible. 
Since long at track one level fore mentioned techniques of conflict 
resolution have been used by official representatives of India and 
Pakistan but could not solve the dispute. The ongoing conflict in 
Jammu & Kashmir is protracted. It involves society - wide actors. 
Prominent actors involved in the conflict are Kashmiri Muslims, Hindu 
dogras of Jammu and Buddhists of region-Ladakh. However there 
are some other ethnic groups whose identity urges have remained 
either unheard or ignored because of their less political clout. Among 
these groups Hindus of region-Kashmir, Balti-speaking Muslims of 
Ladakh, Pahari and Gogri speaking Muslims of region-Jammu and 
Sikhs in region-Kashmir as well as in Jammu too. Their political 
aspirations for the future of the state (J&K) are different and cross 
cutting in such a way as to make the resolution of conflict very 
difficult. Urge of independence that we found among Muslims of all 
ethnicities in the state where not found among Hindus and Sikhs of 
all ethnicities as well as among Buddhists also. 
Moreover, they not only question the representative character of each 
other in the state but some of them question the legitimacy of both 
India and Pakistan. 
Resolving such a conflict requires a full and fair hearing of all ethnic 
groups in Jammu & Kashmir. Track one mediation whether done by 
representatives of governments (India and Pakistan) or international 
bodies are unsuitable to deal effectively with Kashmir conflict 
because they do not take various ethnic groups in Jammu & Kashmir 
into consideration, denies the legitimacy of non-state actors or 
Kashmiri militants and some other ethnic groups. In fact for 
addressing the protractedness of conflict involvement of Kashmiris in 
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any dialogues process going on between India and Pakistan are 
must. As it is Kashmiri etiinic group especially Muslims from whom 
militancy emerged. It is therefore unless dialogue and reconciliation 
with Kashmiri Muslims and other ethnic groups in the state will be 
made part of composite dialogue between India and Pakistan, the 
protracted ethnic conflict in Kashmir could be resolved easily. 
In case of Kashmir conflict non governmental approaches track two 
and multi-track diplomacy, stand good chance of directing the 
negotiation process in right direction. Track two diplomacy involves 
unofficial mediators they work with parties in conflict and facilitate 
agreements among them. The strength of track two approach on 
conflict resolution is based on the idea that informal negotiations 
allow the parties to come together more easily to explore mutual 
fears, grievances and demands. It also provides the opportunity of 
tentative negotiation offers to be floated, policy linkages to be 
broached in ways that formal negotiations might preclude. 
Official diplomacy and unofficial second track approaches may also 
be complemented by a range of multi-track solutions. Multi-track 
diplomacy is the application of peace making from different vantage 
points within a multi centered networks, reflects the different levels 
and variety of factors which need to be addressed. It is a new form of 
diplomacy, involving a strategic shift from purely state controlled 
diplomacy towards a greater division of labour between governments, 
NGO's and other organizations. In fact, protracted ethnic conflict in 
Kashmir could not be resolved without involving reliable non-
governmental organizations will play an important role in bridging the 
gap between the states and conflicting parties in Jammu & Kashmir. 
Conflict in Kashmir is multi-dimensional. It involves question of 
International law, right of self-determination and socio-historical. 
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economic and religious factors. To study such a complex conflict is a 
very difficult task. It is also difficult to arrive at very definitive 
conclusion. Therefore, our findings about the conflict are of 
suggestive in nature. 
We have explored responses of our respondents regarding political, 
economic, religious and ethnic factors of the conflict. In regard with 
our question related to the background factors we found that of the 
310 respondents, the highest percentage (59.03%) of respondents at 
state-level consider Maharaja (Hah Singh) responsible for creating 
the problem. While, 16.31% held Britishers responsible for originating 
the conflict. For the same, 15.81% believed that the hasty partition of 
India by Britishers created the problem. Very small percentage of 
respondents expressed opinion to remaining two factors i.e. strategic 
location of the state (3.55%), Boundary commission's role in 
partitioning the Indo-Pak boundary at Panjab (5.48%). In this way, 
majority of respondents at state-level think Maharaja responsible for 
creating background of Kashmir conflict. 
Religion and region-wise data reveals that majority of Muslim 
respondents of valley and Muslims of other two regions (Ladakh & 
Jammu) along with Sikhs of valley held maharaja responsible for 
creating the conflict's background. 
While, Hindus of Jammu and Buddhists of Ladakh held the policy of 
the Britishers responsible for created background of the conflict. In 
this way we can say that no non-Muslim community in the state held 
Muslims responsible for creating the problem's background. 
Other questions related with exploring those political factors which 
appear prominent in keeping alive, promoting and flaring up the 
conflict we found that the highest percentage of respondents 
(42.90%) at state-level viewed the denial of plebiscite right to the 
233 
people responsible for promoting the conflict in post-accession era. 
While the next major response (19.68%) went each to two factors i.e. 
weakening the special status that was grated to the state in the form 
of article-370 by central govt, and the nepotism and corruption 
promoted by Kashmiri politicians. 11.29% and 4.52% respondents 
hold the exploitation of Kashmir politicians by central govt, and the 
amendment of Jammu & Kashmir constitution by central government 
through unpopular local governments responsible for promoting the 
conflict. Thus we found majority of respondents in Jammu & Kashmir 
viewed the denial of plebiscite right, major factor promoting the 
conflict in post-accession era. This opinion of Muslims is supported 
by Hindus of the valley-Kashmir. However, Buddhists of Ladakh, 
Hindus and Sikhs of Jammu have different opinion. They regarded 
nepotism and corruption as major factors for promoting the conflict. 
Thus it can be established that the legal factor, denying of plebiscite 
right and political nepotism and corruption are two major factors in 
view of people for aggravating the conflict. 
Concerning with increasing violence, the highest number of 
respondents (40.65%) at state-level held United Nations Organization 
(UNO) responsible as it has failed to persuade India for the plebiscite. 
While, 31.29% think electoral malpractices in 1987 assembly 
elections there arose violence. This shows that majority of 
respondents is of the opinion that issue of plebiscite and political 
corruption are major factors which make conflict violent. 
No doubt there is difference of opinion among people of different 
religious communities in three regions of the state. Majority of 
Muslims in all the regions (K, J&L) appear to be unanimous in making 
failure of UNO for settling the dispute through the mechanism of 
plebiscite. This opinion is shared by most of the Hindus of the valley-
Kashmir and Sikhs of the Jammu-region. However, Hindus in Jammu, 
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Sikhs in valley and Buddhists in Ladakh differ from this opinion as 
their majority thinks political nepotism and corruption is the major 
factor that promotes violence in the state. 
We have again questioned our respondents in different way, asked 
them to point out the root cause of the conflict. At state-level the 
highest percentage of respondents (44.48%) said mishandling of 
politics in Jammu & Kashmir by central Government is the major 
factor. While, 33.55% respondents view the potential factors of the 
conflict lied in political and economic alienation of the people. 16.45% 
respondents hold the undemocratic and dishonest politics by 
politicians in the state responsible for causing the conflict. 
It is commonly believed outside the state that Pak support to militancy 
in Kashmir is the root cause of the conflict but this view do not have 
support in majority of population in Jammu & Kashmir as only 4.52% 
respondents were found in support of the view. 
There is wide spread notion among both scholars and laymen in the 
country that rise of Islamic resurgence is the factor which makes 
Muslims everywhere militant and "terrorist". This view is also held 
about the rise of violent conflict in Kashmir. Surprisingly we have 
found only 0.65% respondents at state-level were in support of the 
view-rise of Islamic resurgence is the root cause of the conflict. In this 
way we found majority of respondents at state-level considered the 
mishandling of polities in Jammu & Kashmir by central government 
responsible for causing the conflict. 
When we see our data region and religion-wise we found that 
majority of Muslims of all the regions, along with Sikhs of region 
Kashmir and Jammu as well as Hindus of Jammu share similar 
opinion regarding the role played by Government in mishandling 
polities in the state. However majority of Hindus in Kashmir, unlike 
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their co-religionists in Jammu, attributed tiie root cause of the conflict 
to the political and economic cjlienation of the people. While 
Buddhists of Ladakh held undemocratic and dishonest politics by 
political leaders of Jammu & Kashmir responsible for the conflict. 
This shows that at regional-level too the mishandling of polities in 
Jammu & Kashmir by central government emerged as a major factor 
involved in the conflict. Some importance has been given to political 
and economic alienation of the people led by undemocratic and 
dishonest politics of the state's political elites. 
With the analysis of four questions related to political factors it has 
emerged that denial of plebiscite right, corruption and nepotism as 
promoted both by central government and local politicians there are 
two major political factors, which keep the conflict alive and make it 
violent. 
It is commonly believed outside the state that Pak support to militancy 
in Kashmir is the root cause of the conflict but this view do not have 
support in majority of population in Jammu & Kashmir as only 4.52% 
respondents were found in support of the view. 
Moreover, there is wide spread potion among both scholars and 
laymen in the country that rise of Islamic resurgence is the factor 
which make Muslims every where militant and terrorist. This view is 
also held about the rise of violent conflict in Kashmir but surprisingly 
we found only 0.65% respondents in Jammu & Kashmir in support of 
the view - rise of Islamic resurgence is the root cause of the conflict. 
Besides political, economic factors play an important role in 
integrating people to any social system. In case of Kashmir conflict in 
regard with economic factors like lack of governmental will in creating 
better economic and employment opportunities we found at state-
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level majority of respondents (78.39%) think that if government had 
created better economic and employment opportunities there would 
have been no conflict. However 21.61% respondents did not 
corroborate the majority view. 
Seeing the responses region and religion wise, we founded majority 
of Hindus, Buddhists, Sikhs and Muslims in all regions (K, J & L) 
share the same view that lack of economic and employment 
opportunities promote Kashmir conflict. 
In fact due to lack of governmental will to create better economic and 
employment In this hilly state have resulted not only to promote 
conflict but also severe kind of economic hardships among the 
people. Therefore, we have found that majority of respondents 
(83.87%) at state-level think those economic hardships as a factor 
motivates Kashmiri youth towards the militancy. 
Moreover, examining the responses region and religion-wise we 
found that majority of Hindus, Sikhs and Buddhists respondents in all 
regions (J, K, L) consider that economic hardships motivate people 
towards the militancy there. 
Thus, economic factors like the lack of governmental will to create 
better economic and employment opportunities and the economic 
hardships that people suffer in the state are the major factors that stir 
up the conflict. 
Social movements or struggle for achieving collective goals generally 
emerge when people experience or perceive political and economic 
deprivations. Both political and economic deprivations have been 
experienced by people of Jammu and Kashmir as we have explored 
it in preceding pages. However, people are mobilized on the basis of 
symbols and beliefs. There are many examples in Indian society 
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where people have been mobilized on the basis of caste, language, 
tribe and religion for expressing their political and economic 
grievances as well as achieving their goals. Religion is very important 
basis of exploiting sentiments of people or mobilizing opinion for 
struggle. In case of Kashmir conflict we found that at state-level 
majority of respondents (64.52%) think religion inspires Kashmir 
youth for the movement. 
When we examine our data region and religion wise it could be found 
that majority of Muslims in all regions along with majority of Hindus 
(72.00%) and Sikhs (60.00%) in Jammu share the same opinion i.e. 
religion motivates people for the movement. 
However, majority of Hindus in Kashmir (75.00%), and Buddhists in 
Ladakh (60.00%) do think that religion inspires people for the 
separatist movement. 
Thus we found at regional-level except majority of Buddhists in 
Ladakh and Hindus of Kashmir, majority of Muslims in all regions (J, 
K & L), Sikhs and Hindus of region-Jammu opined unanimously that 
religion inspires people towards the militant movement. 
In another question related to role of religion, we found at state level 
majority of respondents (73.55%) believe Hindu doubt about the 
quality of Muslim patriotism in India is one of the factors with the 
persistence of Kashmir conflict. 
Seeing responses region and religion-wise we found majority of 
Muslims in all regions and Sikhs of Kashmir (80.00%) share the same 
view i.e., Hindu-Muslim mistrust factor in India promote conflict in 
Kashmir. However, majority of Hindus in Kashmir (55.00%), in 
Jammu (64.00%) along with Sikhs in Jammu (70.00%) and Buddhists 
of Ladakh (80.00%) have different opinion i.e. they think that Hindus 
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do not doubt loyalty of Muslims in India. Thus, this factor is not at play 
in Kashmir conflict. 
Thus we found at regional-state level only majority of Muslims in all 
regions of the state hold that mistrust between Hindus and Muslims in 
India as a factor promote conflict in the state. 
Therefore from the analysis of various questions related to religion we 
found Kashmiri militants derive inspiration from religion in the current 
ongoing struggle in Jammu & Kashmir. Moreover, Mistrust between 
Hindus and Muslims as a factor also promote conflict in the state. 
Besides religion, there are many issues which come under the scope 
of ethnic diversity. These are socio-cultural, linguistic and tribal 
differences. Both intra-religious and inter-regional ethnic divisions 
exist in the state we have explained such divisions in chapter number 
two of the study. In order to find out relevance of such differences to 
Kashmir conflict, we found at state-level that majority of respondents 
(79.35%) think that ethnic and cultural diversity is the internal source 
of the conflict. This shows majority of respondents in Jammu & 
Kashmir consider ethnic and cultural diversity of the state as an 
endogenous source of the conflict. 
Region and religion-wise analysis of data in regard with ethno-cultural 
diversity, majority of Muslims (78.57% of Kashmir 80.0% of Jammu & 
53.33% of Ladakh) in all regions shared the same view i.e., ethnic 
and cultural diversity is the internal source of Kashmir conflict. The 
same view is shared by Hindus in region Jammu (100.00%) and 
50.00% Kashmiri Hindus. Similarly 100.00% Buddhists in region 
Ladakh too consider that ethno-cultural diversity of the state promote 
the conflict. 
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However, majority of Kashmiri Sikhs (60.00%) in their opinion differ 
from the majority of Sikhs (90.00%) in Jammu-region. The former 
attribute the conflict to ethnic and cultural diversity of the state while 
the latter do not hold so, like 50.00% Kashmiri Hindus. This shows 
that all major ethno-religious groups like Kashmiri Muslims, dogri 
speaking Hindus of Jammu and Buddhists in region Ladakh consider 
unanimously that ethnic and cultural diversity in the state constitute 
one of the endogenous sources of the conflict. 
There is a section of scholars who believe that Kashmir conflict has 
emerged and persisted due to quest of Kashmiri speaking Muslims to 
establish their political hegemony over other ethnic groups. They also 
believe Kashmiri speaking Muslims discriminate against non-Muslims 
and non-Kashmiri speaking people. In order to confirm this view we 
have included question in regard of persistence of the conflict due to 
dominance of Kashmiri speaking Muslims over other ethnic groups. 
At state level we have found that majority of respondents (71.61%) 
do not believe Kashmir conflict persist because of Kashmiri speaking 
Muslim hegemony over other ethnic groups in Jammu & Kashmir 
At regional-level we found only majority of Hindus (96.00%) in region 
Jammu and Buddhists (93.33%) in Ladakh region think about the 
persistence of conflict due to Kashmiri speaking Muslims endeavor to 
impose their dominance over other ethnic groups in the state. 
Thus, we found majority of ethno religious groups in different regions 
of the state attributed Kashmir conflict to the ethno-cultural diversity 
factor. Infact it emerged as the major factor that promotes conflicts 
there. But regarding the superiority of Kashmiri Muslims as a factor 
we did not find majority of respondents in support of this factor at 
state-level. 
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Although we found political, economic, religious and ethnic factors 
are responsible for creating and sustaining Kashmir conflict but it 
appears so far very difficult to identify the factor which respondents 
think is the major factor involved in Kashmir conflict. From the 
analysis of multi-factorial question which involves-political, economic, 
religious, cultural, regional and outside support factors, we found at 
state level the highest percentage (47.09%) of respondents believe 
political factor is major. While 28.38% view economic factor is major 
while 9.03% respondents think that major factor is cultural. Small 
percentage of respondents have expressed their opinion to remaining 
three factors i.e., 6.45% respondents to outside support factor, 6.12% 
to religious and 2.90% to regional factors, respectively. This shows at 
state level majority of respondents consider political and economic as 
major factors involved in Kashmir conflict. 
When we see our data related to fore mentioned factors region and 
religion-wise we found the highest percentage fo Muslims (52.14%) in 
valley Kashmir think political the major factor, like their co-religionists 
in Jammu (50.00%) and Ladakh (53.33%) this view is shared by the 
highest percentage of Sikhs in Kashmir (50.00%) and Jammu 
(40.00%). 46.66% Buddhists respondents in Ladakh view political as 
a major factor. Related to political factor, however, differences were 
found between the opinion of Hindus in Jammu and in region 
Kashmir. The former has given the highest percentage (36.00%) of 
response to political factor while the later (45.00%) consider 
economic as major factor. This shows almost all the religions at 
regional level believe that Kashmir conflict is a political phenomenon. 
In regard with economic factor w<3 found among Kashmiri Hindus 
(45.00%) economic factor has got the highest percentage of opinion, 
while other ethnic groups irrespective of religion like 28.00% Hindus 
in Jammu 30.00% Muslims each in region Kashmir and Jammu as 
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well as 20.00% in Ladakh region share the same opinion related to 
economic factors as shared by Hindus in Kashmir but they in their 
opinion have given second highest percentage of response to it 
(economic factor). This shows almost all the religious communities at 
regional level view economic factor's importance in the conflict. 
Concerning cultural factor's involvement in the conflict we found all 
religious communities (10.00% Hindus of Kashmir and 12.00% of 
Jammu, 10.00% Sikhs each in valley Kashmir & Jammu, 6.67% 
Buddhists and Muslims (13.33%) in Ladakh region, 10.00% Muslim of 
Jammu and 7.14% of valley) at regional level have given some 
significance to it. This shows cultural factor's also induces the conflict. 
Over religious factor's involvement in the conflict we found almost all 
religious communities (8.57% Muslims of Kashmir, 8.00% of Jammu 
and 6.66% of Ladakh, 5.00% Hindus of Kashmir, and 10.00% Sikh 
respondents of Jammu) in different regions have given fourth highest 
percentage of response to it. This also shows that religion plays some 
role in the conflict. 
Concerning outside support factor we found that 10.00% Hindu 
respondents each in Kashmir and Jammu regions, 10.00% Sikhs 
each in Jammu and region Kashmir, 20.00% Buddhists in Ladakh, 
4.28% Muslims in Kashmir, 2.00% in Jammu and 6.66% in Ladakh 
'share same opinion i.e., outside support plays some role in making 
the conflict. Moreover, compared to other factors outside support 
factor has got fifth highest percentage of responses. 
In regard with regional factor at regional level we found only 14.00% 
Hindus of Jammu and 13.33% Buddhists of Ladakh there think that it 
promotes the conflict. This also shows regional factor has got sixth 
position in the hierarchy of response percentage. Thus from the 
analysis of data we found that political and economic are major 
factors involved in making the confl-ct in Jammu & Kashmir. Although 
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some significance has been given to cultural and religious factors. 
But the remaining two factors i.e. regional and outside support factors 
have got least importance. This also shows that conflict in Jammu & 
Kashmir is multidimensional as political, economic, cultural and 
religious considerations are at play in making, promoting and 
sustaining it. 
Every conflict is the product of some factors and it has some 
consequences. Consequences may be both positive and negative 
depending upon the nature, scale and location of the conflict Kashmir 
conflict has its long history and is the cumulative result of various 
factors which we have explained in the preceding pages. Kashmir 
conflict is of a nature which has largely negative consequences 
because Kashmiri nationality involved in it is attacking the values 
upon which the foundation of Indian state is based. Internally the 
conflict appears to be between the Kashmiri - nationality and an 
Indian state, between Muslims and non-Muslims. Externally this is a 
conflict between the two states i.e. India and Pakistan in which 
Kashmiri nationality is smashed. It is therefore the conflict has more 
negative consequences for the relationship between state and 
nationality, among various ethnic groups and for the socio-economic 
development of the Jammu and Kashmir. 
Concerning political consequences we have found that majority of 
respondents (75.16%) at state level think that they feel alienated from 
the political system. 
When we examine our data region and religion-wise we found that 
majority of Muslims respondents (92.86% in Kashmir, 80.00% in 
Jammu and 100.00% in Ladakh) in all regions of the state feel 
politically alienated. 
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However, opinion of Hindus in region Kashmir differ from the opinion 
of Hindus in Jammu. As 100.00% Kashmiri Hindus think that they feel 
alienated politically, unlike majority of their co-religionists in Jammu 
(72.00%) who do not think so. While majority of Kashmiri Sikhs 
(80.00%) and 60.00% Sikhs living in Jammu share the same opinion 
i.e. both feel politically alienated. About, 100.00% Buddhists in the 
region of Ladakh do not feel any political alienation. 
This shows the conflict has thrown negative repercussion over the 
political integration of religion communities. At regional level although 
majority of Muslims and Sikhs in different regions of the state feel 
more politically alienated as compared to majority of Hindus of 
Jammu and Buddhists of Ladakh, this shows upon the political 
Integration of respondents the consequences of conflict has remained 
uneven. 
In fact, alienation of people has enabled them to form soft opinion 
about the slogan like freedom rhetoric and extremism. Concerning 
their support to what is called in Kashmir valley freedom movement, 
we have found that at state level majority of respondents (58.71%) 
maintain that they support the freedom movement. Remaining 
41.29% respondents do not support the movement. 
However, analysis of data region and religion wise shows that 
majority of Muslims in all regions (82.14% in valley, 92.00% in 
Jammu and 86.66% in Ladakh region) have expressed their opinion 
in support of the movement. While majority of Hindus (95.00% in 
Kashmir and 100.00% in Jammu), Sikhs (80.00% in Kashmir and 
90.00% in region-jammu) and Budahists (100.00%) in Ladakh do not 
support the movement. 
Therefore we found only Muslims irrespective of their ethnic 
affiliations are in support of the movement where as non-Muslims do 
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not support it. Moreover, this also shows that religion rather than 
region plays an important role in shaping the opinion of people in 
supporting the movement. In fact rampant political corruption and 
nepotism in the state has not only alienated people especially 
Muslims from the politics but also softened their attitude towards 
extremism/militancy. 
Apart from political, the conflict has badly affected the economic 
prospects of people. At state level we have found that majority of 
respondents (75.16%) believe that their economic prospects declined 
in the period of militancy. Remaining 24.84% respondents think their 
economic prosperity remained uninfluenced in the period of turmoil. 
This shows the ongoing conflict in Jammu & Kashmir has badly 
affected the economic prospects of people. 
For the same, if seeing our data region and religion wise it could be 
found that majority of Muslim respondents (90.00% in Kashmir, 
84.00% in Jammu and 100.00% Buddhists in Ladakh) in all regions 
think that in the period of militancy their economic progress declined. 
For the same, the opinion of Hindus in Kashmir differ from the opinion 
of Hindus in Jammu. As 90.00% Kashmiri Hindus consider that their 
economic prosperity declined in the period of conflict, whereas, 
84.00% Hindus in Jammu region do no consider so. While, majority of 
Sikhs in Kashmir (100.00%) and Jammu (80.00%) opined that conflict 
has blocked their economic prospects. While 100.00% Buddhists in 
Ladakh believed that the conflict has not damaged their economic 
prosperity. This shows at regional-level majority of Hindus in region 
Jammu and Buddhists of Ladakh think that in the period of militancy 
their economic prospects do not decline. However majority of 
Muslims and Sikhs in all regions and Hindus of Kashmir region share 
the same view that in the period of turmoil their economic progress 
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hampered. Thus, like political, the consequences of the conflict over 
economy of religious communities there has remained uneven as 
some dominant ethno-regional groups (Buddhists of Ladakh and 
Hindus of Jammu) think their economic prospects hardly declined 
than other ethno-religious communities at regional level. 
Apart from the arrest or disruption of politico-economic development 
growing alienation and poverty among people, conflict in Kashmir has 
serious repercussions for family and marriage organizations. At state 
level we have found that majority of respondents. (60.65%) think that 
since the emergence of conflict number of widows and their children 
have not only increased but created problems in the family and 
marriage systems. 13.23% respondents believe that parental 
authority has declined in the family. About, 4.84% respondents said 
divorce rate has increased. This rhows majority of respondents at 
state level opine that increasing the number of widows and their 
children in the family and decline of parental authority in the family 
are the consequences of ongoing conflict in the state. Our case study 
also shows that problem of wido-remarriage and rehabilitation of the 
orphans especially among those families that have become the 
victims of violence are some other issues related to impact of the 
conflict over family and marriage like organizations. 
Related to issue of family and marriage when we see our data region 
and religion-wise it could be found that majority of Muslims (70.71% 
in valley, 68.00% in Jammu and 100.00%) in all three regions believe 
that in the ongoing conflict increasing number of widows and their 
children have created problems in the family and marriage systems 
there. Similarly majority of Hindus (80.00% in Kashmir and 32.00% in 
Jammu) in both regions share the same opinion as shared by 
majority of Muslims. Correspondingly 80.00% Sikh respondents in 
region Kashmir hold the same view, unlike their co-religionists in 
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Jammu (0.00%). Like Sikhs in Jammu, Buddhists (0.00%) in Ladakh 
do not express any opinion on the impact of conflict over family and 
marriage systems. This shows majority of Muslims and Hindus in all 
regions as well as Sikhs in Kashmir believe that increase in the 
number of widows and their children due to the conflict created 
problems in the family and marriage systems. 
In regard with the impact of conflict on parental authority we found 
20.71% Muslims in Kashmir 8.00% in Jammu think that it has 
declined in the family. 
For the same, 20.00% Hindus in Kashmir share their opinion with 
4.00% Hindus in Jammu while 20.00% Sikhs in region-Kashmir think 
that parental authority has declined in the family in the period of 
conflict. This shows Buddhists of Ladakh (0.00%) and Sikh 
respondents of Jammu have expressed no opinion over the Issue. 
However some Muslims and Hindus of region-Kashmir and Jammu 
think that ongoing militancy has declined parental authority in the 
family. 
So far as the impact of conflict on marital break up is concerned we 
found only 8.57% Muslim respondents in valley-Kashmir and 6.00% 
in Jammu believe that divorce rate has increased in the period of 
militancy. 
Thus we find majority of Muslims and Hindus in all the regions think 
that increase in the number of widows and their children and decline 
of parental authority are the horrible consequences of Kashmir 
conflict. Majority of Sikhs in region Kashmir share the same view. 
Related to increase in number of widows and their children Buddhists 
of Ladakh and Sikhs in Jammu have expressed no opinion. We also 
found related to divorce rate only small percentage of Muslims think 
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that divorce rate has increased since the emergence of militancy. 
Over other issues like practice of dowry and increase in illegitimate 
relations in the period of militancy no religious community has 
expressed any opinion. 
Kashmir conflict appears to have adversely affected the syncretic 
cultural identity (Kashmiryat) of the state. Kashmiryat cements 
religious communities together since long there. In regard with 
consequences of conflict over Kashmiryat at state level we have 
found that majority of respondents (62.90%) believe that it cements 
religions together. Remaining 37.10% respondents consider 
Kashmiryat has lost its influence to hold religions together after the 
emergence of militancy. This shows at state-level majority of 
respondents in the state think that Kashmiryat in still alive even in the 
period of conflict. 
At regional level, we have found that majority of Muslims in Kashmir 
(86.43%) and in Ladakh (80.00%) differ in their opinion from majority 
of Muslims in Jammu (56.00%). The former hold Kashmiryat is still 
alive there whereas the later do not think so. 
Majority of Hindus in Kashmir (85.00%) think that in the period of 
militancy Kashmiryat still hold its influence there, however, majority of 
Hindus in Jammu do not consider so. While we also found majority of 
Sikhs in region - Kashmir (100.00%) said that in the period of 
militancy Kashmiryat has not lost its influence to hold religions 
together. Whereas some significant percentage of their co-religionists 
in Jammu (50.00%) believe that militancy has damaged sprit of 
Kashmiryat among people. Buddhists respondents (100.00%) in the 
region of Ladakh too think Kashmiryat has lost its influence to hold 
religions together due to emergence the conflict. 
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This shows at regional-level majority of Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs in 
region Kashmir consider that militancy has not influenced Kashmiryat, 
but majority of their co-religionists (H, M, S) in region Jammu along 
with Buddhists of region-Ladakh consider the impact of militancy on 
Kashmiryat. 
Concerned with inter-religious relationship we have found at state-
level highest percentage (64.19%) of respondents think that militancy 
has increased the gulf between religious communities in J&K and out 
side of it also. 
Religion-wise analysis of data at regional level reveal that majority of 
Muslims in valley Kashmir (78.57%) and Jammu (90.00%) hold the 
same view i.e. militancy has not disturbed the religious harmony, 
however, majority of Muslims in Ladakh (60.00%) think that it has 
disturbed the inter-religious harmony. 
Similarly, majority of Hindus (80.00%) and Sikhs (80.00%) in region 
Kashmir share the same opinion, however, majority of Hindu 
(80.00%) and Sikh (60.00%) respondents in region-Jammu consider 
unanimously that militancy is responsible for disturbing the inter-
religious harmony. 80.00% Buddhist respondents in Ladakh region 
shared the same opinion. Thus, we find, majority of Buddhists and 
Muslims in Ladakh along with Hindus and Sikhs in region Jammu 
opine that widening of gulf between religious communities in the state 
and outside of it is the outcome of conflict in Kashmir. However this 
view do not get significant support among Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims 
of Kashmir region. 
Apart from breaking the syncretic cultural identity, widening the gap 
between religious communities, the conflict is said to have adversely 
affected respect of people of J&K in other parts of India. We have 
found at state level majority of respondents (60.97%) perceive that 
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emergence of conflict in the state resulted loss of respect of people in 
other parts of India, However, 39.03% respondents do not think so. 
This shows that majority of respondents at state level view that they 
are not getting due respect from people living in other parts of India 
after the emergence of militancy there. 
Seeing our data region and religion wise we found disparity in the 
opinion of Muslims, Majority of Muslims in valley (95.71%) and 
Jammu-region (90.00%) perceive loss of respect after the emergence 
of militancy in various states of India, however, majority of Muslim 
respondents in region-Ladakh (60.00%) do not perceive so. 
Moreover, majority of all non-Muslim religious communities (100.00% 
Hindus of Kashmir and 100.00% Hindus of Jammu, 80.00% Kashmiri 
Sikhs and 80.00% in Jammu, and 100.00% Buddhists in Ladakh) in 
all regions there think that they have not experienced any loss of 
respect from people of other parts of India in the period of turmoil. 
Thus we found only majority of Muslim respondents in Kashmir and 
Jammu regions experience loss of respect from people living in 
different parts of India after the emergence of militancy in Jammu & 
Kashmir. 
In fact during survey number of Muslim respondents who work 
outside the state said that some people in other states of India 
suspect them as "terrorists". Moreover, while frisking disdainful 
remarks by police or security agencies are other examples of 
humiliation. 
Consequences of the ongoing conflict in Jammu & Kashmir could be 
seen in the form of curtailing the rights and liberties of people as the 
fundamental rights guaranteed to every citizen of India under the 
Indian constitution have been denied to them. 
250 
The emergence of militancy is no doubt one of the factors 
responsible for this unhealthy development. But the various policies 
that central government formulated for checking militancy in Kashmir, 
in practice turned out to be an exercise directed against the vast 
masses of Kashmiri people. In one of the questions related to 
consequences of the conflict on rights and liberties of people we have 
found at state-level majority of respondents (90.00%) opine that their 
freedom of speech, to protest and form the government of their 
choice got curtailed. Remaining 10.00% respondents do not share 
the view as expressed by majority of respondent in the state. This 
shows majority of respondents at state level believe that their rights 
and liberties got curtailed due to prevailing conflict in the state. 
When we see responses region and religion wise we have found that 
majority of Muslims (89.29%, 86.00% in Jammu and 80.00% in 
Ladakh) respondents in all regions understand that in the period of 
conflict their fundamental rights got curtailed. 
Similarly, all Hindu respondents in valley (100.00%) and Jammu 
(100.00%) have expressed the same opinion as expressed by 
majority of Muslims in all regions there. Also, majority of Sikh 
respondents in valley Kashmir (60.00%) and Jammu (80.00%) along 
with majority of Buddhists (80.00%) in Ladakh have expressed the 
same opinion. 
Thus at regional level too we found that majority of respondents 
irrespective of religion think that their freedom of speech, right to 
protest and form government of their choice have got curtailed since 
the emergence of violent conflict in the state. 
Apart from curtailing the rights and liberties, the prevailing conflict 
appears to have affected adversely the religious life of people in the 
state. In this regard we have found at state level majority of 
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respondents (54.19%) think that in the period of conflict they suffered 
loss of religious freedom. However, 45.81% respondents do not think 
so. This shows at state level majority of respondents have suffered 
loss of religious freedom. 
When we see our data region and religion-wise we found differences 
in the opinion of Muslim respondents. Majority of Muslim respondents 
in both Kashmir (81.43%) and Jammu (56.00%) think their religious 
freedom suffered whereas Muslims (100.00%) in Ladakh do not 
suffer loss of religious freedom. Hindus in valley (100.00%) and 
Jammu (100.00%) as well as Sikhs (100.00% in valley and 100.00% 
in Jammu) have experienced no loss of religious freedom. Also, 
Buddhist (100.00%) in Ladakh hold the same view. Thus we found at 
regional level only Muslims in valley Kashmir and Jammu viewed that 
after the emergence of conflict their religious freedom suffered. 
In fact at the time of survey most of the Muslims in valley said us that 
current turmoil has adversely affected their religious life as they could 
not offer Namaz in mosques especially those prayers which are 
offered in dark hours. Moreover, Muslims there think that because of 
the fear of military for perceiving them as terrorists they do not 
organize Ijtemas (one of the religious duties) in mosques and homes, 
they used to organize there before the emergence of militancy. 
Another impact of Kashmir conflict we observed in the form of 
migration of Kashmiri Hindu families from region Kashmir to region 
Jammu. Though some of the families have migrated to other states of 
India. In this way migration led by Kashmir conflict is of intra-state 
and inter-state in nature. In regard with factors which became 
responsible for the migration of Hindu families we have found at state 
level the highest percentage of respondents (46.45%) think policy of 
the government responsible for it. 46.13% respondents view the rise 
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of militancy became responsible for migration of pandits (Hindus) 
from Kashmir. For the same, 7.42% respondents are of the view that 
pandits migrated because of the presence of employment and other 
economic opportunities in other parts of India. 
This shows majority of respondents at state level think the policy of 
Government and emergence of militancy are the two main factors 
that triggered migration among Kashmiri Hindus. 
If we analyse our data region and religion wise we have found 
differences in the opinion of Muslims. Majority of Muslims in Jammu 
(58.00%) and region Kashmir (60.00%) consider that it was the policy 
of the government to migrate Kashmiri pandits, unlike the highest 
percentage of their co-religionists in Ladakh (46.67%) who viewed 
rise of militancy became responsible for migration of Hindus from 
Kashmir. 
Moreover, for migration of pandits all Hindus in Jammu (100.00%) 
and valley (100.00%) think emergence of militancy is responsible. 
Relatedly, majority of Sikhs (60.00% in valley & 50.00% in Jammu) at 
regional level share the same opinion as shared by Hindus. Similarly 
all Buddhists in Ladakh (100.00%) believe rise of militancy is 
responsible for the migration of Pandits from valley. 
Thus, we found majority of Muslims in region Kashmir and Jammu 
regions believe the policy of government have encouraged migration 
among Hindus in Kashmir. Whereas majority of Hindus, Sikhs and 
Buddhists along with Muslims in LaJakh think emergence of militancy 
became responsible for migration of Kashmiri Pandits from Kashmir. 
It is therefore at regional level majority of non-Muslims said militancy 
as a factor has triggered migration of Kashmiri Hindus there. 
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After the emergence of militancy (1989) in Jammu & Kashmir 
government of India facing the immanent threat to the territorial 
integrity of the country resorted to heavy deployment of security 
forces there. Ironically heavy deployment of security forces for 
suppressing ongoing militancy lead to sharp escalation of human 
rights violation particularly custodial deaths reprisal killings rape 
torture and assaults on innocent people, incidents of firing on 
peaceful demonstrations, humiliating body searches and arresting 
someone on suspicious groups. 
Human rights are not merely violated by armed forces they are 
violated by the militants also. There are two kinds of militants 
operating in the state. One is of those who claim themselves as 
freedom fighters and fight against Indian forces in Kashmir. Another 
kind of militant group is of those who surrendered themselves before 
Indian military and working on the behest of it. They are known as 
Nabedis or Ikhwanis in Kashmir. They terrorize people, loot and 
plunder their property and kill those whom they consider their 
enemies. 
In regard with the question related to violators of human rights in 
Kashmir we have found at state level majority of respondents 
(64.52%) think that Indian security forces have violatated Human 
rights. About, 20.00% respondents consider K. militants have mostly 
violated the human rights. And, 10.65% respondents view Ikhwanis 
(surrendered Kashmiri militants) the violators of human rights. 
Remaining 4.19%, 0.65% respondents believe Pakistan and some 
local Kashmiris as the main violators of human rights. 
This shows majority of respondents at state level think that security 
forces of India and Kashmiri militants are the major violators of 
human rights in Kashmir. 
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At regional level our data show that majority of Muslim (84.29% of 
Kashmir, 86.00% of Jammu and 80.00% of Ladakh) respondents in 
all regions hold Indian security forces responsible for the human 
rights violation. However, we found difference in the opinion of Hindu 
respondents. As, majority of Hindu respondents in region Kashmir 
(70.00%) think security forces have violated the human rights. 
Whereas majority of Hindu respondents in region-Jammu (70.00%) 
have different opinion i.e., they think militants as violators of human 
rights of the people. Sikhs respondents about 40.00% in region 
Kashmir hold security forced responsible for violating the rights of 
people, unlike the highest percentage of their co-religionists in 
Jammu (40.00) hold militants responsible. In the region of Ladakh 
Buddhist (100.00%) think that militants have violated the human 
rights of people brazenly. This shows at regional level we found 
Muslims in all regions hold security forces of India responsible for the 
violation of human rights. This view is also shared by majority of 
Kashmiri, Hindus and Sikhs. 
Contrary to this, majority of Hindus in region Jammu and the highest 
percentage of Sikhs in the same region along with all Buddhists in 
region Ladakh share the same opinion i.e. they consider militants as 
the major violators of human right? of people there. Thus we found 
security forces of India and Kashmiri militants as the major violators 
of Human rights. 
Kashmir conflict as we have explored in the preceding pages 
foregoing section has adversely affected the political atmosphere as 
majority of people there still feel alienated from politics which was 
revived in Jammu & Kashmir in 1996. It has hampered the economic 
property of people also. Both political alienation and decline in the 
economic prosperity there were found more in Muslim dominated 
areas of Jammu & Kashmir or in those areas which are more in 
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throes of militancy. Moreover syncretic cultural identity called 
Kashmiryat which used to cement religious communities together too 
got weakened. Although Muslim along with Hindus and Sikhs in 
region Kashmir think sprit of Kashmiryat is still alive even in the 
period of militancy the impact of conflict on family and marriage 
organizations shows that it has declined parental authority in family 
and increased the number of widow and orphans especially in 
Kashmir and Jammu regions only. 
Therefore problems of widow re-marriage and rehabilitation of 
orphans are other issues which need quick solution. Widening of gap 
between religious communities and influencing the honor of Muslims 
of valley and some parts of Jammu in other parts of India reveal the 
conflict has thrown negative repercussions on social relationships. In 
the prevailing conflict the rights and liberties including religious 
freedom of Muslim in valley and Jammu have also got curtailed. The 
conflict has drastically changed the demographics of the state to a 
great extent, because of the migration of most of the Kashmiri Hindu 
families from valley Kashmir. 
As we have seen in preceding analysis, Kashmir conflict is complex 
and multi-layered phenomenon. It has a long history which involves 
legal questions and international diplomacy. It is not merely an ethnic 
conflict but also an issue of conflict between two sovereign states 
(India and Pakistan) and occupies a place in international peace 
keeping agenda. Scholars have suggested various strategies for 
resolving conflict in Kashmir. Some of these strategies are coercive in 
nature while others are reconciliatory in nature. Ethnic flooding, the 
mailed first strategy-suppressing militarily the ongoing struggle for 
independent Kashmir, the wear-down strategy, conceding the valley 
to Pakistan, shared sovereignty, Holding a plebiscite, independence, 
the protectorate option. An alternative strategy, A Trieste type 
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solution, creation of sovereignty association and creation of several 
independent states are the various strategies which we have 
described briefly in the preceding chapter. 
Apart from describing the design and desirability of the fore 
mentioned models of conflict resolution over which scholars have 
already reflected upon, we have sought to know the view-point of 
respondents related to resolution of Kashmir conflict. Concerning with 
granting full autonomy in politico-constitutional matters to Jammu & 
Kashmir, we have found at state level the highest percentage of 
respondents (50.97%) think that if government of India restore the 
autonomy powers of lammu & Kashmir which existed there till 1952 
the conflict would be resolved. Remaining 49.03% respondents do 
not think so. This shows at state level majority of respondents in the 
state opine that if autonomy of the state is restored the conflict would 
be resolved peacefully. If we see our data region and religion-wise 
we found majority of Muslims (54.28% in Kashmir, 60.00% in Jammu 
and 60.00% in Ladakh) in all regions of the state are in favour of 
resolving the problem through the mechanism of autonomy to Jammu 
& Kashmir. However we found difference in the opinion of Hindus in 
Kashmir and Jammu. Majority of Hindus (60.00%) in valley Kashmir 
opine that granting fall autonomy to Jammu & Kashmir would solve 
the conflict, unlike the majority of Hindus (80.00%) in Jammu. 
Moreover, majority of Sikhs in Kashmir (70.00%) wish to resolve the 
conflict through the mechanism of autonomy, while 50.00% Sikhs in 
region Jammu too share the same opinion. In the region of ladakh 
majority of Buddhists (80.00%) have expressed their opinion against 
granting any autonomy to the state. Thus, majority of Muslims in all 
regions, along with Kashmiri Hindus and Sikhs of both regions 
(Kashmiri & Jammu) share the same opinion i.e. if autonomous 
powers are restored to the state as existed there till 1952 Kashmir 
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conflict would be resolved. However, majority of Hindus in Jammu 
and Ladakhi Buddhists opine that granting autonomy to the state 
wouldn't resolve the dispute. 
Related to autonomy, we have asked another question to respondent 
in order to ascertain their viewpoint on separate regional autonomy. 
At state level only 17.74% respondents believe that granting 
autonomous status to all three regions would resolve Kashmir 
conundrum. This shows among majority of respondents (82.26%) at 
state-level regional autonomy model lacks appeal. 
If we see our data region and religion wise it could be found that only 
majority of Hindus in Jammu (68.00%) and Buddhists in ladakh 
(80.00%) have opined in favour of regional autonomy model. 
However majority of Muslims and Sikhs in all regions and Kashmiri 
Hindus have expressed their opinion against the model, i.e. Kashmir 
conflict wouldn't be resolved if govt, gives autonomous status to all 
regions like Kashmir valley, Jammu and Ladakh. 
Another legitimate and democratic way to resolve the Kashmir 
problem is to ascertain the wishes of people through an impartial 
plebiscite. In this regard at state level we have found majority of 
respondents (75.48%) think that if plebiscite is allowed there and its 
result honoured Kashmir problem would be resolved. 
Seeing responses of respondents region and religion-wise we found 
majority of Muslims in all regions 95.00% in Kashmir, 94.00% in 
Jammu and 100.00% in Ladakh) believe that holding plebiscite and 
honouring its result is the best way to resolve the conflict. Majority of 
Hindus in Kashmir (85.00%) have expressed their view In favour of 
the plebiscite, however, majority of Hindu respondents in Jammu 
(76.00%) do not share their views with Kashmiri Hindus i.e., they view 
holding of plebiscite would not resolve the conflict. We also found the 
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opinion of Sil<h respondents in Kashmir valley differ from the opinion 
of Sikh respondents in Jammu region. The former (60.00%) hold that 
Kashmir conflict would not be resolved through the mechanism of 
plebiscite, however, the letter (60.00%) in Jammu opined that 
plebiscite if allowed can resolve the conflict. While all Buddhist 
respondents (100.00%) in Ladakh opined against the resolution of 
conflict by allowing plebiscite there. 
This shows at regional level majority of Muslims in all regions think it 
plebiscite is allowed in J& K the conflict would be peacefully resolved. 
Similarly majority of Sikhs in Jammu and Hindus in Kashmir-region in 
Kashmir too share the same opinion on plebiscite. 
However, ethno-religious communities among whom we did not find 
acceptability of the model (holding impartial plebiscite) are majority of 
Hindus in Jammu and Sikhs in Kashmir valley as well as majority of 
Buddhists in Ladakh. 
In another question concerning plebiscite respondents were asked 
what options should be given in plebiscite if it is allowed in the state. 
We have found at state level majority of respondents (74.19%) there 
wish that Jammu and Kashmir should be a sovereign country. About 
28.81% respondents desire that option like the state should go with 
India be included if plebiscite is held there. This shows that no 
respondent in Jammu & Kashmir wishes the state to go with 
Pakistan, majority of respondents their desire to retain Jammu & 
Kashmir an independent country. 
When we see responses of respondents region and religion wise it 
could be found that majority of Muslims in all regions (98.57% of 
Kashmir valley, 96.00% of Jammu and 100.00% of Ladakh) share the 
same opinion i.e. they prefer independence of the state. Similarly 
majority of Kashmiri Sikhs 980.00%) sharer the same opinion. 
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However, majority of Hindus (70.00% of Kashmir valley and 80.00% 
of Jammu) along with 60.00% Sikh respondents of Jammu and 
93.33% Buddhists of Ladakh region think that the state should go 
with India. This shows in regard with what options should be given in 
plebiscite we found two prominent opinions. Majority of Muslims in all 
regions along with Kashmiri Sikhs wish the state should be sovereign 
country. Whereas majority of Hindus (in Kashmir & Jammu regions) 
and Buddhists in Ladakh opined that the state should go with India. 
Similarly majority of Sikhs in Jammu share the same opinion as 
shared by Buddhists and Hindus i.e. in plebiscite option like Jammu & 
Kashmir should go with India be included. 
Geographical area of Jammu and Kashmir is quite large. Some 
portion of this state is under control of Pakistan called Pakistan 
occupied Kashmir (POK). People in POK and those in Indian part of 
Kashmir have religious affinity & ethnic affiliations. Many of them are 
close relatives and feel alienated and marginalized when they are not 
allowed to see each other due to border restrictions since 1948 war. 
In this way people living in both parts of Kashmir (POK and Indian 
part of Kashmir) have lost social contact. 
It is therefore large number of social activist propose that India and 
Pakistan should encourage free movement of Kashmiris in order to 
restore peace in the region. Recently governments of both countries 
have implemented steps in this regard i.e. launching bus services 
between Srinagar and Muzaffarabad in 2006, however, we have 
conducted our fieldwork before these steps were taken. 
In one of the questions we asked respondents would Kashmir conflict 
be resolved if Government of India allow free movement of Kashmiris 
across the boarder. At state level we have found that majority of 
respondents (94.52%) there think that free movement of Kashmiris 
260 
across the boarder would not resolve the conflict. However, very 
small percentage of respondents (5.48%) view that it would help to 
resolve the conflict. 
Examining the data region and religion-wise shows that majority of 
Muslims, Hindus, Sikhs and Buddhists in different regions of the state 
view that free movement of Kashmiri people across the boarder 
would not resolve the conflict. Thus, we found all religious 
communities at regional level think Kashmir conflict would not be 
resolved merely by allowing free movement of Kashmiris across the 
border (LOG). 
We have described in the preceded chapter there is a small section 
of people in India who believe that if Kashmir valley is granted to 
Pakistan, the ongoing conflict in the state would be resolved. In this 
regard at state level we found that majority of respondents (96.45%) 
consider if Kashmir valley is given to Pakistan the conflict would not 
be resolved. Only 3.55% respondents view allowing valley Kashmir to 
go with Pakistan would end the conflict. 
Seeing our data region and religion-wise show that all four religious 
communities (H,M,S,B,) living in different regions think unanimously 
that Kashmir conundrum wouldn't end if valley Kashmir is granted to 
Pakistan. Thus, strategy of conflict resolution, which grants valley to 
Pakistan, lacks appeal among both Muslims and non-Muslim 
respondents at regional as well as state level. Therefore our finding 
also rejects the viewpoint of scholars who think Kashmiri Muslims 
want to go with Pakistan or accession of Jammu & Kashmir to 
Pakistan. 
Another way to resolve the conflict is revitalizing polity and economy 
of the state. Moreover, taking measures for providing education and 
employment opportunities to large number of people there. In this 
261 
regard at state level we found majority of respondents (55.48%) think 
that ensuring proper functioning of democratic politics, economic 
development and education and employment opportunities to large 
number of people would be sufficient for conflict resolution there, 
however, remaining 44.52% respondents have opined against the 
majority view. This shows at staie level majority of respondents 
consider if political and economic development of the state is ensured 
Kashmir conflict would be resolved. 
At regional level we have found that only majority of Muslim 
respondents in Kashmir-valley (77.14%) have opined against the 
model i.e. ensuring political and economic development of Jammu & 
Kashmir is not sufficient for conflict resolution there. However majority 
of Muslims in Jammu (58.00%) and Ladakh (80.00%) along with 
majority of Hindus (95.00% in Kashmir and 100.00% in Jammu) and 
Sikhs (80.00% in Kashmir & 70.00°o in Jammu) as well as Buddhists 
(100.00%) in Ladakh share the same opinion i.e., they think proper 
functioning of democracy, economic development of the state, 
educational and employment opportunities to the large number of 
people would resolve the conflict. 
Thus, at regional level we have found, except majority of Kashmiri 
Muslims, the majority of all other ethno-religious groups in different 
regions wish to resolve the conflict through the mechanism of politico-
economic development strategy. 
Another possible way to resolve the conflict in Jammu and Kashmir 
for India is to have direct negotiations with the separatist groups. In 
this regard we have found at state-level majority of respondents 
(68.71%) opine that there would be peace if Govt, of India takes into 
consideration those who have guns in their hands. Remaining 
31.29% respondents do not opine so. This shows at state level 
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majority of respondents believe that if government of India hold talks 
with militants there would be peace in Jammu & Kashmir. 
If we see data region and religion wise, majority of Muslims (90.71% 
in Kashmir, 94.00% in Jammu and 100.00% in Ladakh) share same 
opinion i.e., if government of India takes into consideration militants 
there would be peace. Correspondingly 60.00% Sikh respondents in 
Kashmir valley share the same opinion as shared by Muslims in all 
regions. 
However, majority of Hindus in valley (95.00%) and Jammu (76.00%) 
as well as 80.00% Sikhs in Jammu and 80.00% Buddhists in Ladakh 
have different opinion i.e. they think there would be no peace if 
government takes militants into consideration. Thus, at regional level 
we found two prominent opinions. Majority of Muslims in all regions 
and Kashmir Sikhs wish for the peaceful settlement of the conflict 
government of India should take militants into consideration. However 
majority of Hindus in Kashmir and Jammu regions are not in favour of 
resolving the conflict if government takes militants into consideration 
like Sikhs in Jammu and Buddhists m Ladkh. 
In regard with right of property for outsiders in J&K we have found at 
state level 88.39% respondents consider this model would not 
resolve the conflict. 11.61% respondent's opinion have been found in 
support of the model. This shows majority of respondents at state 
level view that allowing outsiders to settle in the state is undesirable 
model for the resolution of Kashmir dispute. 
Region and religion wise scrutiny of data reveal majority of Muslims 
(99.29% of Kashmir, 100.00% in all regions have opposed the model 
i.e., settlement of outsiders in the state would not resolve the conflict. 
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Similarly, majority of Sikhs (100.00% each of Kashmir and Jammu 
regions) along with 95.00% Kashmiri, Hindus and 60.00% Buddhists 
in Ladakh have shared the same opinion. 
However, majority of Hindu respondents (56.00%) in Jammu-region 
have opined that allowing outsiders to settle in the state would help to 
resolve the problem, thus we find except Hindus in Jammu, majority 
of Muslims, Hindus, Sikhs and Buddhists in different regions believe 
that allowing Muslims and non-Muslims to purchase and own 
property in J&K is not right strategy for bringing peaceful settlement 
of Kashmir dispute, this shows strategy like "ethnic flooding" if 
implemented for resolution of the conflict would not remain 
successful. 
Kashmir conflict can also to resolve by engaging United Nations 
Organizations (UN) in the process of conflict resolution. In one of the 
questions we have asked respondents can UN play an effective role 
in resolving the conflict. In this regard at state level we have found 
majority of respondents (65.81%) think that UN can resolve the 
conflict. Remaining 34.19% respondents do not think so. 
This shows majority of respondents at state level are in favour of 
resolving the conflict through UN involvement. 
Region and religion-wise analysis of data show that majority of 
Muslims in region Kashmir (90.00%) and Jammu (94.00%) hold UN 
can play an effective role in the conflict resolution, however, majority 
of Muslims in Ladakh (60.00%) do not think so. Moreover, Majority of 
Hindus (55.00% in Kashmir and 80.00% in Jammu) and Sikhs 
(60.00% in Kashmir and 80.00% in Jammu) as well as all Buddhists 
in Ladakh (100.00%) hold that UN involvement cannot resolve the 
conflict. This shows at regional level we found that only Muslims in 
both Kashmir and Jammu regions opined in favour of the UN 
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involvement. However majority of Muslims and all Buddhists in 
Ladakh along with Hindus and Sikhs in regions Kashmir and Jammu 
share same opinion i.e. they think UN cannot play an effective role in 
resolving the dispute. Thus, at regional level we found majority of 
ethno-religious groups are not in favour of resolving Kashmir conflict 
by engaging UN in the process. 
There are some scholars who believe that a balanced American 
diplomatic investment, if encouraged between India and Pakistan 
would prove fruitful in resolving the conflict in Jammu and Kashmir. In 
one of the questions that we asked respondents at state level we 
found 58.39% respondents there think that sincere American 
intervention can resolve the conflict, However, 41.61% respondents 
do not opine it would help to resolve the problem. This shows that 
majority of respondents at state-level believe that balanced American 
intervention can solve the Kashmir problem. 
Region and religion-wise examination of data show that majority of 
Muslims in all regions (85.00% in Kashmir, 86.00% in Jammu and 
80.00% in Ladakh) share the same opinion i.e. balanced American 
intervention can resolve the conflict. However, majority of non-
Muslims (95.00% Hindus in Kashmir and 96.00% in Jammu, 80.00% 
Sikhs in Kashmiri and 80.00% in Jammu, as well as all Buddhists in 
Ladakh (100.00%) have expressed their opinion against American 
involvement. This show at regional level only majority of Muslims in 
all regions think that balanced American Intervention could resolve 
the dispute, in like none-Muslim religious communities there. 
We have sought to know from respondents would Kashmir problem 
be resolved if Muslim majority areas of Kargil (in Ladakh) and Doda, 
Poonch and Rajouri (in Jammu) are clubbed with Kashmir valley and 
allowing the entity to become a sovereign country. At state level we 
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have found 58.39% respondent in support of the strategy. However, 
41.61% respondents have expressed their view against the strategy. 
This shows majority of respondents at state level seek to resolve the 
problem by clubbing the Muslim majority areas of the state and 
allowing the new entity to become independent. 
Region and religion-wise analysis of data in regard with fore 
mentioned strategy shows the highest proportion of Muslim 
respondents (82.14% in Kashmir, 64.00% in Jammu and 100.00%) in 
all regions have supported the strategy i.e., the conflict would be 
resolved if Muslim majority areas of the state are joined together. 
However, majority of non-Muslim communities in different region 
(100.00% Hindus of Kashmir and 76.00% of Jammu, 60.00% Sikhs of 
Kashmir and 80.00% of Jammu as well as 100.00% Buddhists of 
region Ladakh) have expressed their view against the model. Thus, 
at regional level we have found only Muslims in all regions of the 
state believe Kashmir conflict would be resolved if Muslim majority 
districts of Jammu & Kashmir are clubbed together and allowing the 
entity to become an independent country. 
According to the findings mentioned in the study, there is no such 
perfect model of conflict resolution that could satisfy the aspirations of 
religious communities in Kashmir. 
Our findings suggest that there are two ways to resolve the Kashmir 
conflict, peacefully. 
Firstly, restoration of 1952 status, when the central government 
controlled only defence, external affairs and communication. Practical 
implementation of the Kashmir constitution will strength existing 
judicial bodies, electoral procedures and alter recruitment practices 
into administrative agencies. Such efforts could contribute 
significantly towards improving institutional procedures at the state 
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and local levels. Improving the functional efficacy and capabilities of 
such organization is critical for responding to the needs of a highly 
mobilized population. There is no denying of the fact that erosion of 
such institutional arrangements gave birth to the conflict. 
Secondly, immediate steps snould be taken for proper 
implementation of democracy and economic development of the 
state. As, unemployed educated youths who join militant outfits due 
to lack of adequate economy and job opportunities would not be lured 
by militant organizations (55.48% respondents of the state supported 
this view). 
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INTERVIEW- SCHEDULE 
Dated: 
1. Name (If you wish) 8. Religion 
2. Age 9. Sect 
3. Education 10. Region 
4. Occupation 11. District 
5. Income 12. City/Town/village 
6. Marital Status 13. Mother Tongue 
14. Which of the following is responsible for creating background for the J&K 
conflict? 
a) Hasty partition of the subcontinent by Britishers. 
b) Strategic location of the State. 
c) Boundary commission's award of Muslim majority district of Gurudaspur to 
India. 
d) Policy of the Britishers to retain the state with India as India could better 
defend it against the then communist Soviet Union. 
e) Maharaja's accession of the state to India without consulting his people. 
15. After the state's accession to India, which of the following is responsible 
for the conflict In J&K state? 
a) Diluting the special status (article 370) of J&K. 
b) The centralizing tendency in the Indian Constitution. 
c) Exploitation of Kashmiri leadership by central Govt, with a view to impose 
their dictate on the state. 
d) Promotion of nepotism & corruption by political leaders of Kashmir. 
e) Amendment of J&K Constitution through unpopular Governments. 
f) Denial of plebiscite right to the people of the state. 
16. Which of the following is/are responsible for promoting violence in J&K? 
a) Non implementation of promised plebiscite by India. 
b) Pakistan's inability to compel India for plebiscite. 
c) Failure of U N to persuade India for the plebiscite. 
d) Disappointment of Kashmiris in 1987 assembly elections. 
17. Where does the root cause of Kashmir conflict lie? 
a) Mishandling politics in J&K by Govt, of India. 
b) Undemocratic and dishonest politics by political leaders of J&K. 
c) Rise of Islamic resurgence/fundamentalism. 
d) Pakistan's support to insurgency. 
e) Political and Economic alienation of people. 
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18. Would there be conflict In the state if the Government had created better 
economic and employment opportunities? 
a) Yes b) No 
19. Do economic hardships promote the militancy? 
a) Yes b) No 
20. Do you think that religion motivates Kashmiri youth for militancy? 
a) Yes b) No 
21. Do you think that crucial to the Kashmir problem is the question of trust 
and the doubts about the quality of Muslim patriotism? 
a) Yes b) No 
22. Do you think that the ethnic & cultural diversity in the state is the internal 
source of J&K conflict? 
a) Yes b) No 
23. Do yon agree that Kashmir conflict persist because Kashmiri speaking 
Muslims endeavor to impose their hegemony/superiority over other ethnic 
groups? 
a) Yes b) No 
24. What is main factor of conflict in J&K State? 
a) Political d) Religious 
b) Economic e) Regional 
c) Cultural f) Outside Support 
25. Do you feel alienated from the present political system? 
a) Yes b) No 
26. Do you support the freedom movement in the state? 
a) Yes b) No 
27. Did your economy prosper during the period of militancy? 
a) Yes b) No 
28. Do you think conflict led to devastation of educational infrastructure? 
a) Yes b) No 
29. What kind of impact militancy has on family and marriage systems? 
a) Parental authority has declined 
b) Divorce rate has increased. 
c) Increasing no. of widows and their children, created problems in the family 
and marriage systems. 
d) Illegitimate relations increased. 
e) Practice of dowry has declined. 
30. Kashmiri culture was defined in terms of the Kashmiriyat, do you feel 
Kashmiriyat still holds Its influence? 
a) Yes b) No 
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31. Do you think that militancy in Kashmir has increased the gulf between 
different religious communities in the state and outside of the state? 
a) Yes b) No 
32. Do you think that after the emergence of militancy you are not getting due 
respect from the people living In other parts of India? 
a) Yes b) No 
33. Did your religious freedom suffer during the period of militancy? 
a) Yes b) No 
34. Did conflict curtail your freedom Including freedom of speech, right to 
protest and elect a government of your choice? 
a) Yes b) No 
35. Which of the following is responsible for the migration of Kashmiri Pandits 
from valley? 
a) Rise of militancy in the valley 
b) Policy of the govemment to migrate Pandits 
c) Pandits migrated because of employment and other economic opportunities 
36. Who is the violator of human rights in Kashmir? 
a) Indian security forces 
b) Ikhwanis (Surrendered Kashmiri Militants) 
c) Militants 
d) Pakistan 
e) Local Kashmiris 
37. Do you think that Kashmir conflict would be resolved if Govt, of India 
restore the autonomy powers of J&K which existed till 1952? 
a) Yes b) No 
38. Would Kashmir problem be solved if government gives autonomous status 
to all three regions like Kashmir valley, Jammu and Ladakh? 
a) Yes b) No 
39. Would holding of plebiscite and honoring Its result solve the conflict? 
a) Yes b) No 
40. What options should be given in plebiscite? 
a) It should go with India 
b) It should be a sovereign country 
c) It should go with Pakistan 
41. Would Kashmir conflict be resolved if Govt, of India allow free movement 
of Kashmiri people across the border? 
a) Yes b) No 
42. If government of India allows the valley of J&K state to go with Pakistan 
would Kashmir problem be resolved? 
a) Yes b) No 
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43. Do you think that proper functioning of democracy, economic development 
of the state, educational and employment opportunities to the large number 
of people in J&K would be sufficient for conflict resolution there? 
a) Yes b) No 
44. Should non-Muslims and Muslims of India other than J&K be allowed to 
purchase and own property in J&K state? 
a) Yes b) No 
45. Can UN play an effective role in resolving Kashmir problem? 
a) Yes b) No 
46. Would there be peace if Govt, of India takes into consideration those who 
have guns in their hands? 
a) Yes b) No 
47. Do you agree that no country, no organization can solve the Kashmir 
problem except balanced American intervention? 
a) Yes b) No 
48. Would Kashmir problem be resolved if Muslim majority areas of Kargil and 
Doda, Poonch and Rajouri are clubbed with Kashmir valley and allowed to 
become a sovereign country? 
a) Yes b) No 
49. Any other comments 
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